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PRACTICAL REASON: THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH PARADIGM
Edward J. Eberle*
First Amendment jurisprudence incorporates a continual struggle to
balance coflicting interests. Free speech values must be weighed
against communitarian interests in a rational manner. The article
examines the foundationalist approach to this task, and finds it
incapable of providing a unified First Amendment theory. Through
examination of the treatment of commercial speech, the article
arrives at a more coherent approach through the application of
practical reasoning. The proposed methodology allows for princi-
pled analysis and decisions which yield an internally consistent
body of law.
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O sages standing in God's holy fire
As in the gold mosaic of a wall,
Come from the holy fire, peme in a gyre,
And be the singing masters of my soul.
Consume my heart away; sick with desire
And fastened to a dying animal
It knows not what it is; and gather me
Into the artifice of eternity.
Once out of nature I shall never take
My bodily form from any natural thing,
But such a form as Grecian goldsmiths make
Of hammered gold and gold enamelling
To keep a drowsy emperor awake;
Or set upon a gold bough to sing
To lords and ladies of Byzantium
Of what is past, or passing, or to come.'
INTRODUCTION
A debate rages in current First Amendment theory2 between
those who view the Amendment as containing one or a selective
core of foundational values ("Grand Theory") 3 and those who es-
pouse legal pragmatism.4 In the realm of Grand Theory, a remark-
able outpouring of scholarship has attempted to explain the central
meaning of the First Amendment in terms of fundamental values.5
1. WLLAM B. YEATS, Sailing To Byzantium (1927), in THE TOWER 1, 2-3 (1928).
2. My concern in this article is with the speech clause, rather than the press or re-
ligion clauses of the First Amendment.
3. "Foundationalism [is] the effort to discover a unified principle that would provide
the basis for judicial decisions." Daniel A. Farber, Legal Pragmatism and the Constitution,
72 MINN. L. REV. 1331, 1334 (1988). Foundationalism is thus the doctrine based upon
the theoretical system described in this article as "Grand Theory."
4. "Legal pragmatism . . . essentially means solving legal problems using every tool
that comes to hand, including precedent, tradition, legal text, and social policy . . . ." Id.
at 1332. For a further description of legal pragmatism, see infra notes 40-59 and accom-
panying text.
5. Since the seminal case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80,
283 (1964), the search for the central meaning of the First Amendment has been nothing
short of epic. Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Practical Reason and the First
Amendment, 34 UCLA L. REV. 1615, 1632 n.81 (1987). See, e.g., Harry Kalven, Jr., The
New York Times Case: A Note on the 'Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964
SUP. CT. REV. 191, 194-200 (analyzing the initial impact of New York Times on First
Amendment theory).
[Vol. 42:411
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Among the scholars examining this topic are Professor Redish, who
sees the Amendment in terms of the core value of self-realization,6
Professor Baker, who believes the main value of the Amendment
lies in encouraging individual liberty,7 and Professor Meiklejohn,
Judge Bork, and others who view the Amendment as a bulwark of
self-government. 8
Pragmatism, by contrast, asserts that attempts to explain the
Amendment solely in terms of fundamental values have failed to
explain all dimensions of reality that reflect through the First
Amendment prism. Instead, modem pragmatism views the Amend-
ment in terms of a web of interlocking values that serve to support
one another. Pragmatism further advocates solutions to First
Amendment problems through careful, contextual, pragmatic reason-
ing. Pragmatism is thus a search for a Middle Ground in First
Amendment theory between the grandeur of Grand Theory and
reliance on ad hoc balancing.
This article continues the search for the Middle Ground in
First Amendment theory.9 Grand Theory is stimulating and useful
in illuminating the First Amendment and its core values. Yet while
heuristic, Grand Theory appears to have been thwarted in its efforts
to explain free speech only in terms of foundational values by the
complexity of social reality. Grand Theory, therefore, fails to
achieve its goal of a unified First Amendment theory. Accordingly,
there is a need to move beyond Grand Theory toward a vision of
the First Amendment that is more encompassing and more satisfy-
ing, referred to here as the Middle Ground. To this end, this article
provides further content to this more comprehensive theory.
The argument in favor of the Middle Ground proceeds as
follows. Part I outlines the ongoing debate in First Amendment ju-
risprudence, describing the context in which the Middle Ground
6. See generally MARTIN REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS 9-
40 (1984); infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
7. See generally C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN LBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH
(1989); infra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
8. Meiklejohn and other advocates of a political speech model of the First Amend-
ment are discussed infra text accompanying notes 16-17, 20-22. See generally ALEXANDER
MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (2d ed. 1965) (original title: FREE SPEECH AND ITS
RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT (1948)); Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 47 IND. LJ. 1, 20-35 (1971) (arguing that the fundanen-
tel aspect of First Amendment protection addresses political discourse).
9. The search for the Middle Ground is by no means novel, as the text accompany-
ing infra notes 60-78 discusses with respect to the work of Professors Farber, Frickey,
Schauer and Shiffrin, among others.
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vision has evolved. Here, the article describes the contributions and
shortcomings of Grand Theory in understanding the Amendment.
For example, the reality of our world is so complex that descrip-
tions of the Amendment only in terms of foundational values have
proved limiting. Furthermore, traditional First Amendment analysis
eschews foundationalism in favor of pragmatism. To this extent,
Grand Theory is at odds with judicial reasoning and runs the risk
of creating a deeper rift between theory and practice. Therefore, the
focus of First Amendment work should shift toward the Middle
Ground, combining the insights of Grand Theory with the flexibil-
ity of practical reasoning.
Part II describes the Middle Ground, -which captures the deci-
sional process of the courts and, yet, offers a measure of grandeur
too. It also brings a certain structure, coherence and dynamism to
the First Amendment. The Middle Ground views the Amendment
as embodying many diverse but interrelated values. These values
support one another, but also pose their own inner tensions. Conse-
quently, the types of speech supported by these values may differ
in importance. For example, political speech is more important than
commercial speech in the hierarchy of values plainly embodied
within the Amendment and increasingly recognized by the Supreme
Court." Nevertheless, First Amendment values can come into con-
flict with other communal interests. Accordingly, one key question
in First Amendment theory is how to accommodate free speech
and communitarian values. This has been a main preoccupation of
the Supreme Court, whose efforts bespeak the difficulty of the
task. Traditional legal reasoning may not, in fact, be fully up to
this task, as Part IV indicates. This article argues that such ac-
commodation can best be reached through practical reasoning; that
is, by identifying and comparing the values at issue and the con-
texts in which they arise, and then determining which value or
values should prevail. Drawing upon moral philosophy, the article
describes how practical reason may better achieve reasonably reli-
able results.
In addition, Part HI provides further content to the Middle
Ground vision by focusing on one difficult area of First Amend-
10. The Supreme Court first recognized a hierarchy of values within the First Amend-
ment in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (commercial speech
afforded a limited measure of protection "commensurate with its subordinate position in
the scale of First Amendment values'). Since Ohralik, the Court has acknowledged that
hierarchy explicitly. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 477 (1989).
416 [V/ol. 42:411
PRACTICAL REASON
ment law - commercial speech. Initially, Part III provides
grounding in the relationship of commercial speech to First
Amendment theory. This analysis illuminates some of the inner
dynamics in First Amendment theory that the Middle Ground vi-
sion captures, and it lays the foundation for the practical reasoning
model to be applied to speech questions. The fit of commercial
speech within free speech theory is examined in subsection A,
through analysis of Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia
Citizens Consumer Council, Inc." Drawing upon the Virginia
Pharmacy paradigm, this section first evaluates the free speech
values implicated by commercial speech. The Court's reasoning in
that case illustrates that it relied upon a web of interlocking values
to fashion broad support for commercial speech. Next, in assessing
the asserted state interests in relation to the free speech values, the
Court strikes an accommodation strongly favoring free speech. This
result is discussed in subsection B. Having determined through Vir-
ginia Pharmacy that commercial speech merits protection under the
First Amendment, the question of where commercial speech fits
within free speech theory is examined next.
In subsection C, this article concludes that the principle hold-
ing all speech of equal value should prevail in most cases, but that
an expansive view of the First Amendment necessitates selective
exceptions for lesser status speech, as in the case of commercial
speech. Still, any breach of the equal value principle is justifiable
only for a compelling rationale. Subsection D argues that this
criterion is satisfied in the case of commercial speech because of
its lower intrinsic value, its speech plus conduct character, and its
dissemination in a manner that is not value free. Accounting for
the tension between the value of free speech generally, and its
lesser worth when proposing a commercial transaction, 2 the sec-
tion concludes that commercial speech merits an intermediate level
of protection.
Part IV focuses on the accommodation of free speech values
made in the commercial context. This section sets forth the prac-
tical reasoning model to be applied to commercial speech. The
model consists of three general rules designed to sort out the in-
11. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976).
12., The prevailing definition of commercial speech is speech that "proposes a com-
mercial transaction.- Fox, 492 U.S. at 473. See also infra notes 131-42 and accompanying
text.
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nate tensions in commercial speech, thereby guiding analysis in this
area. The three rules are: (1) truthful, nondeceptive, noncoercive
speech may not be regulated except in the face of truly compelling
governmental interests; (2) truthful speech that carries elements of
deception, coercion, duress, harassment or similarly substantial
interests may be regulated when government proves (a) the pres-
ence of a substantial interest, (b) the regulation directly advances
the asserted interest, and (c) the restriction on speech is no greater
than necessary to serve the interest; and (3) false information may
be regulated.
Finally, in Part V, the article applies the practical reasoning
methodology to several problems in commercial speech including
advertisement in the professions, corporate speech, targeted adver-
tising and mailings, in-person solicitation and persuasive advertising
in the electronic media. The goal here is to demonstrate the
pragmatic approach in one area of free speech, thereby providing
further content to the Middle Ground vision. In applying practical
reasoning to resolution of commercial speech issues, this section
illustrates how the balance should be struck between free speech
values and substantial governmental interests in the commercial
context. The section provides both an approach to guide principled
analysis in commercial speech that can be useful to judges and
other decisionmakers who must actually resolve these cases and a
methodology useful to general First Amendment issues.
I. THE LIMITs OF GRAND THEORY
The arguments for and against Grand Theory have been so
well developed that there is little need to recapitulate them here. 3
Instead, this section will summarize these arguments in order to
portray the context in which the Middle Ground vision has
evolved.
The search for the Grand Theory has generated a remarkable
13. A sampling of the voluminous commentary on Grand Theory includes MELVEILE
B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH, ch. 1 (1984); JOHN E. NOWjK ET" AL,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 16.6-16.7 (3d ed. 1986); FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A
PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 6 (1982); STEVEN H. SHIFRIN, THE FIRST AMENDMENT, DE-
MOCRACY AND ROMANCE 141-42 (1990); LAWRENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTION-
AL LAW §§ 12-1 to 12-2 (2d ed. 1988); Ronald A. Cass, Commercial Speech,
Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1317 (1988); Farber & Frickey,
supra note 5; Pierre J. Schlag, An Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of
Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1982).
[V/ol. 42:411
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outpouring of scholarship over the last 20 years.14 All of these
scholars have been seeking the same elusive goal - describing the
central meaning of the First Amendment in terms of foundational
values in attempts to build a unified theory of the Amendment.
These efforts have been impressive, and they have much to teach
us.
15
Professors Meiklejohn and Emerson precipitated this ongoing
debate in their classic theories of the First Amendment. Professor
Meiklejohn viewed the First Amendment in terms of only one
main value, self-government. Meiklejohn perceived self-government
as the process by which expression can form, inform and express
the public will so that citizens will actively be able to "self-gov-
em."16 Meiklejohn later accepted a more elaborate definition of
speech that encompassed arts, literature and academic work, though
he still considered these forms of speech "political" in that they
helped form the public will necessary for effective political expres-
sion and self-government.17
Professor Emerson outlined four broad categories of values
that a system of free speech encourages: "(1) assuring individual
self-fulfillment, (2) advancing knowledge and discovering truth, (3)
provid[ing] for participation in decisionmaking by all members of
society, and (4) achieving a more adaptable and hence a more
stable community ... maintaining the precarious balance between
healthy cleavage and necessary consensus.""8 Although distinct,
"[ejach is necessary, but not in itself sufficient, for the four of
them are interdependent."19 In recognizing the multi-valued, inter-
dependent content of the First Amendment, Emerson presaged the
Middle Ground vision as, indeed, he did much of modem free
speech theory.
14. This work includes BAKER, supra note 7, THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970), and REDISH, supra note 6, and is discussed infra text
accompanying notes 18-39.
15. Indeed, Professor Kalven noted that the "quest for coherent general (first
amendment) theory . . . needs no apology and no defense.- HARRY KALVEN, JR., TiE
NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 4 (1965) (cited in Farber & Frickey, supra note 5,
at 1615 n.1).
16. M OHN, supra note 8, generally and especially at 9, 27, 55, 255.
17. Id. at 263; Alexander Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 Sup.
Cr. REV. 245, 263.
18. EMERSON, supra note 14, at 7; see also THOMAS EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL
THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1963).
19. Thomas Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68 CAL. L
REV. 422, 423 (1980).
419IM]
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The classic Meiklejohn and Emerson theories have been
worked and reworked by modem scholars. Many still see the pre-
eminent value of free speech in terms of Meiklejohn's political
speech model. Chief among these adherents are Professors
BeVier,20 Bicke12t and Bork.22 Others seem to have built main-
ly on Emerson's multi-valued framework, but moved beyond it in
very original ways. Among the most original and convincing of
recent theories are those of Professors Redish and Baker.'
Professor Redish defines the First Amendment in terms of
only one true value, self-realization. Self-realization includes both
"the inherent value in allowing individuals to control their own
destiny, and the instrumental value in developing individuals' men-
tal faculties so that they may reach their full intellectual poten-
tial."24 All expression is therefore ultimately a form of self-real-
ization; all expression enhances self-realization either by facilitating
speaker self-expression or by providing listeners with information
they need to enhance their own self-realization. Self-realization is
thus both intrinsically valuable as the means by which one
achieves control over life and "life-affecting decisions," instrumen-
tally valuable in encouraging the development of other important
values, like rationality and autonomy.' With self-realization as the
20. Lillian R. BeVier, The First Amendment and Political Speech: An Inquiry into the
Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REV. 299, 308-09 (1978) (acknowledging,
however, the Court may be justified in extending First Amendment protection to catego-
ries of speech other than strictly political in order to protect political speech).
21. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CONSENT 62-63 (1975).
22. Former Professor and Judge Bork first argued that the First Amendment protects
only explicitly political speech, excluding from its protection art, literature, science and
academic work. Bork, supra note 8, at 22. Later, as Judge, Bork seemed to move beyond
this confined view of the Amendment. See, e.g., Ollman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 993-
1010 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Bork J., concurring) (defending broadly the Supreme Court's con-
stitutional protection of libelous speech), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1127 (1985).
23. Other important theories not discussed here include Dean Bollinger's tolerance the-
ory, LEE C. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXTREMIST
SPEECH IN AMERICA 9-10 (1986) (extrapolating the 'social value in tolerance of extremist
speech to other types of social encounters), and Professor Blasi's pathological perspective,
Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L.
REV. 449, 449-50 (1985) (arguing that the First Amendment should "do maximum service
. ..when intolerance of unorthodox ideas is most prevalent and when governments are
most able and most likely to stifle dissent systematically").
24. Martin H. Redish, Self-Realization, Democracy, and Freedom of Expression: A
Reply to Professor Baker, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 678, 679-80 (1982); see also REDISH,
supra note 6, at 30.
25. REDISH, supra note 6, at 11-13. Other relevant work of Professor Redish includes,
Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense
[Vol. 42:411
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core value, the First Amendment can be seen as supporting a host
of other values such as dignity, liberty, democracy, arts, literature
and truth.
Linked inextricably in many ways to Professor Redish's theory
is Professor Baker's "liberty model" of free speech. Professor
Baker's model "delineates a realm of individual liberty, freedom
and choice roughly corresponding to noncoercive, nonviolent ac-
tion."26 He sees the central meaning of the First Amendment, ac-
cordingly, in terms of "protected liberties [which] promote self-
realization... and self-determination... and which... empha-
sizef people's self-fulfillment and participation in societal change"
free from inhibiting social and cultural influences.27 Professor
Baker asserts that "the values supported or functions performed by
protected speech result from that speech being a manifestation of
individual freedom and choice."28
There is certainly much to admire in the work of Professors
Redish and Baker. Yet all of these modern First Amendment theo-
ries, however grand, seem to have run up against certain hard, irre-
ducible facts that in some way make the fit of facts to theory
incompatible. With the exception of Professor Redish, none of the
theories account for the totality of free speech.29 Each poses com-
of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REV. 1159 (1982); Martin H. Redish, The
Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REv.
53 (1984) (examining the theory, ambiguities and inconsistencies of the prior restraint doc-
trine and its effect on First Amendment rights); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free
Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982) (concluding that the ultimate value of free speech
is self realization) [hereinafter Redish, Free Speech]; Martin H. Redish, The Warren
Court, the Burger Court, and the First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 78 Nw. U. L.
REV. 1031 (1983).
26. BAKER, supra note 7, at 47; see also C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First Amend-
ment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964 (1978) (developing a liberty theory of
speech due to the inadequacies of the classic and market theories).
27. C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and
Redish's The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 646, 658 (1982); see also BAK-
ER, supra note 7, at 48.
28. C. Edwin Baker, Commercial Speech: A Problem in the Theory of Freedom, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) [hereinafter Baker, Commercial Speech]. See also C. Edwin
Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the First Amendment, 55 S.
CAL L. REV. 293 (1981) (contrasting his theory to market-based theories and concluding
that his theory promotes First Amendment protection of individual liberties that must be
protected by a government in order to claim legitimacy).
29. For example, the theories of Professors Baker, Meiklejohn and Emerson exclude
commercial speech from the First Amendment. See, e.g., BAKER, supra note 7, at 194-
229; ME]K.EIOHN, supra note 8, at 87; EMERSON, supra note 14, at 311 &,948 n.93.
Indeed, Meildejohn's original theory categorically excluded all speech other than that relat-
1992]
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plex theoretical difficultiesso and each contains practical difficulties."1
ed directly to self-government. See infra note 30. This view attracted a wide following.
See, e.g., BeVier, supra note 20; Bork, supra note 8.
30. Taking these in the order presented, the most obvious theoretical difficulty posed
by Professor Meiklejohn's theory was his radically reductionist view of speech in terms
only of political speech, and the resulting exclusion of art, literature, science and academic
work. See supra note 16 and accompanying text. Later, of course, he attempted to fix this
defect by including such speech within his theory. See supra notes 16-17 and accompany-
ing text. However, this altered view of speech highlights another defect in his theory, the
absence of any principled definition delimiting the concept of political speech. BAKMR,
supra note 7, at 26, 33. Detailed critiques of Meiklejohn's theory include REDIsH, /supra
note 6, at 14-29; Zechariah Chafee Jr., Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REV. 891 (1949);
Schag, supra note 13, at 675 n. 13, 707-11; Steven H. Shiffrin, The First Amendment
and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amendment, 78 Nw.
U. L. REV. 1212, 1225-39 (1983) (critiquing Meiklejohnian political-based approaches,
including those of modem adherents like Professors Jackson, Jeffries, Bork and BeVier).
One theoretical difficulty posed by Professor Emerson's theory is his dichotomy
between action and expression. This dichotomy has been a source of confusion for readers
and has posed serious difficulties in application, resulting in "Emerson's denial of first
amendment protection in some concrete situations ... ." Schlag, supra note 13, at 722,
724. An extensive critique of Emerson's theory may be found at id. at 721-26. See also
BAKER, supra note 7, at 70-71; TRIBE, supra note 13, at 788-89; Shiffrin, supra, at 1283.
Professor Redish's theory is the most comprehensive and attentive to the needs of
society. Nevertheless, one theoretical difficulty posed by his approach is his desire to de-
scribe all of First Amendment reality in terms of his ultimate value, self-realization. This
leads him to assert confidently that he
rejects those authorities (1) who believe that the First Amendment is
multivalued, whether they superimpose a hierarchy upon those values or rec-
ognize them as interdependent coequals; (2) who argue that the First Amend-
ment is single-valued with that value being something other than individual
self-realization; (3) who, although accepting the self-realization value or its
rough equivalent as the sole determinant of free speech, refuse to acknowledge
one or more of the various subvalues that derive from it; and (4) who believe
that total reliance on something akin to the self-realization value is inconsistent
with any form of constitutional balancing process with regard to free speech.
REDISH supra note 6, at 13. In addition, Professor Redish argues that "although recogni-
tion of the self-realization value leads to the view that all forms of expression are equally
valuable for constitutional purposes, this does not necessarily imply that all forms of
expression must receive absolute, or even equal, protection in all cases." Id. For extended
critiques of Redish's theory, see Baker, supra note 27; Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at
1621-24; Schiag, supra note 13, at 726-30 (discussing Redish among other marketplace
theorists). I
Baker's innovative liberty theory focuses exclusively on the source of speech as a
"charter of liberty for noncoercive liberty." Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28, at
7. This focus, however, is insufficiently attentive to social needs. Two glaring theoretical
difficulties are Baker's insufficient attention to traditional audience or listener rights and
his rejection of any marketplace theory. These insufficiencies are detailed in Redish, Free
Speech, supra note 25, 620-21. Another "problem with Baker's approach is that it rests
on a body of knowledge antithetical to liberal political philosophy . . . [and] rests on the
view that current forms of social organization severely restrict the arena where individuals
are free to pursue their own ends and values." Schiag, supra note 13, at 720-21. Detailed
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In addition, the approach of Grand Theory is at odds with
human reason and traditional judicial analysis of free speech ques-
tions.32 Grand Theory requires essential agreement over seminal
principles prior to discussion of specific problems. It requires "re-
placement of the practical question as to how to resolve" conflicts
of competing values "with the purely normative question" as to
"what is the right value from which to reason deductively toward
solution" of problems.33 However, there has been significant dis-
agreement as to what is the right value.
In contrast to Grand Theory, courts do not necessarily discern,
nor promote ultimate values. Rather, their function is to decide
critiques of Baker's theory include REDISH, supra note 6, at 49-52; Farber & Frickey,
supra note 5, at 1619-21 (Baker's theory both extends the First Amendment too far in
some instances and contracts protection too narrowly in other instances); Schiag, supra
note 13, at 711-21.
31. All of these Grand Theories suffer from "astigmatism," of striving to fit all of
reality into the theory and, accordingly, "twisting . . . phenomena to fit preordained cate-
gories." Schlag, supra note 13, at 737. This "distorts the relationship between values and
applications . . . lead[ing] to highly dubious applications. ... ." Farber & Frickey, supra
note 5, at 1641. Of course, this is not due to any lack of brilliance. Rather, the problem
is the seduction of Grand Theory and its "Procrustean Demahds." Id. at 1623. Neverthe-
less, the inability "to provide sensible answers to concrete problems . . . is an important
failing in . . . legal theory, since a major purpose of legal theories is to guide courts in
deciding individual cases." Id. at 1626.
Examples of such practical difficulties in each of these Grand Theories include Pro-
fessor Meiklejobn's initial exclusion and subsequent inclusion, through reformulation of his
theory, of such speech as art, literature and science. See supra notes 29-30 and accompa-
nying text.
An obvious pragmatic difficulty in Professor Emerson's theory is his "denial of first
amendment protection in some concrete situations (for instance, some solicitations to crim-
inal action and some invasions of privacy)." Schag, supra note 13, at 724.
Professor Redish generally avoids "any truly horrible results" through his general
balancing test. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1622-23. Nevertheless, "his ambition to
wrap up all of the first amendment in one tidy package distorts his thinking," at least at
times. Id. at 1623-24. One example is his extension of qualified constitutional protection
to certain murder proposals made in the service of an ideological cause. Id. at 1623.
The most glaring difficulty presented by Professor Baker's theory is its rejection of
much of social reality. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Specific concrete diffi-
culties include rights to use heroin and engage in espionage. See Farber & Frickey, supra
note 5, at 1620.
32. "[G]rand theory is based on a misapprehension of the nature of human rea-
son. ... By confining reason to logical deduction from set premises, [grand theo-
ry] ... curtails the use of our most powerful problem-solving abilities." Farber &
Frickey, supra note 5, at 1617. A growing body of philosophers and law professors be-
lieve foundationalism limits human reason. See id. at 1639-45. Indeed, "accepting ...
ontological predicates . . . requires us to reject the basic framework for First Amendment
decisionmaking used by courts." Cass, supra note 13, at 1328.
33. Cass, supra note 13, at 1327.
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cases in keeping with the constitutional prohibition against re-
straints on expression.' In performing this function, judges are
wisely informed as to the values at issue. Here Grand Theory has
made immeasurable contributions in illuminating these values.
Nevertheless, foundational values are only part of what comprises
the First Amendment. 3
5
The purpose here is not to demonstrate the failings of Grand
Theory; others have done that well.36 Rather, the intent is to fo-
cus attention on the limits of Grand Theory and the need to shift
direction in the focus of current work in free speech theory.
The grand but ultimately unsuccessful quest of Grand Theory
seems to suggest that the paradigm of foundational values is be-
yond our reach. The very magnitude of the task is daunting.37 We
might do better to focus our efforts on more practical and attain-
able solutions. Indeed, much can still be done "to sharpen, to clari-
fy, and to criticize our underlying intuitions."
38
Because we seem to have reached the limits of Grand Theory,
we should move toward a broader and more satisfying vision of
free speech. That direction is the Middle Ground, between the lofty
realm of Grand Theory and the unsatisfying alternative of ad hoc
34. Id. ("Courts generally have viewed their task not as promoting ultimate human val-
ues, but as implementing a constitutional prohibition that may be informed by concern for
such values.").
35. Indeed, "courts have not found any single value consistently compelling, adverting
instead to a group of values notwithstanding the tension inherent among values such as
self-development, truth, democracy, and social stability." Id. at 1328. Accord Shiffrin,
supra note 30, at 1252.
36. In particular, see Cass, supra note 13; Farber & Frickey, supra note 5; Schlag,
supra note 13; Shiffrin, supra note 30. Each new theory sets off another round of cri-
tique, reformation and ultimately retrenchment. Practical reason is offered here as one
"way out of this downward spiral," which otherwise could result in "absolute skepticism
about judicial outcomes" and legal theory. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1645.
37. Indeed, as Professors Farber & Frickey state:
Our discussion does not, of course, prove that a general theory is an impossi-
bility. Still, when Baker, Redish, and Bollinger - not to mention Emerson,
Meiklejohn, Ely, and Tribe - have all undertaken a task and failed, the prob-
lem is obviously not lack of intellectual ability. Perhaps the enterprise as a
whole needs to be rethought.
Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1626-27 (footnotes omitted).
Professors Farber & Frickey worry that "the failure of grand theory may simply collapse
legal scholarship into absolute skepticism about judicial outcomes, that judge-made law
consists merely of judicial personal preferences." Id. at 1645. Professor Shiffrin notes,
simply, that "system building aspires beyond the possibilities offered by the raw material."
Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1254.
38. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1254.
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balancing.39
II. THE MIDDLE GROUND
In place of foundationalism, the time now seems ripe to focus
attention on constructing a new, nonfoundational paradigm, referred
to here as the Middle Ground.
A. The Movement Toward The Middle Ground
The movement toward nonfoundationalist knowledge has much
in common with broader intellectual movements, particularly in
science and philosophy.' Lessons from moral philosophy are es-
pecially insightful. The premises of intuitionism closely match the
quest for the Middle Ground. According to John Rawls, "the
intuitionist believes... that the complexity of the moral facts
defies our efforts to give a full account of our judgments and
necessitates a plurality of competing principles."4' He contends
that attempts to go beyond these principles either reduce to triviali-
ty ... or else lead to falsehood and over-simplification."42 The
pragmatic approach to the First Amendment "is intuitionist because
it posits that there are limits to the level of generality we can
achieve in free speech theory without falling into triviality or false-
hood. 43
Much recent important legal commentary has also suggested a
movement away from Grand Theory toward something new, vari-
ously called "intuitionism,"" "prudence," "prudential reason-
It45 46.eoing, pragmatism46 and "practical reasoning." The range of
39. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1627 (There is such a thing as thinking
too small.).
40. Farber, supra note 3, at 1335-37. Note the work of the following in furthering this
movement away from Grand Theory: in science, THOMAS S. KUHN, TIE ESSENTIAL TEN-
SION: SELECTED STUDIES IN SCIENTIFIC TRADITION AND CHANGE (1977); THOMAS S.
KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962) (exploring the history of
science by examining developments against the scientific background of their time, rather
than against the accumulation of all scientific knowledge); in philosophy RICHARD J.
BERNSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL PROFILES (1985); ROBERT NOZiCK, PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANA-
TIONS (1981); RICHARD RORTY, PHILOSOPHY AND THE MIRROR OF NATURE (1979).
41. JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 39 (1971).
42. Id.
43. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1254.
44. Steven H. Shiffrin, Liberalism, Radicalism, and Legal Scholarship, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 1103, 1192-1215 (1983); see Farber, supra note 3, at 1334-37.
45. See, e.g., Anthony T. Kronman, Alexander Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94
YALE LJ. 1567, 1567-73 (1985).
46. Farber, supra note 3; Robin L. West, Liberalism Rediscovered: A Pragmatic Deft-
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scholarship in this area is impressive, covering republicanism," le-
gal history,49  general legal reasoning, statutory interpretaton,
moral philosophy,52 legal ethics53 and constitutional interpreta-
nition of the Liberal Vision, 46 U. PIT. L. REV. 673, 726-38 (1985) (arguing that a
liberal pragmatist stance toward constitutional issues is preferable to intuitionism because
of the former's optimism about humanity's potential for providing moral guidelines).
47. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1639-56; Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme
Court 1985 Term - Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARV. L. REV. 4, 17-36
(1986) (arguing that the republican premise of practical reason was rightly adopted by
Justice O'Connors's dissent in Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986)); Vincent A.
Weliman, Practical Reasoning and Judicial Justification: Toward an Adequate Theory, 57
U. COLO. L. REV. 45 (1985).
48. Michelman, supra note 47, at 17-55 (examining and evaluating various facets of
republicanism and its application to constitutional interpretation); Suzanna Sherry, Civic
Virtue and the Feminine Voice in Constitutional Adjudication, 72 VA. L. REV. 543, 543-
44 (1986) (arguing that values such as community and virtue are both inherent in Jeffer-
sonian republicanism and feminine jurisprudence and ought to supplant masculine liberal-
ism when interpreting the Constitution); Cass R. Sunstein, Interest Groups in American
Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29, 68-75 (1985) (arguing that Madisonian republicanism
should be used by the courts when they review legislative and administrative laws); Cass
R. Sunstein, Legal Interference With Private Preferences, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 1129, 1134-
35 (1986) (arguing that the political process should invoke Madisonian republicanism,
which advocates that government should select preferences through deliberation and debate
rather than from factional pressures).
49. See, e.g., Anthony D'Amato, Lon Fuller and Substantive Natural Law, 26 AM. J.
JuRIS. 202 (181) (criticizing Fuller's thesis equating natural law and morality); Kronman,
supra note 45 (analyzing the work of Alexander Bickel); Peter R. Teachout, The Soul of
the Fugue: An Essay on Reading Fuller, 70 MINN. L. REV. 1073 (1986) (defending the
work of Lon Fuller).
50. See, e.g., STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING
132-38, 170-71, 181-85 (1985) (arguing that the law, by necessity, is interpreted pragmati-
cally since any principle of law must find legitimacy with the people); James Gordley,
Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 CAL. L. REV. 138, 160-62 (1984) (exploring situa-
tions in which a legal authority would apply a pragmatic approach in interpreting the
law); Shiffrin, supra note 44, at 1215 (advocating "adjust[ment of] theory to practice and
practice to theory"); Wellman, supra note 47 (asserting that practical reasoning is prefera-
ble to deductionism and analogizing, which are too limiting for legal reasoning).
51. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, CASES AND MATRIALS ON
LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 613-35 (1988) (explaining
the dynamic model of statutory interpretation and contrasting it with textualist and
intentionalist models); William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479, 1497-1538 (1987) (responding to arguments supporting static statutory inter-
pretation by advocating a dynamic model which would not necessarily defer to legislative
expectations in every case); William N. Eskridge & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation
as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 321-22 (1990); Philip Frickey, Congressio-
nal Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of Federal Indian Law, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 1137 (1990).
52. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 41; David A. J. Richards, Moral Theory, The Devel-
opmental Psychology of Ethical Autonomy and Professionalism, 31 J. LEGAL EDUc. 359,
359 (1981) (examining the interdisciplinary relevance of developmental psychology and
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tion, in addition to First Amendment scholarship." There are
many familiar strains among this diverse outpouring. These include
a concern for history [society, community] and context; a
desire to avoid abstracting away the human component in
judicial, [ethical and individual] decisionmaking [and judg-
ment generally]; an appreciation of the complexity of life
[and human nature]; some faith in dialogue and delibera-
tion; a tolerance for ambiguity, accommodation and tenta-
tiveness, but a skepticism of rigid dichotomies; and an
overall humility.m
All are linked to the American tradition of pragmatic reasoning
and common law methodology, of building from the ground up. 7
This approach favors "situat[ional] practical judgment," mediating
"between the general standard and the specific case" so that rules
will emerge over time with a concrete meaning."s The approach
moral philosophy to legal education, especially to ethical reasoning).
53. Edward J. Eberle, Toward Moral Responsibility in Lawyering: Further Thoughts on
the Deontological Model of Legal Ethics, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 1 (1989) (explaining the
deontological model of legal ethics and its application as a means of improving congruity
between ethical rules and moral norms).
54. Farber, supra note 3. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text. See also Mi-
chael J. Perry, Freedom of Expression: An Essay on Theory and Doctrine, 78 NW. U. L.
REV. 1137, 1138 n.3 (1983) ("A theory of freedom of expression is, in part, an aspect of
a theory of practical reason.").
55. See infra notes 60-63 and accompanying text.
56. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1646 (footnote omitted).
57. Like Professor Farber, "I use the term legal pragmatism for the nonfoundational
approach to law. This term highlights the connection between the new turn in legal
thought and the American pragmatist philosophers.- Farber, supra note 3, at 1337. Rele-
vant work in the American tradition of pragmatic reasoning, noted by Professor Farber, id.
at 1341-42 & nm 52, 53, includes JOHN DEwEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE, 85, 117, 344-46
(1934) ("the value of art rests in its ability to enrich the human experience"); WILIAM
JAMES, PRAGMATISM 31 (1975) ("A pragmatist... turns away from abstraction and
insufficiency, from verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles,
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns towards concreteness and
adequacy, towards facts, towards action, and towards power ... ."); and OLIVER W.
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 213 (1881) ("Law, being a practical thing, must found itself
on actual forces.").
58. Mihelman, supra note 47, at 28-29; see also THOMAS NAGEL, MORTAL QtiES-
TIONS 135 (1979):
[J]udgment - essentially the faculty Aristotle described as practical wis-
dom, . . . reveals itself over time in individual decisions rather than in the
enunciation of general principles ....
[W]e should [not] abandon the search for more and better reasons and
more critical insight in the domain of practical decisions. It is just that
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also favors "'situation sense': the ability to take a complex set of
facts, identify the key relevant attributes, and understand their
societal significance." '59
B. The Middle Ground
The groundwork for the Middle Ground has been laid by Pro-
fessors Farber, Frickey, ° Schauer," and Shiffdin,62 among oth-
our capacity to resolve conflicts in particular cases may extend beyond
our capacity to enunciate general principles that explain those resolutions.
Perhaps we are working with general principles unconsciously, and can
discover them by codifying our decisions and particular intuitions.
Indeed, "if total objectivity is not humanly attainable, something less may still
suffice."
Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1652 (footnote omitted).
Justice Brennan seems to capture the human dilemma well:
The struggle for certainty, for confidence in one's interpretative efforts, is real
and persistent. Although we may never achieve certainty, we must continue in
the struggle, for it is only as each generation brings to bear its experience and
understanding, its passion and reason, that there is hope for progress in the
law.
William J. Brennan Jr., Reason, Passion, and "The Progress of the Law, " 10 CARDOZO
L. REV. 3, 12 (1988).
59. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1635 (citing KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE COM-
MON LAW TRADmoN: DECIDING APPEALS 268-85 (1960)). Professors Farber & Frickey
continue:
Having done so, the judge could approach the case as an example of a broader
situation, giving the peculiar facts of the case some weight but assessing them
in regard to the broader implications of the case. The judge could then decide
the case, not by deductive logic, but by a less-structured, problem-solving pro-
cess involving common sense, respect for precedent, and a sense for society's
needs. Such a decision would not be limited to the peculiar facts of a given
case, but would necessarily give guidance to future cases involving the same
life-reason. For some, this might seem an invitation to pure judicial
policymaking, but Llewellyn had confidence in the power of craft and tradition
to guide the judge's decision.
Id. at 1635-36 (footnotes omitted). Besides, as Professor Redish notes:
To be sure, such an analysis places a good deal of faith in the ability of judg-
es to exercise their authority with wisdom and discretion, both in establishing
and applying general rules of First Amendment construction, and where neces-
sary, in- engaging in ad hoc balancing. But, after all, that is what they are
there for, and in any event we appear to have little choice.
REDISH, supra note 6, at 55.
60. See Farber, supra note 3, at 1377 (criticizing the Grand Theory and the founda-
tional approach and advocating the theory of "legal pragmatism" as an approach to consti-
tutional law based on a "satisfactory adjustment of... both social policy and traditional
legal doctrines"); Farber & Frickey, supra note 5 at 1628 (asking "Is there any middle
ground between unified theories and complete eclecticism?").
61. See SCHAUER, supra note 13; Frederick Schauer, Commercial Speech and the Ar-
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ers.' The Middle Ground is an alternative view of the Amend-
ment that assumes social reality is too complex to be reflected
through any single value. To meet the needs of society, therefore,
the Middle Ground considers many values and relies upon diver-
gent tools and techniques to interpret the Amendment. The goal of
the Middle Ground, in short, is to construct a more complete and
satisfying vision of the First Amendment.
The Middle Ground builds on Grand Theory. It recognizes
Grand Theory's important contributions to free speech theory, par-
ticularly in elucidating fundamental values and protecting the core
speech supported by those values. But the Middle Ground goes
beyond Grand Theory.
First, it is a broader approach to reality and endeavors to re-
main open to the diversity, dynamics, and fluidity of social reali-
ty.64 Second, the Middle Ground does not recognize that any one
value may be the only true value underlying the First Amendment.
Instead, a better way of viewing a value like self-realization is
chitecture of the First Amendment, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1181, 1203 (1988) (discussing the
First Amendment in the context of commercial speech and suggesting that the danger of
dealing with the First Amendment by incremental decisions is the potential loss of the
"core" of the First Amendment) [hereinafter Schauer, Architecture]; Frederick Schauer,
Categories and the First Amendment. A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. U. L. REV. 265,
307 (1981) (concluding that for the time being, general categories are the most important
way we have of incorporating the constitutionally mandated preference for free speech
values into a "legal system populated by human beings of less than perfect ability and
less than perfect insight") [hereinafter Schauer, Categories]; Frederick Schauer, Must
Speech Be Special?, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284 (1984).
62. See SHIFFRIN, supra note 13, at 655 (discussing various traditional approaches to
restraints on government speech and concluding that "there are too many rights and inter-
ests worth 'taking seriously' to make the government speech problem an easy one to re-
solve"); Shiffrin, supra note 30; Steven H. Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L.
REV. 565, 609-10 (1988) (advocating an eclectic approach to analyze government speech
because "the search for single principles or all encompassing models yielding easy solu-
tions is too often misdirected" due to the variety and complexity of government speech).
"Yet for all its difficulties, the middle ground seems superior to the alternatives." Shiffrin,
supra note 30, at 1253.
63. Other commentators arguing for nonfoundationalist approaches to the First Amend-
ment include NIMSM, supra note 13 (discussing the history and theories of First Amend-
ment free speech); Cass, supra note 13 (discussing various approaches to commercial
speech and the First Amendment); Schlag, supra note 13 at 733 (criticizing categorical
approaches to the First Amendment and discussing the possibility of a "four parameters"
approach based on "content, source, manner and effect").
64. See REDISH, supra note 6, at 86 ("Although each of the existing theories (those of
Meiklejohn, Emerson, Bork, Baker, Schauer, Blasi, traditional marketplace, Jackson and
Jeffries) is correct as far as it goes, none sufficiently extends the scope of the constitu-
tional protection.").
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as one of "a web of mutually reinforcing values." 65 In other
words, self-realization supports other important values, like democ-
racy and free speech; but the converse is also true, democracy
supports free speech and self-realization, and free speech supports
self-realization and democracy, and so on.' These values are
foundational in nature; they support themselves and a host of other
values. But these values are supported by other values too in an
interwoven web of values. This web of values better reflects the
diversity, if not contrariness, of life that flows through the First
Amendment prism and, yet, gives life meaning.67
A web of values also better reflects the Supreme Court's ap-
proach to speech. The Court has consistently eschewed
"foundationalism in favor of a broad, multi-valued approach to the
First Amendment.s After all, free speech urges many ideas in
varied ways, supports and encourages innumerable other values and
"performs a multitude of functions." 69 The web metaphor helps
conceptualize this more encompassing view of expression.
A web of values, in turn, provides a means of transcending a
purely ad hoc approach to speech questions. A web of values
imbues the Amendment with a certain structure, coherence and
consistency. It also establishes a measure of strength and dyna-
mism."° To confront the complexity of life, the Middle Ground
advocates use of all tools helpful to reaching satisfactory solutions
of speech questions. Indeed, although preferring rules where possi-
ble, the Middle Ground proposes a distinctly eclectic approach to
65. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1640.
66. Id.
67. "[A] web of values . . . collectively compris[es] our understanding of how people
should live." Id. at 1641.
68. See Cass, supra note 13, at 1327-28 ([C]ourts have not found any single value
consistently compelling, adverting instead to a group of values notwithstanding the ten-
sions inherent among values such as self-development, truth, democracy and social sta-
bility.").
69. Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28, at 6.
70. The difference between the Middle Ground and Grand Theory can also be
analogized to a skyscraper supported by many piles of steel and reinforced concrete as
compared to the foundationalist tower representing one majestic value reaching toward the
heavens. In the winds of changing social and empirical reality, the skyscraper has a better
chance of remaining upright than the tower. Importantly, the configuation of First Amend-
ment values, like the configuration of building supports, provides "a basis for broader
social consensus." See Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1642-43. To the extent the
Amendment is defined in terms only of selective values, support for the Amendment will
falter if those values are rejected.
[Vol. 42:411
PRAC77CAL REASON
the First Amendment.71
The Middle Ground does not, therefore, reject deductive rea-
soning from foundational principles. Rather, it incorporates
deductionism as one of several approaches to the Amendment.
Deductionism from foundational principles may provide the right
answer in many cases. Indeed, deductionism from the foundational
principles of free speech categorically yields the right answers to
most questions concerning core speech areas. 2
On the other hand, strict reliance on deductionism presents
dangers, including that of "abstracting away the [vital] human
component."73 Definitional balancing may better accommodate
some human interests, like certain rights of privacy.74 For exam-
ple, definitional balancing can better mediate between true speech
and freedom from invasive commercial advertising techniques. 7
5
Reasoning by analogy may also often provide insight, as this
71. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1252-53. Professor Shiffrin has generally argued for an
eclectic approach to the First Amendment. Id.; SHIFRIN, supra note 13. The Supreme
Court might also be characterized as employing this approach. Note, for example, the
philosophy of Justice Brennan:
The framers bequeathed to us a vision of rulers and the ruled united by a
sense of their common humanity .... [W]e cannot console ourselves with the
belief that reliance on formal rules alone is ever sufficient to be faithful to the
vision of the framers. The Constitution demands the full measure of all our hu-
man capacities, not merely from judges, nor from rulers, but from our ultimate
sovereign - the people.
Brennan, supra note 58, at 22-23; cf. authorities cited supra note 32.
72. See infra notes 282-84, 330-47 and accompanying text.
73. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1646.
74. For example, the right to be free from defamation and libel as mediated by New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), was thought by Professor Nimmer to
be a classic case of definitional balancing. NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.03 at 2-15 to 2-
16. As Professor Nimmer explains elsewhere:
Tmes points the way to the employment of the balancing process on the
definitional .. . level. That is, the Court employs balancing not for the purpose
of determining which litigant deserves to prevail in the particular case, but only
for the purpose of defining which forms of speech are to be regarded as
"speech" within the meaning of the rust amendment.
...By in effect holding that knowingly and recklessly false speech
was not "speech" within the meaning of the fiust amendment, the Court must
have implicitly (since no explicit explanation was offered) referred to certain
competing policy considerations.
Melville B. Nimmer, The Right to Speak from imes to Time: First Amendment Theory
Applied to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 942-943 (1968)
(footnotes omitted).
75. See infra notes 269-84, 330-408 and accompanying text.
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article generally demonstrates through Virginia Pharmacy.76 The
right answer may even arise on rare occasion from ad hoe balanc-
ing, as it does with respect to some false commercial speech.77
Often the answer arises from a combination of methodologies or
arguments. Values interact with social reality in complicated ways,
and the search, therefore, must be for the best answer to the prob-
lem at hand.8
C. Practical Reason
Applying practical reason is a main task of the Middle Ground
because practical reason appears to offer the best means for achiev-
ing sound and reliable answers to First Amendment questions.
Practical reasoning is principled yet flexible. It is principled be-
cause it can found general rules on reasonably reliable objectives
grounded in our tradition of free speech and, thereby, guide analy-
sis and cabin discretion within these objectives.7" It also offers
consistency in application in deference to those objectives."0 It is
flexible because it can adjust to mediate the particular case in
relation to the general standard.81 Practical reasoning is especially
good at harmonizing competing values. 2 Given the disappointing
results of much judicial reasoning, especially its discretionary tone
and general inability to harmonize values," practical reasoning
76. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748 (1976). As Professors Farber & Frickey similarly demonstrate, New York 77rmes
"illustrates the existence of a middle ground between general theory and ad hoc
eclecticism." Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1637.
77. See infra notes 303-06, 441-42 and accompanying text.
78. "The search, then, is for contextual justification for the best legal answer among
the potential alternatives." Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1647. This "problem of the
relation of law and society is not the sort of issue which can be *solved' by some
'theory' and then passed over. It is ...one of the 'permanent problems of the law.'"
Lon L. Puller, American Legal Realism, 82 U. PA. L. REv. 429, 453 (1934), quoted in
Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1647 n.138.
79. See infra notes 281-306 and accompanying text (Part IV).
80. See infra notes 307-442 and accompanying text (Part V).
81. "[P]ractical reason can accommodate shifting understandings of empirical reality;
foundational theories premised on certain empirical assumptions cannot." Farber & Frickey,
supra note 5, at 1647.
82. See infra notes 307-442 and accompanying text (Part V).
83. See infra text accompanying notes 330-64 (discussing Posadas de Puerto Rico
Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986), and Board of Trustees v.
Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989)). For evaluation of modes of legal analysis, see Wellman, su-
pra note 47, passim ('[A] theory of judicial justification in terms of practical reasoning is
preferable ... to a theory in terms of deduction or analogy." Id. at 63.).
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may be our best hope at present for reaching a broad range of reli-
able First Amendment outcomes.
Some lessons of moral philosophy are again illuminating, here
in providing additional content and coherence to practical reason-
ing? 4 W.D. Ross argued that moral conflicts can arise in
deontological theory, a theory of ethics that recognizes that "some
acts are morally obligatory regardless of their consequences for
human happiness.""5 According to Ross, "it is incoherent to insist
upon universal validity of any one moral rule to the exclusion of
all others."86 For example, the moral obligation to maintain a con-
fidence cannot always displace other competing moral values, such
as the duty to warn innocent third parties of imminent and serious
harm.87 Instead, Ross' approach was to recognize moral conflicts
and then seek to resolve them. When a conflict between competing
moral values arises, it is necessary to analyze the situation critical-
ly so that it may be resolved in an ethically satisfying manner.8"
Rawls characterized this approach as "intuitionism."8 9  By
intuitionism, Rawls meant a doctrine containing "an irreducible
family of first principles- which have to be weighed against one
another by asking ourselves which balance, in our considered judg-
ment, is the most just."' Ross viewed this problem as one of dis-
tributive justice calling for the distribution of goods according to
moral worth. But "while the principle to produce the most good
ranks as a first principle, it is but one such principle which must
84. "[]f [practical reasoning] is to offer a meaningful alternative to foundationalism, it
must be given some content [in order to] transcend d hoc eclecticism and create a co-
herent legal tradition.- Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1616-17.
85. Anthony D'Amato & Edward J. Eberle, Three Models of Legal Ethics, 27 ST.
Loins U. W. 761, 772 (1983) (citing WILuAM K. FRANnNA, ETHics 16-17 (2d ed.
1973)).
86. Id. at 773 (citing WILLIAM D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD (1939)).
87. See Eberle, supra note 53, at 16-17 (citing IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF
THE METAPHYSiCS OF MORALS 39 (Lewis W. Beck trans., 2d ed. 1959)). Kant used the
following as an example:
[An individual] who intends to murder your sister asking you if your sister is
at home. If in fact she is at home, Kant requires that you tell the truth and
answer in the affirmative. Later, pressed by his students, Kant further explained
that if you answer truthfully, the would-be murderer would probably not believe
youl
D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 85, at 772.
88. Eberle, supra note 53, at 17.
89. See supra notes 41-43 and accompanying text.
90. RAWLS, supra note 41, at 34. Here, Rawis views intuitionism "in a more general
way than is customary.- Id.
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be balanced by intuition against the claims of the other prima facie
principles." 9 Accordingly, when presented with a conflict between
competing moral claims one must try to find a "constructive an-
swer.., to the problem[] of assigning weights to competing prin-
ciples of justice."92 This has been named the "priority problem"
in moral philosophy.
One tool to help achieve a coherent answer is provided by
lexicographical reasoning. Lexicography calls for a serial or lexical
ordering of values. It "requires us to satisfy the first principle in
the ordering before we can move on to the second, the second
before we consider the third, and so on."93 In this manner, Ross
ranked moral worth as lexically superior to nonmoral values, a
classic example of lexicographical reasoning in moral philosophy.
On this basis, moral rules outweigh nonmoral values, but they may
conflict with other moral rules. When moral rules conflict with
other equally weighted moral rules, the conflict must be evaluated
and resolved in an ethically satisfying manner through intuitive
reasoning.'
Still, the obvious danger in using lexicography is that princi-
pled results may not be obtained simply by applying "intuitionism"
to the resolution of moral conflicts. In our world there is almost
always a "plurality of principles" which must be balanced in deter-
mining which single principle in the plurality is "most just." This
balancing inevitably requires the exercise of some discretion.
But the problem is not irreducible.9' Reliance on intuitionism
can be reduced by substituting Rawls' prudential, rational judgment
for "unguided" moral judgment.' Classic philosophers like Aris-
totle called this form of reasoning "practical judgment" or "practi-
cal wisdom."' Kant termed it "universal practical reasoning."98
Contemporary constitutional and First Amendment scholars call it
variously "practical reason," "prudential reasoning or judgment," or
91. Id. at 40 (citing WILLIAM D. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD 21-27 (1930)).
Ross' theory is an intuitionist theory that is deontological. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 43.
94. WI.LIAM D. Ross, THE PIGHT AND THE GOOD 149-54 (1930).
95. Eberle, supra note 53, at 18-19.
96. RAWLS, supra note 41, at 44.
97. VI ARISTOTLE, NICHOMACHEAN ETHICS (Martin Ostwald trans. 1962).
98. IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 32-33 (Lewis
W. Beck trans., 1976) (all moral concepts have their origin in practical, rational reason-
ing).
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"intuitionism." 99
The task, then, in moral philosophy is one "of reducing and
not of eliminating entirely the reliance on intuitive judgments." 1"
It is unrealistic to think that all elements of discretion can be
eliminated. Rather, "[t]he practical aim is to reach a reasonably
reliable agreement" in judgment in order to provide a common
conception of justice."" 1
The approach of moral philosophy, as described above, is func-
tionally similar to modern First Amendment analysis. As in moral
philosophy, the First Amendment contains many core values, but
any one core value does not predominate over another. It is inco-
herent in the realm of First Amendment theory to insist upon the
universality of any one value to the exclusion of others, as in
moral philosophy. A web of values is preferable to a single strand
representing one value. Therefore, First Amendment work should
focus more on finding reasonably reliable solutions than universal
answers.
Because free speech values do not exist in a void but interact
with society in complicated ways, free speech must yield in certain
limited circumstances to social regulation. In other words, while the
First Amendment comprises a set of first order principles which
will almost always prevail in core speech areas, free speech is
nevertheless not absolute. Communitarian interests may represent
important social values too, and may occasionally outweigh free
speech values in certain limited circumstances.
In the face of such conflicts, the key question is how to reach
a proper accommodation of speech values. Inevitably this is a
question of balancing." z But given the preferred value of free
speech in our value structure, free speech must be given preference
in any balancing. Otherwise, there is a danger that the First
Amendment will be balanced away in favor of social interests in
reaching results. That would be too small an approach to free
speech.1°3
Preference can properly be given to free speech through a form
99. See supra notes 41-47 & 60-63 and accompanying text.
100. RAWLS, supra note 41, at 44.
101. Id.
102. "In the final analysis, balancing is nothing more than a metaphor for the accom-
modation of values. Everyone balances - even Baker. The real debate is about how we
should accommodate values in specific contexts.- Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1249.
103. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1627.
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of weighted balancing which, as Professor Redish has said, means
that one thumb on the scale should firmly favor expression."° In
this sense weighted balancing is the right general approach to the
"acconmnodation of values in [concrete] contexts."" ° In other
words, the general rule to mediate the First Amendment ought to
be that the Amendment trumps all concerns other than very strong
governmental interests. How strong the interests need be to justify
curtailment of free speech will inevitably depend on context.
Faced with the need to make such an accommodation, how can
the proper balance be reached in the context of a concrete prob-
lem? Only by a critical evaluation of the problem. That is, by
identifying the speech values at stake, evaluating them in relation
to communitarian interests and forging the proper accommodation.
This analysis does not occur in a void. In the First Amendment
realm, we can draw upon a rich tradition"° to help reach reason-
ably reliable solutions. These solutions must be guided by a con-
cern for the Constitution's language, structure, context and history,
as well as by consideration for precedent (especially "paradigmatic
judicial opinions"), t" the limits of judicial review, social and
104. According to Professor Redish:
if we define "balancing" to include definitional balancing, as well as the ad
hoc variety, we can see that the concept has gained a wide acceptance, for any
general rule of First Amendment interpretation that chooses not to afford abso-
lute protection to speech because of competing social concerns is, in reality, a
form of balancing. The point, however, is to balance with "a thumb on the
scales" in favor of speech.
Redish, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 624 (citations omitted).
Owen Fiss refers to this form of balancing as -weighted balancing." Owen M. Fiss,
Free Speech and Social Structure, 71 IowA L. REV. 1405, 1419 (1986). "[F]ree speech
lies so close to the core of our constitutional structure to warrant tipping the scales in its
favor. In this regard the structuralist can confidently borrow the weighted balancing pro-
cess used by progressives to protect speech in the interest of autonomy." Id.
Weighted balancing has generally taken the form of categorical or definitional bal-
ancing in First Amendment cases. It is not my purpose here to evaluate the relative mer-
its and demerits of ad hoc, definitional, categorical or other forms of balancing. Excellent
discussions of these forms of balancing include John H. Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case
Study in the Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88
HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1975); Nimmer, supra note 13; Schauer, Categories, supra note 61,
at 273-76; Schlag, supra note 13, at 672-75.
105. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1249.
106. Professor Fis rightly reminds us that we have a "Free Speech Tradition." Owen
M. Fiss, supra note 104, at 1405. Of course, the "Tradition is flawed in some important
respects. . .. " Id. at 1406. Thus, it is incumbent on us to draw out the best of the tra-
dition to shape our future.
107. Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1631. Professors Farber & Frickey exemplify
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moral norms, concepts of justice and other "shared values, assump-
tions, and techniques.""° Therefore, reason is not "unguided," but
bounded by identifiable principles."° One key to achieving prop-
er outcomes is developing the right "situation sense,""' anchored
in the First Amendment tradition.
Serial reasoning offers another valuable tool for cabining dis-
cretion and achieving coherent accommodations. Serial reasoning
can be particularly useful in ordering categories of speech. In the
first order of speech, most people would include political, religious
and other ideological communication, artistic and literary expres-
sion, and academic and scientific expression."1 Second order cat-
egories would include commercial speech, pornography, labor
speech, defamation, offensive speech, and fighting words. Bottom
level and unprotected speech would include obscenity and certain
false statements of fact.
Similarly, important contextual concerns could be ranked. First
order, or "compelling," governmental interests would include clear,
present, imminent and serious dangers to the state order or to the
public health, safety or welfare. Second order, or "substantial,"
interests would include speech that is deceptive, misleading or
violative of certain human rights, like some privacy interests. Third
order, "rational" interests would include such traditional concerns
this style of analysis with respect to New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254
(1964). Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1631-39. See also infra notes 131-98 (Part
III(A)-(B)) (analyzing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 743- (1976) from this perspective and assessing its precedential
value in the development of First Amendment jurisprudence).
108. Farber, supra note 3, at 1335 n.24.
109. As Justice Harlan stated in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring):
Judicial self-restraint ...will be achieved in this area, as in other constitution-
al areas, only by continual insistence upon respect for the teachings of history,
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society, and wise appreci-
ation of the great roles that the doctrines of federalism and separation of pow-
ers have played in establishing and preserving American freedoms.
110. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
111. See Schauer, Architecture, supra note 61, at 1186. This first order of speech is the
central core of the First Amendment. As Professor Schauer explains, the "first amendment
has ...several cores, explainable largely in terms of clusters of communicative conduct."
Id. This central core is where, among other concerns, "government has demonstrated such
a proclivity toward overregulation that compensatory underregulation is now neces-
sary .... There may be other[] [cores] now, and there may be still more in the future."
Id.
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as maintaining streets and public facilities in a sanitary and work-
able fashion.
Evaluating speech questions in context could produce meaning-
ful rules that would help to order analysis and ultimately provide
more coherence and substance to free speech theory. For example,
a first order principle like political speech would clearly outweigh
a rational governmental interest like maintaining clean streets.
Similarly, first order speech would also outweigh a substantial
interest like preventing misleading claims." 3  However, that
speech may not outweigh a truly compelling interest like a clear,
present, imminent and serious danger to the social order. For ex-
ample, "publication of the sailing dates of transports or the number
and location of troops" during war time constitutes such a truly
compelling interest."" Conversely, a compelling governmental in-
terest, like protecting the welfare of children, would clearly out-
weigh bottom-level speech like obscenity. Such an interest would
also outweigh second level speech like pornography, and it might
even outweigh first level speech like artistic expression in certain
contexts." 5 These are all relatively easy cases. Nevertheless, they
112. See, e.g., Schneider v. New Jersey, 308 U.S. 147, 160 (1939) (concluding that a
municipality may regulate conduct of those using the streets in the interest of public
safety, health, welfare or convenience, but such regulations may not "abridge the constitu-
tional liberty of one rightfully upon the streets to impact information through
speech... ").
113. Consider President Bush's use of the Willie Horton advertisement in the 1988 pres-
idential election campaign as an example of misleading claims. Robert W. Pittman, Voices
of the New Generation; We're TalUng the Wrong Language to 'TV Babies,' N.Y. TES,
Jan. 24, 1990, at A23 (suggesting that generations who grew up with television are highly
attuned to visual images such as those projected by President Bush in his 1988 cam-
paign); Washington Talk: Exact Words; Second Thoughts on First Reactions To Race,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 26, 1989, at A24 (indicating that Bush's use of Willie Horton to exem-
plify his stance on crime was overpowered by racial undertones); see generally JOE
MCGINNISS, THE SELLING OF THE PRESIDENT (1969) (addressing how campaign advertising
can be manipulated so that the audience's impression of the candidate differs from reali-
ty). For a discussion of deceptive advertising, see Philip Nelson, Comments on Advertising
and Free Speech in ADvERTISNG AND FREE SPEECH, 49, 53-54 (Allen Hyman & M.
Bruce Johnson eds., 1977) (characterizing deception as a two-way street requiring both a
deceiving statement and someone capable of being deceived).
114. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (citation omitted).
115. Some of these issues were raised in connection with the recent controversies sur-
rounding the photography of Robert Mapplethorpe. See Mark Curriden, But Is It Art? 17
BARRISTER, Winter 1990-91, at 13, 35-36 (discussing obscenity prosecution concerning the
content of certain rap music, artwork of Robert Mapplethorpe on display at the Cincinnati
Art Center, sexually explicit videos and even bumper stickers); Neil A. Lewis, What the
Supreme Court Considers to Be Obscene, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 8, 1990, at 26 (discussing
obscenity tests fashioned by the Supreme Court and likely protections they offered the
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serve as guideposts to help illuminate analysis of speech ques-
tions.1 6
Serial reasoning can also be used to set sound general rules to
guide principled analysis within a category of speech."' The
proper accommodation of speech values in concrete contexts thus
can be brought into sharper focus.
Nonetheless, serial reasoning can only go so far."' At some
point, a plurality of principles will vie with each other for the
designation "most just," necessitating a balance of the value of
expression against communitarian interests.1 9 In the First Amend-
ment context, this has generally been accomplished through weight-
ed balancing, mainly the definitional or categorical form as de-
scribed above." This balancing will inevitably require the exer-
cise of some discretion; we must rely on practical reason to yield
principled outcomes.
As with moral reasoning, the practical aim in First Amendment
analysis should be to reach reasonably reliable agreements as to the
proper accommodation of speech values in context.12' This is typ-
Mapplethorpe exhibit). The performances and albums of Madonna and 2 Live Crew have
also spurred debate about the line between art and obscenity or pornography. Stephen
Holden, That Madonna Vdeo: Realities and Fantasies, N.Y. TamES, Dec. 3, 1990, at C18;
Sara Rimer, In Rap Obscenity TriaI Cultures Failed to Clash, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 22,
1990, at A12.
116. Further serial rules could be derived from the wealth of First Amendment case
law, especially "paradigmatic judicial opinions" like New York 7Tmes v. Sullivan. See
Farber & Frickey, supra note 5, at 1631-39 (discussing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
381 U.S. 254 (1964)).
117. This articles takes up this task in relation to commercial speech. See infra text
accompanying notes 307-442.
118. See, e.g., RAWLS, supra note 41, at 43-45 (suggesting that the usefulness of serial
reasoning in developing a moral theory of justice may be limited to certain specific social
circumstances, rather than generally applicable to priority problems).
119. See NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.03 (suggesting that definitional balancing be used
to determine the First Amendment free speech guarantee). A general rule is preferred, "at
least where we can discern generally applicable rules that should balance with fair preci-
sion the competing interests at stake ... ." Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S.
29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, L, dissenting), quoted in NIMMER, supra note 13, § 2.03, at 2-24.
See also Irving R. Kaufman, The Message, the Medium, and the First Amendment, in THE
MESSAGE, THE MEDIUM, AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 28 (1970) (concluding that "the
regulation of any particular medium is constitutionally permissible only to protect some
legitimate and important interest of the state . . . and only as long as the restraint... is
no greater than necessary and is applied evenhandedly . . . "). But see EMERSON, supra
note 14, at 17 (arguing that "the main function of the courts is not to balance the inter-
est in freedom of expression against other social interests but to define the key elements
in the First Amendment . . . -).
120. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
121. As Justice Harlan said.
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ical of the movement toward the Middle Ground. A related, more
focused objective is to provide guidance for achieving reliable
accommodations in specific speech areas to aid judges and other
decisionmakers who must actually resolve these cases. This article
undertakes this task with respect to commercial speech.
The approach for resolving commercial speech cases may also
be useful in other First Amendment areas. In particular, the Middle
Ground illuminates a sound and reliable method for upholding our
tradition of free speech. The Middle Ground can also measure the
efforts of judges and other decisionmakers who actually resolve
speech questions. A review of the relationship of commercial
speech to the First Amendment will help to lay a foundation for
the practical reasoning model to be applied to commercial speech.
II. COMMERCIAL SPEECH
Protection of commercial speech has been a subject of consid-
erable controversy in free speech theory. The path from Valentine
v. Chrestensen'22 to Board of Trustees v. Fox23 has been well
documented.124 Rather than reviewing the voluminous case law
and commentary on commercial speech, this section focuses on one
seminal Supreme Court case, Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc."2
There are several reasons for the choice. First, Virginia Phar-
At least where we can discern generally applicable rules that should balance
with fair precision the competing interests at stake, such rules should be pre-
ferred to the plurality's [ad hoc] approach both in order to preserve a measure
of order and predictability in the law that must govern the daily conduct of
affairs and to avoid subjecting the press to judicial second-guessing ....
Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 63 (1971) (Harlan, J., dissenting), over-
ruled by Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976).
122. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942), overruled by Village of Schaumberg
v. Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980).
123. 492 U.S. 469 (1989). Fox is discussed infra text accompanying notes 348-64.
124. A sampling of the leading literature includes: BAKER, supra note 7, at 194-224;
REDISH, supra note 6, at 60-68; Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28; Cass, supra
note 13; Daniel A. Farber, Commercial Speech and First Amendment Theory, 74 Nw. U.
L. REV. 372 (1979); Thomas H. Jackson & John C. Jeffries, Commercial Speech: Eco-
nomic Due Process and the First Amendment, 65 VA. L. REV. 1 (1979); Martin H.
Redish, The First Amendment in the Marketplace: Commercial Speech and the Values of
Free Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 429 (1971); Schauer, Architecture, supra note
61; Shiffrin, supra note 30. See also Michael Feldman, Note, Survey of the Literature:
Commercial Speech and Commercial Speakers, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 659 (1981) (surveying
academic commentary on commercial speech between 1976-81).
125. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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macy has a secure place within the First Amendment tradition. The
Court both employed conventional First Amendment analysis in
founding its rationale and, in turn, expanded the horizon of free
speech." 6 Second, the case established constitutional protection
for commercial speech, and thus created an entire area of law.17
Third, the Court incorporates many values to forge its rationale, re-
flecting the web metaphor described here as central to the Middle
Ground vision."' Fourth, the arguments used by the Court expli-
cate the essential rationale for protecting commercial speech and,
thus, are key to the more fundamental question of the reach of free
speech theory. Fifth, the Court's treatment of commercial speech il-
lustrates how it might treat other candidates for inclusion under the
Amendment should the Court choose to expand the spectrum of re-
ality that reflects through the First Amendment prism. 29 Sixth,
126. Id. at 756-61.
127. I,4 at 761-70.
128. See supra text accompanying notes 65-71.
129. "[L]anguage is a means not only to describe reality, but also to discover reality."
Bernhard Grossfeld, Language and the Law, 50 J. AIR L. & COM. 793, 799 (1985) (cit-
ing WIHEM VON HUMBOLDT, UBER DIE VERSCHIEDENHErT DES MENSCHIEN
SPRACHBAUS UND IHREN EINFLUSS AUF DIE GEISTIGE ENTWICKLUNG DES
MENSCHENGESCHLECHTS [ON THE DmFERENCES OF HUMAN LANGUAGES AND THEIR INFLU-
ENCE ON THE INTELL.Ec'UAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HUMAN RACE] (1836)).
Since the Court's proclamation of "certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been thought to raise any
Constitutional problem," Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942),
most such classes have been accorded some degree of constitutional protection, illustrating
the remarkable expansion in the reach of the First Amendment. For reevaluation of "the
lewd and obscene," id. at 572, compare Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)
(holding obscenity unprotected and specifying the test to be whether or not the material is
"utterly without redeeming social importance") with Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24
(1973) (rejecting the Roth standard and imposing a narrower, three-part test). For reconsid-
eration of "the profane," Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, compare Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 213-14 (1975) (holding ordinance prohibiting outdoor exhibi-
tion of films containing nudity overinclusive) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26
(1971) (reversing disturbing the peace conviction based on defendant's wearing a jacket
emblazoned with the words "Fuck the Draft" because doing so was "speech" rather than
"offensive conduct") with FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748-50 (1978)
(holding FCC regulation of otherwise protected speech justified by the nature of the
broadcast medium). For an illustration of change with respect to "the libelous,"
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, see New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266
(1963) (holding statements "otherwise . . . constitutionally protected [against allegations of
libel] do not forfeit that protection because they were published in the form of a paid
advertisement"). For examples of reevaluation regarding "insulting or 'fighting' words,"
Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 572, see Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108 (1973) (per curiam)
(holding statement not directed toward a particular person or group not "fighting words");
Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 528 (1972) (striking abusive language statute as
overbroad because applicable to more than "fighting words").
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the opinion recognizes that state interests may also be important in
relation to free speech, thus requiring, in some circumstances, an
accommodation of competing values. Seventh, the Court proceeds
from this recognition to strike a balance between free speech and
state interests in a principled manner wholly consistent with the
meaning and tradition of the First Amendment As a result, the
opinion suggests a sound general approach to free speech analysis.
Eighth, Justice Blackmun exercises his "situation sense ""' to ac-
complish these goals, showing us all how to remain faithful to the
First Amendment tradition.
In short, Virginia Pharmacy offers a good paradigm through
which to explore the inner tensions, dynamics and ultimate reach
of free speech theory that the Middle Ground captures. The case is
also useful to illustrate the general accommodation of speech val-
ues to be made in concrete contexts, such as the commercial area.
A. Why Commercial Speech Merits First Amendment Protection
Justice Blackmun begins his opinion for the Virginia Pharmacy
majority by noting that prior decisions of the Court had given
"some indication that commercial speech is unprotected."131 To
establish protection for commercial speech, Blackmun must con-
front this legacy of seemingly contrary opinion. He proceeds with
this task by "clarifying" the existing body of law, asserting that
"[s]ince the decision in Breard,' . . . the Court has never de-
Current candidates for protection under the First Amendment include: a range of
professional confidential communications, see Fred C. Zacharias, Rethinking Confidentiality
11: Is Confidentiality Constitutional?, 75 IOWA L. REV. 601, 614 (1990); hate speech of
some form, see R.A.V. v. St. Paul, No. 90-7675, 1992 U.S. LEXIS 3863 (June 22, 1992)
(invalidating ordinace banning hate speech) and compare BOLLINGER, supra note 23, (ar-
guing for tolerance of extremist speech as the anvil on which basic conceptions of First
Amendment protections are hammered out) with Mari I. Matsuda, Public Response to
Racist Speech: Considering the Victim's Story, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2320, 2356-57 (1989)
(suggesting that racist hate speech need not be afforded First Amendment protection) and
Robert C. Post, The Constitutional Concept of Public Discourse: Outrageous Opinion,
Democratic Deliberation and Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 103 HARV. L. REV. 603, 612-
13 (1990) (arguing that Falwell shows the Court extends First Amendment protection to
hate speech); and a range of business, corporate'and securities speech that arguably fits
within an expanded commercial speech category, see infra note 141-42 and accompanying
text.
130. See supra note 59.
131. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 758.
132. Breard v. Alexander, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). In Breard, the Court upheld a prohibi-
tion on door-to-door solicitation of magazine subscriptions. It emphasized that the "sell-
ing ... brings into the transaction a commercial feature" not present in door-to-door
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nied protection on the ground that the speech in issue was 'com-
mercial speech.' 133 He paints the Court's earlier view as "[t]hat
simplistic approach, which by then had come under criticism or
was regarded as of doubtful validity by [some] Members of the
court .."134
The Court's opinion in Bigelow v. Virginia, 35 issued in the
immediately preceding Term, foreshadowed the metamorphosis of
commercial speech to occur in Virginia Pharmacy. Blackmun noted
that, with the Bigelow decision, "the notion of unprotected 'com-
mercial speech' all but passed from the scene. " "36 The Bigelow
Court recognized that the "relationship of speech to the market-
place of products or of services does not make it valueless in the
marketplace of ideas."137  However, according to the Virginia
Pharmacy majority, Bigelow left open the question of First Amend-
ment protection for commercial speech because the advertisement at
issue there was not purely commercial.' 31 Thus, Virginia Phar-
macy placed the status of commercial speech "squarely before [the
Court]."' 39
The type of commercial speech at issue in Virginia Pharmacy
was standard commercial advertising, pure and simple."4 Today,
distribution of leaflets concerning core speech, like religion, condoned in Martin v.
Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). Breard, 341 U.S. at 642.
133. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759.
134. Id. (footnote omitted).
135. 421 U.S. 809 (1975). In Bigelow, the Court reversed the conviction of an individ-
ual who placed an advertisement about the availability of legal abortions in New York in
a Virginia newspaper in violation of Virginia's then-existing abortion law.
136. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 759. The Court sidestepped the issue on an earlier
occasion. See Pittsburg Press Co. v. Pittsburg Commn on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 385 (1973) (characterizing employment advertisements as "classic examples of com-
mercial speech,- but upholding an ordinance prohibiting gender-designated columns for the
notices because the discriminatory hiring proposed was illegal).
137. Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 825-26.
138. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 760.
139. Id. at 761.
140. Id. at 761.
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural, philosoph-
ical, or political. He does not wish to report any particularly newsworthy fact,
or to make generalized observations even about commercial matters. The "idea"
he wishes to communicate is simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription
drug at the Y price." Our question, then, is whether this communication is
wholly outside the protection of the First Amendment.
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of course, the range of communication to which the category
"commercial speech" could be applied seems much more expansive
than merely speech which proposes a commercial transaction.
141
Any comprehensive treatment of such an expanded category of
commercial speech need concern a wide range of business, corpo-
rate and securities speech in addition to standard commercial adver-
tising, promotion and solicitation. In fact, the limit of the com-
mercial speech category remains one of the open issues in First
Amendment jurisprudence. It may be preferable to allow the doc-
trine to develop further through the common law, building from
the ground up.
The Virginia Pharmacy Court's commercial speech rationale is
noteworthy in that it relies on a web of diverse, interlocking val-
ues. Each of these values is worth exploring in order to capture the
dynamic of free speech theory.
141. See Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989) (involving First Amendment
challenge of a rule promulgated by the State University of New York prohibiting, inter
alia, "Tupperware Parties" in dormitory rooms). Proposal of a commercial transaction "is
the test for identifying commercial speech." Fox, 492 U.S. at 473-74. The Court has dis-
played occasional looseness with respect to its definition. The Court's initial definition
was "speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction."' Virginia
Board of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). In Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp.
v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561-62 (1980), however, the Court lent some
confusion to the definition by referring to commercial speech as both "expression related
solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience" and "speech proposing a
commercial transaction." Id. at 561, 562. (The Central Hudson Court invalidated a regula-
tion barring advertisement of the electric company's services. Id. at 572.) Since Central
Hudson, the Court seems to have settled on the latter definition, without the "does no
more than" language of Bigelow, 421 U.S. at 820.
Several commentators have advocated revised definitions of commercial speech. See,
e.g., David F. McGowan, Comment, A Critical Analysis of Commercial Speech, 78 CAL.
L. REV. 359, 401 (1990) (suggesting commercial speech be defined as "speech that does
no more than propose the sale of a specific, named good or service"); Comment, First
Amendment Protection for Commercial Advertising: The New Constitutional Doctrine, 44
U. Cm. L. REV. 205, 236 (1976) (proposing as the definition "(1) speech that refers to a
specific brand name product or service, (2) made by a speaker with a financial interest in
the sale of the advertised product . . . [and] (3) that does not advertise an activity itself
protected by the first amendment").
142. The Court first referred to these types of "communications [as ones] regulated
without offending the First Amendment ... [because the] commercial activity [was]
deemed harmful to the public." Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456
(1978). An expanded category of commercial speech has been perceptively discussed by
Professors Schauer and Shiffrin. See Schauer, Architecture, supra note 61, at 1183-85;
Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1213-14.
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1. Profit motive
The first settled proposition in First Amendment theory invoked
to support commercial speech is "that speech does not lose its First
Amendment protection because money is spent to project
it .... ."4 3  Profit motive is not a principled basis on which to
distinguish commercial from non-commercial speech because there
are obvious similarities between commercial and other speech pro-
moted at a cost to the speaker." Still, profit motive is trouble-
some for First Amendment theory, especially when not linked to
more central free speech values.14 The marketplace of ideas has
not traditionally been thought to depend on the marketplace for
goods and services."
2. Content regulation
The Court next moves to content regulation and the axiomatic
First Amendment principle that expression may not be regulated by
content.'47 Focusing on the content of commercial expression,
143. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 761.
144. See, e.g., Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28, at 9 (exploring the differences
and similarities between profit-oriented and self-interested speech); Farber, supra note 124,
at 381-83 (citing newspapers, paid public speakers, political candidates and professional
authors as examples of those who should be afforded constitutional protection, despite the
profit motive underlying the speech); Redish, supra note 124, at 430 ("Speech aimed at
improving the speaker's economic position by private means, however, is not automatically
severed from the stronger safeguards of the first amendment, as illustrated by the numer-
ous supreme court [sic] decisions bringing certain labor unions under the rubric of the
first amendment.").
145. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1950) (ordinance forbidding door-to-door
sale of goods not a violation of free speech), overruled by Village of Schaumberg v.
Citizens for Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620 (1980); see also BAKER, supra note 7, at
198 ("the profit-motivated speech of the marketplace of commodities ... does not seem
to deserve the same status as the speech of the marketplace of the mind.. . [and]
justifties] excluding this commercial speech from constitutional protection," for the reasons
Baker describes in his book).
146. See infra notes 211-52 and accompanying text (Part I(D)).
147. Indeed, "[e]liminating economic motive as a disqualifying factor seems to leave no
basis for excluding commercial speech, as a class, from First Amendment protection."
Farber, supra note 124, at 383. Farber suggests that certain types of commercial speech
might be excluded if they do not contain "some minimum level of *redeeming social
value.'" Id. (citing Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 21-25 (1973)). See also Baker, Com-
mercial Speech, supra note 28, at 45 (discussing the failure of the Court to distinguish
between commercial speech and other forms of speech in both Bigelow and Virginia
Pharmacy); Redish, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 613 (rejecting approach of exclusion
by content); see generally Martin H. Redish, The Content Distinction in First Amendment
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i.e., commerce, the Court asserts that "if ... commercial
speech... lacks all First Amendment protection,... it must be
distinguished by its content."148 However, "the speech whose con-
tent deprives it of protection cannot simply be speech on a com-
mercial subject" because commercial subjects have never been
thought outside the ambit of First Amendment protection. 149 The
Court then states:
No one would contend that our pharmacist may be prevent-
ed from being heard on the subject of whether, in general,
pharmaceutical prices should be regulated, or their adver-
tisement forbidden. Nor can it be dispositive that a com-
mercial advertisement is noneditorial, and merely reports a
fact. Purely factual matter of public interest may claim
protection."
3. Advancement of Knowledge and Pursuit of Truth
Advancement of knowledge and pursuit of truth are invoked to
support commercial speech in the succeeding part of the Court's
opinion. "Our question is whether speech which does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction,' ... is so removed from
any 'exposition of ideas,' . . . and from 'truth, science, morality,
and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government,' that it lacks all protection."'
This question is perhaps the central one of the case. The Court ex-
amines whether ideas and information on commercial subjects are
unlike speech on other subjects protected by the First Amendment.
Given that our knowledge of the world comes from ideas and in-
formation we collect and share, the answer to this query has to be,
as the Court concludes, "that it is not.%'
152
Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113, 142-43 (1981) (arguing that a distinction between "con-
tent based" and "content neutral" legislation is unnecessary when balancing state interest
and available alternative means of expression).
148. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 761 (1976).
149. Id.
150. Id. at 761-62 (citing Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975) and Thornhill
v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940)).
151. Id. at 762 (citations omitted).
152. Id. It is certainly naive to assume that the truth will always prevail through the
"power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ...
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, L dissenting). However, the
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4. Speaker Interests: Economic
From its discussion of commercial speech in the abstract, the
Court shifts direction, "[flocusing first on the individual parties to
the transaction that is proposed in the commercial
advertisement .... .1 53 Here, the Court invokes traditional speak-
er and listener interests underlying free speech theory. Turning first
to the speaker's interests, the Court "assume[s] that the advertiser's
interest is a purely economic one"' u and concludes that a primar-
ily economic interest "hardly disqualifies' [the pharmacist] from
protection under the First Amendment."' 55 The value of art, not
mentioned by the Court, might be added to the speaker interests in
advertising. Professor Redish has argued convincingly that adver-
tising may have artistic value." Commercial art does not, of
course, make commercial speech core expression. However, art
does play an important role in free speech theory with respect to
both self-realization of artistic talent by the speaker and the inspira-
tion listeners derive therefrom.
5. Listener Interests: Self-realization
Turning to the other individual party to the commercial transac-
tion - the listener - Justice Blackmun unfolds some of the core
arguments supporting constitutional protection for commercial
speech. The "[c]onsumer's interest in the free flow of commercial
information... may be as keen, if not keener by far than his
marketplace model still has an important role to play in free speech theory for protecting
the free flow of information and recognizing the fallibility of government in regulating
speech. Redish, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 616-19 (though potentially dangerous, the
truth test should not be discarded); Shiffrin, supra note 30, passim.
153. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762.
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. REDISH, supra note 6, at 446-47 (noting, among other examples, art nouveau
posters). Modem advertising has given society trendy ideas and catchy slogans like
"Where's the beef?," which took on political implications in the 1984 presidential eam-
paign, see Bernard Weintraub, Mondale Goads Reagan To Submit Economic Plans, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 21, 1984, at B12, appealing logos and trademarks like the Campbell's soup
can Andy Warhol raised to an art form, and times like "I'd like the teach the world to
sing/In perfect harmony ..." Joseph P. Kahn, The Super Sell; Stakes High for Adver-
tisers, BOSTONGLOBE, Jan. 25, 1990, at 73. See also Cass, supra note 13, at 1367 (con-
sidering the potential social and political value of some well-known, brand-specific ad-
vertisements).
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interest in the day's most urgent political debate." 57 This state-
ment, perhaps the most famous in the case, conjures up several
central First Amendment arguments.
Even though prosaic, commercial speech is nonetheless impor-
tant because it involves the dissemination of information concern-
ing products and services in our vast market economy where infor-
mation is among the most valuable of resources.'58 The free flow
of information increases our knowledge of the world, thereby aid-
ing us to purchase the goods and services we need to function in
society. In other words, commercial speech facilitates self-realiza-
tion, a core value of the First Amendment. 59 Justice Blackmun's
opinion implicitly recognizes this core value of free speech. Posses-
sion of commercial information allows "self-realization" because,
among other functions, it enables us to assert some measure of
control over our lives, aiding in the decisionmaking process
through which we may fulfill our aspirations."W
Moreover, in an overwhelmingly materialistic society,
Blackmun seems quite right in asserting that commercial informa-
tion may be more important than the "day's most urgent political
debate." 16' While Americans may not participate in the political
process in great numbers, they do participate in the commercial
process every day through innumerable market transactions.'62
157. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
158. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, The Proper Role of a
Target's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981)
(assessing the effect of management's superior access to information relating to tender
offers, as compared to shareholders, and the benefits that information provides).
159. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
160. The Supreme Court of Canada, a comparable modem society, also recognizes the
value of commercial speech vis-a-vis self-realization. See Ford v. Quebec (Attorney Gener-
al), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 716-17:
Commercial expression, like political expression, is one of the forms of expres-
sion that is deserving of constitutional protection because it serves individual
and societal values in a free and democratic society. Indeed, over and above its
intrinsic value as expression ... commercial expression plays a significant role
in enabling individuals to make informed economic choices, an important aspect
of individual self-fulfillment and personal autonomy.
161. Vrginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
162. BAKER, supra note 7, at 194. See also REDISH, supra note 6, at 26-30 (questioning
the average individual's interest and ability to become involved in political affairs from
the perspective of elitist theory); Redish, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 608-10 (arguing
that inherent value of free speech in a democratic system relates to individual
decisionmaking rather than political control).
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Certainly, commercial speech addresses the problems of
everyday life. Consumption and purchasing are major
sources of recreation and satisfaction. Many people devote
more attention and care to private economic decisions than
they do to political issues. Private economic decisions may
be both more personally controllable and more relevant to
a person's life, to self-expression and self-realization, than
are most political issues. Advertising often provides infor-
mation and arguments relevant to these decisions and, thus,
is relevant for 'achieving a materially satisfactory life.'
Practice in assimilating commercial speech also could help
develop people's rational decision-making capabilities. In
all these ways, commercial speech, probably to a greater
extent than political speech, makes individual self-govern-
ment more effective.
This state of affairs constitutes an illustration of the rift between
Grand Theory and practice.163 Perhaps self-realization through
commerce can lead to enhanced self-realization generally.
6. Informational Value
Commercial speech disseminates valuable data to the public,
allowing speakers and listeners to economize their time and effort
in deciding how to allocate resources.164 Both listeners and
speakers benefit by this exchange of information; neither profits
when commercial speech is suppressed. Blackmun invokes this
efficiency principle in his Virginia Phannacy opinion and combines
it with a social twist. Tangible social and economic effects follow
from suppression of commercial speech. Stopping the flow of in-
formation hurts everyone, but it disproportionately affects "the
poor, the sick, and particularly the aged.""~ These weakest mem-
bers of society spend a "disproportionate amount of their in-
come.., on prescription drugs; yet they are the least able to
learn, by shopping from pharmacist to pharmacist, where their
scarce dollars are best spent."16 Accordingly, this information is
163. See supra note 31nd accompanying text.
164. The informational value of commercial speech was recognized early. See Farber,
supra note 124, at 387 (advertising has an informative function); Redish, supra note 124,
at 432-33, 447 (discussing the informational value of advertising).
165. irginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 763.
166. Id.
1992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
"more than a convenience."" For the poor, sick and aged, "[i]t
could mean the alleviation of physical pain or the enjoyment of
basic necessities."'
Rarely has the value of free speech been put so graphically.
Rarely also has the link between the economic marketplace and the
marketplace of ideas been made so explicit.
7. Society and Public Interest
Viewing the bigger picture, the Court discusses "society['s] ...
strong interest in the free flow of commercial information."1"
Commercial speech may involve matters of public interest too.
Examples are not hard to conceive.
The facts of decided cases furnish [ample] illustrations:
advertisements stating that referral services for legal abor-
tions are available ... ; that a manufacturer of artificial
furs promotes his product as an alternative to the extinction
by his competitors of fur-bearing mammals ... ; and that
a domestic producer advertises his product as an alternative
to imports that tend to deprive American residents of their
jobs . . 27
167. Id.
168. Id. at 764. Indeed, the role of advertising in lowering search costs and making
products affordable is well documented. See, e.g., Terry Calvani et a]., Attorney Advertis-
ing and Competition at the Bar, 41 VAND. L. REV. 761, 781 (1988) (concluding that
advertising legal services lowers costs without lowering quality, enhances competition and
reduces consumer search time without increasing costs); Ronald H. Coase, Advertising and
Free Speech, 6 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 2, 14 (1977); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., Why
Lawyers Should Be Allowed To Advertise: A Market Analysis of Legal Services, 58
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1084 (1983) (concluding that lawyer advertising will lead to more afford-
able legal services for low- and middle-income consumers and that attorneys providing
these services will also benefit); George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J.
POL ECON. 213 (1961) (examining the effects of various types of advertising on consum-
er behavior).
169. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764.
170. Id. (citations omitted).
Professor Shiffrin argues that while "commercial advertising sometimes has political
significance," it rarely contributes to political dialogue. Accordingly, "sorting out such
advertisements on a case-by-case basis presents risks of arbitrary decisionmaking and un-
certainty." Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1227. On this basis alone, it would seem preferable
to protect commercial speech under the Amendment in order to guard against the possibil-
ity of arbitrary decisionmaking, resulting in the exclusion of other valuable speech. See,
e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 474 (1989) (recognizing that where com-
mercial speech is inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech, the level
of First Amendment scrutiny must depend on the nature of the speech taken as a whole).
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Less weighty public interests might also be involved. Indeed, ac-
cording to the Virginia Pharmacy opinion,
[t]here are few [commercial messages] to which such a
[public interest] element ... could not be added. Our
pharmacist, for example, could cast himself as a commenta-
tor on store-to-store disparities in drug prices, giving his
own and those of a competitor as proof. We see little point
in requiring him to do so, and little difference if he does
not
171
This public interest function is a central justification for protec-
tion of commercial speech as bordering on core speech. It impli-
cates foundational values like truth, self-government, self-realization
and autonomy. There is little need to press this argument, however,
as it leads into the crescendo of the last two central justifications
for First Amendment protection of commercial speech, private and
public decisionmaking.
8. Private Decisionmaking
Having established that important economic, content, knowl-
edge, truth, speaker, listener, informational, social and public inter-
est values inhere in commercial speech, Blackmun has, in a sense,
already positioned commercial speech firmly within the First
Amendment tradition. Yet, as he notes, "there is another consider-
ation that suggests no line between publicly 'interesting' or
'important' commercial advertising and the opposite kind could
ever be drawn.""r Commercial and political information often
merge together as individuals exposed to them form ideas, partic-
ularly in America where the market economy is viewed with mysti-
cal reverence.3 Blackmun goes further, lending some grandeur
to free speech theory and the place of commercial speech in the
First Amendment tradition:
See also infra notes 348-64 and accompanying text.
171. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 764-65. Of course, "not all commercial messages
contain the same or even a very great public interest element." Id. at 764.
172. Id. at 765.
173. "Increasingly in this country, the distinctions between governmental and private
sectors are blurred." Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 163 (1967) (Warren,
CJ., concurring) (discussing the relationship between First Amendment values and the
separate standards applied in libel actions where plaintiffs are classified as "public figures"
and "public officials").
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Advertising, however tasteless and excessive it sometimes
may seem, is nonetheless dissemination of information as
to who is producing and selling what product, for what
reason, and at what price. So long as we preserve a pre-
dominantly free enterprise economy, the allocation of our
resources in large measure will be made through numerous
private economic decisions. It is a matter of public interest
that those decisions, in the aggregate, be intelligent and
well informed. To this end, the free flow of commercial in-
formation is indispensable. 74
9. Public Decisionmaking
The Court's leap from private decisionmaking to public
decisionmaking is not great:
[]f [the free flow of commercial information] is indispens-
able to the proper allocation of resources in a free enter-
prise system, it is also indispensable to the formation of in-
telligent opinions as to how that system ought to be regu-
lated or altered. Therefore, even if the First Amendment
were thought to be primarily an instrument to enlighten
public decisionmaking in a democracy, we could not say
that the free flow of information does not serve that
goal. 175
Private decisionmaking facilitates self-realization. Once individual
autonomy is achieved, participation in public decisionmaking and
democratic self-government are better assured. 76 In turn, self-
government promotes autonomy, liberty, equality, and dignity,
values important to a liberal democratic society. Virginia Pharmacy
illustrates how a firm grasp of free speech can promote these val-
174. 1irginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765. Professor Redish first made the argument that
commercial speech facilitates private decisionmaking in his seminal article. Redish, supra
note 124 at 441-44. As Professor Redish explained, '[w]hen the individual is presented
with rational grounds for preferring one product or brand over another, he is encouraged
to consider the competing information . . . and in so doing exercise his abilities to reason
and think; this aids him towards the intangible goal of rational self-fulfillment. Id. at
443-44. See also REDISH, supra note 6, at 57.
175. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765 (footnotes omitted). Many commentators have
made this point for some time, most prominently REDISH, supra note 6, at 19-26.
176. Baker, supra note 27, at 658-59 (arguing that democratic values of self-rule and
self-government justify free speech as a means of fostering informed decisionmaking).
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ues, protecting all available information needed to cope with the
exigencies of our time.
One might also view this process of private and public
decisionmaking as providing a mechanism for facilitating the core
Emersonian value of maintaining a balance between stability and
change in society." Active citizen participation in all spheres of
society serves this value, helping to modulate society. Additionally,
the process seems to further Professor Blasi's "checking" value of
individuals or groups forming spheres of influence ("self-govern-
ments") to counter state influence, thus creating an even more
refined system of checks and balances."8
10. Conclusion: The Web Metaphor
From the standpoint of free speech theory, Virginia Pharmacy
is striking because the Court forged a rationale for commercial
speech on a broad set of interlinking values, not a core of founda-
tional ones. The Court employed a web of interdependent values
that support one another and ultimately support commercial speech.
Truth, self-realization and autonomy support private and public
decisionmaking which, in turn, support and are supported by de-
mocracy, self-government, dignity, equality and liberty. This web
of values establishes a certain structure, coherence and consistency
to free speech theory. It also provides the Amendment with a mea-
sure of strength in relation to social interests.
While the values articulated by the Court are central justifica-
tions for commercial speech, the web can also be expanded to even
loftier heights in the realm of free speech theory. All of these
values serve to support, and are supported by, the core free speech
value identified by Professor Perry as "epistemic." The epistemic
value incorporates Emerson's core truth and self-fulfillment values.
Combining the two ingredients, the epistemic value lends
transcendence, facilitating "human beings... need for, and their
capacity to pursue and achieve, an ever better understanding of
reality."'79 As humans we are artificers with the essential ability
177. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
178. See generally Blasi, supra note 23 (arguing that the First Amendment should be
interpreted so as to preserve rights when governments are most likely to restrict them);
Vincent Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 AM. B. FOUND.
RES. J. 521 (arguing that the First Amendment should serve to check governmental abuses
of power and outlining historical instances of such).
179. Perry, supra note 54, at 1155.
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"to create an ever more satisfying vision of reality." 8 ' "Freedom
of expression facilitates the enterprise in question - whether the
enterprise is that of understanding reality or constructing a vision
of reality - thereby liberating rather than repressing an essential
human capacity,""8 ' namely, that of self-realization.
Viewed in this way, commercial speech is important and merits
constitutional protection because it furthers our understanding of
reality and helps us to construct a more complete vision of life.
Accordingly, in the realm of First Amendment theory there is no
meaningful distinction between private and public or individual and
political decisionmaking, or between individual and political vision.
Vision may instead be described more broadly, and essentially, as
the motivating sense in which we view and structure our lives."
B. Testing the Web: Free Speech versus The State Interest of
Professionalism
A web of values providing broad support for the First Amend-
ment is important because society is predisposed to force accom-
modation of free speech in concrete circumstances. Social concerns
can represent competing values not otherwise included within the
ambit of the Amendment. Because free speech is crucially impor-
tant, because it has intrinsic worth as a key way by which we
develop our faculties and achieve control over our lives, any regu-
lation of free speech demands a heavy burden of justification.
Anything less would jeopardize the strength of the constitutional
guarantee.
Virginia Pharmacy tests these principles. "Arrayed against these
substantial individual and societal interests are a number of justifi-
cations for the advertising ban .... Indisputably, the State has a
strong interest in maintaining ... professionalism" on the part of
licensed pharmacists. 83 Nevertheless, the Court found that the
state dealt adequately with its concern about professionalism "by
the close regulation to which pharmacists in Virginia are sub-
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. See id. at 1160-61.
183. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 766 (1976). The Court discusses the skills and expertise required of pharma-
cists. Id. at 766-68. The Court reaffirmed its opinion about the significance of
professionalism in Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 460 (1978), when it
considered advertising by lawyers.
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ject."" In other words, the Court determined that the state could
rely on alternative means of encouraging professionalism without
restricting speech. Moreover, the Court deferred to the preferred
position of free speech in our value structure, examining the state's
case for the advertising ban closely even though "justifications of
this type [has been regarded as] sufficient to sustain the advertising
bans challenged on due process and equal protection grounds in
[earlier cases]."" That the pharmacists' challenge was based on
the First Amendment "cast[] the Board's justifications in a different
light .... ,186
Assessing the state interest in professionalism in relation to the
preferred position of free speech, the Court invokes some of the
values used to construct its web of support for commercial speech.
Viewed from the light of First Amendment theory, therefore, "it is
seen that the State's protectiveness of its citizens rests in large
measure on the advantages of their being kept in ignorance."" s
Public ignorance is obviously inconsistent with core speech values,
like advancement of knowledge, truth, the marketplace of ideas,
self-realization, liberty, dignity, autonomy and democracy.
The First Amendment alternative to the state's "highly paternal-
istic approach" to advertising regulation is
to assume that this information is not in itself harmful, that
people will perceive their own best interests if only they
are well enough informed, and that the best means to that
end is to open the channels of communication rather than
to close them. If they are truly open, nothing prevents the
'professional' pharmacist from marketing his own assertedly
superior product, and contrasting it with that of the low-
cost, high-volume prescription drug retailer. But the choice
among these alternative approaches is not ours to make or
the Virginia General Assembly's. It is precisely this kind of
choice, between the dangers of suppressing information,
and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely available, that
the First Amendment makes for us.188
Here, Blackmun imparts a valuable lesson on the meaning and
184. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 768.
185. Id. at 769 (citations omitted).
186. Id
187. Id.
188. Id. at 770.
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tradition of the First Amendment. If the First Amendment means
anything, it teaches that more is to be feared from suppression of
speech than from the uses to which speech freely available may be
put. The test of truth, in other words, is to be fought out in the
marketplace of ideas, not in the Virginia General Assembly.
From a broader perspective, in a liberal democratic society
there is a certain faith in humanity - that we can determine for
ourselves the uses to which information freely available may best
be put. This faith in humanity is embodied in many core speech
values, like autonomy, dignity, self-realization and truth, that the
Court invokes to express its preference for free speech. After all,
as the Court said on another occasion: "Freedom of discussion, if
it would fulfill its historic function in this nation, must embrace all
issues about which information is needed or appropriate to enable
the members of society to cope with the exigencies of their peri-
od."'89 Given this tradition and meaning, the First Amendment
"makes [the choice] for us" to prefer more rather than less infor-
mation.190
Faced with the need to strike an accommodation between free
speech and a strong state interest, the Court invokes traditional
First Amendment methodology, balancing the competing interests
with one thumb firmly on the scale in favor of free speech. 9 '
The Court's solution is a model lesson in the First Amendment. In
more general terms, the rule of the case is that the Amendment
trumps all concerns other than very strong state interests. Here,
Virginia failed to demonstrate that its interest in professionalism
possesses that requisite degree of strength.' 92
The Court's firm rooting of commercial speech within the First
Amendment also dampens the force of critics' arguments against
protection of commercial speech, forcing them to take issue with
many of the core values invoked by the Court in Virginia Pharma-
cy. For example, critics arguing for a political speech model 9 3 of
189. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940).
190. Virginia Phannacy, 425 U.S. at 770.
191. The Court employs a form of definitional balancing. See supra notes 74, 102-10
and accompanying text.
192. From the standpoint of contemporary law, professionalism alone is not an interest
weighty enough to pose a serious challenge to free speech. A more concrete demonstra-
tion of harm must be shown, such as misrepresentation, overreaching or coercion. See
infra notes 285-302 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 16-17, 20-22 and accompanying text.
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the Amendment need to address the Court's finding that in our
contemporary world "no line between publicly 'interesting' or
'important' commercial advertising and the opposite kind could
ever be drawn."" Given our "predominantly free enterprise
economy," democratic theory of government and free speech tradi-
tion, no meaningful distinction could ever be drawn between pri-
vate and public decisionmaking in free speech theory.'95 Here
again, "the best means ... is to open the channels of communica-
tion rather than to close them," another choice "the First Amend-
ment makes for us." 96
Other critics who are concerned about the negative influence of
commercial advertising are forced to advocate closing rather than
opening the channels of communication."l This negative influ-
ence argument represents the "highly paternalistic approach" of
state suppression of information the Court thought to be harm-
ful. 9s Needless to say, that argument is a dubious one, obviously
at odds with the First Amendment.
C. The Equal Value Principle
Virginia Pharmacy establishes that commercial speech merits
First Amendment protection. However, the question of where com-
mercial speech fits within free speech theory remains unanswered.
Many have argued that all forms of expression are alike in impor-
tance. Certainly, this equal value principle is fundamental to First
Amendment theory.'"
However, reality is complicated and multi-faceted, and this
complexity filters through the First Amendment prism. In practice,
the Court has already breached the equal value principle to a large
extent.20° Pornography, libel, fighting words, labor and commer-
cial speech are the primary examples of expression which are
194. Virginia Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 765.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 770.
197. See supra notes 26-28 & 30 and accompanying text.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 188-90.
199. See, e.g., Police Dep't of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("There is
an 'equality of status in the field of ideas,* and government must afford all points of
view an equal opportunity to be heard." (quoting ALEXANDER MEiLmOHN, PoLmcAL
FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PowERs OF THE PEOPLE 27 (1948)) (footnote omitted);
accord REDISH, supra note 6, at 13; Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1277-78.
200. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1277 (citing as an example the Court's treatment of
obscenity regulation).
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viewed as possessing lesser value than core expression.
Two fundamental, but controversial reasons exist for this di-
chotomy. One is the intrinsic value of speech. Political or artistic
speech is simply more valuable than, for example, pornography or
commercial speech °.2 ' The other reason is that the comunitarian
interests underlying second order expression tend to be stronger
than the interests in core expression. For example, regulation of
pornography seems more justifiable than regulation of artistic ex-
pression because pornography appears to pose serious harm by
encouraging destructive and demeaning human behavior toward
others.2" Assuming this to be the case, a greater degree of regu-
lation is tolerated to protect important human and communitarian
values, such as safeguarding the dignity of persons against degrada-
tion and violation and the perception and perpetuation of them as
sex objects. Similar arguments could be constructed with respect to
other categories of second order speech.
More coherence and architectural integrity may be brought to
First Amendment theory by simply recognizing that the Amend-
ment comprises many values and supports many types of speech,
201. "[IThe Court clearly looks to the normative value of the subject matter" in deter-
mining the degree of protection under the First Amendment. Id. (arguing that this value
inquiry extends beyond those examples of speech deemed to be outside the scope of First
Amendment protection). Cf Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 557, 563 n.5 (1980) ("[Clommercial expression, . . . although meriting some
protection, is of less constitutional moment than other forms of speech.").
202. See, e.g., Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973) (holding that states
have a legitimate interest in regulating obscenity because of their concern with "safe-
guarding against crime and the other arguably ill effects of obscenity"); CATHERINE A.
MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 91 & Part 111 (1987) (compiling the author's speech-
es regarding pornography and its degradation and disempowerment of women); RsDISH,
supra note 6, at 71; Catharine A. MacKinnon, Pornography, Civil Rights, and Speech, 20
HARe. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 52-54 (1985) (discussing research showing the harmful effects
of pornography on women); Shiffrin, supra note 13, at 104; Jon Nordheimer, "Bundy Is
Put to Death in Florida After Admitting Trail of Killings," N.Y. TIMES, January 25, 1989,
§ A, at I (serial killer Bundy describing effect of pornography on his life of crime).
However, as Professor Redish says, "regulation of speech may be justified [only] on
a showing of harm to competing social interests." REDISH, supra note 6, at 71. Certainly
an "arguable correlation" or "no conclusive proof of a connection" is a wholly insufficient
showing of harm. Paris Adult Theatre, 413 U.S. at 58, 60.
[To prevent substantial erosion of protected speech as a byproduct of the at-
tempt to suppress unprotected speech, and to avoid very costly institutional
harms, . . . we must scrutinize with care the state interest that is asserted to
justify the suppression. For in the absence of some very substantial interest in
suppressing such speech, we can hardly condone the ill effects that seem to
flow inevitably from the effort
Id. at 103. (citations omitted) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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not all of which are of equal magnitude. The Amendment contains
its own difficult inner tensions; recognizing these tensions provides
a clearer view of the proper accommodation of values in speech
questions.
Even though a more comprehensive view of the Amendment
perceives free speech in terms of diverse and multi-ordered values,
it does not follow that the equal value principle should be breached
easily. To as great an extent as possible, the equal value principle
should be kept intact." Core values and areas of speech thereby
supported need vigorous support and protection, which the equal
value principle helps ensure.
But if and when the equal value principle is breached, it
should be done openly, with significant justification and only in
the face of reasonably reliable objective determinants that can
distinguish lesser speech from core speech and thereby guard
against the danger of doctrinal dilution.2° It should also be done
only when the category of speech thereby created "is capable of
principled definition and application." 5 Considering these fac-
tors, courts should confront the difficult compromises being made
in the First Amendment realm.206
Facing and resolving these compromises among competing
values is a healthy enterprise. First, it means that a broader reach
of reality is receiving constitutional protection, as in the case of
203. Professor Schauer expresses the rationale for presumptions against subcategorization.
In the first amendment, as in all of law, the task of the judge is to classify
the particular facts of the case within the appropriate category. Increasing the
number of categories may involve an increased risk of misclassification, even if
the categories are theoretically sound. When the error of misclassification is
likely to occur in derogation of constitutionally preferred values, categorization
in the sense of creating additional subcategories is a technique to be employed
with only the greatest of caution.
. .. We can accomplish this best by creating a presumption, albeit
rebuttable, against the creation of subcategories within the first amendment.
Schauer, Categories, supra note 61, at 295-96 (citations omitted). Professor Shiffrin adds
that 'it is not desirable as a general matter to have judges making decisions that turn on
the value of the speech." Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1278. When such decisions are left
to the judiciary, it should not be done "without regret." Id.
204. Schauer, Categories, supra note 61, at 290-96; Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1278.
205. Schauer, Categories, supra note 61, at 296.
206. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1282. The Court has been facing up to these compro-
nises to some extent. The main examples are commercial speech, defamation, and por-
nography. These are really small compromises, consistent with the force of the equal
value principle.
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commercial speech." 7 This adds to our knowledge and vision,
thereby promoting a number of important First Amendment values.
However, taking in a broader reach of reality tends also to bring in
underlying tensions between the value of free speech and social
interests. Second, state interests asserted in limitation of lesser
speech may be stronger and, accordingly, merit greater deference.
Third, in a broad sense this means that groupings of free speech
values and the permissible scope of their regulation are being more
clearly delineated, thereby providing further content, clarity and
coherence to First Amendment theory. This promotes, in turn, a
more comprehensive view of the Amendment, and a clearer percep-
tion of its interaction with social reality. Fourth, it means funda-
mental free speech values and the core areas of speech they sup-
port are coming into sharper focus, thereby demarcating them more
distinctly from lesser values and lesser types of speech. This in
turn offers a more solid base of support for core values and core
speech, thus reducing the likelihood of a "dilution ... by a level-
mng process, of the force of the Amendment's guarantee.920 8 In
this way the equal value principle can actually protect in the areas
where it most matters - core speech.2' Nevertheless, doctrinal
dilution is a serious threat to expression and must be guarded
against vigilantly.21
0
With respect to commercial speech then, it is necessary to
examine the justification for breaching the equal value principle.
This task illuminates additional inner tensions and dynamics of free
speech theory. Finally, it sharpens the focus of this article by artic-
ulating the proper accommodation of free speech values to be
made in concrete commercial contexts.
D. Justification for Secondary Status
There are several central justifications for breaching the equal
value principle on behalf of commercial speech. These justifications
include commercial speech's lesser intrinsic value, the speech plus
conduct aspect of commercial speech, and the fact that commercial
speech is not value-free and the values it promotes are not wholly
207. This approach appears in striking contrast to several foundationalist theories. See
supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text.
208. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978).
209. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1282.
210. Schauer, Architecture, supra note 61, at 1197.
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compatible with positive human self-realization. Each of *these
justifications is worth examining in order to determine more clearly
the place of commercial speech within First Amendment theory.
1. Intrinsic Value
As discussed above, commercial speech is valuable."' Never-
theless, there is widespread agreement that commercial speech is
less important than core areas of speech."2 While "speech...
which propose[s] a commercial transaction" is surely linked to the
"marketplace of ideas," the ideas to which commercial speech are
linked possess less intrinsic value than core speech.1 Simply
stated, commercial ideas are generally less valuable than political,
scientific, religious, artistic or literary ideas.
Nevertheless, commercial speech may not be less valuable than
core speech in all cases. For some, perhaps many individuals,
commercial speech is more valuable to self-realization than core
speech.2"4 Therefore, the core values underpinning free speech -
democracy, equality, liberty, autonomy and tolerance - mandate
that those wishing to express commercial speech be freely allowed
to do so, even if such expression is thought by only a minority to
be crucial to the right of expression. At a minimum, equality com-
mands that all views be allowed to circulate.215 In essence, then,
the argument that commercial speech is less valuable than core
speech simply means that its dissemination may be subject to
greater time, place, and manner restrictions in deference to social
interests, 2"  and not that commercial speech can be suppressed
211. See supra notes 131-82 and accompanying text (Part mH(A)).
212. Schauer, Architecture, supra note 61, at 1182. "[Commercial speech is not
equivalent to political or even artistic speech; it is less important." Shiffrin, supra note
30, at 1220. 'M]any individuals and communities have the intuition that commercial
speech is not as important or valuable as non-commercial speech." Id. at 1278. See also
supra text accompanying notes 12, 200-02 (detailing the low value ascribed commercial
speech by the Supreme Court). Note also that even in Virginia Pharmacy, the Court im-
plicitly perceived commercial speech as less valuable. "Even if the differences do not
justify the conclusion that commercial speech is valueless, and thus subject to complete
suppression by the State, they nonetheless suggest that a different degree of protection is
necessary to insure that the flow of truthful and legitimate commercial information is
unimpaired." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976).
213. Schauer, Architecture, supra note 61, at 1182.
214. See supra text accompanying notes 157-63.
215. See supra note 199-206 and accompanying text.
216. See supra note 201-03 and accompanying text.
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more easily or inhibited without strong cause.
2. Speech-plus-conduct
Subjugating commercial speech to a secondary status might
arguably be justified on the ground that commercial speech in-
volves speech-plus-conduct. Speech mixed with conduct generally
receives less protection under the Amendment than pure
speech." Commercial speech can be construed as a form of
speech-plus-conduct because of the nexus between the speech pro-
posing a commercial transaction and the subsequent transactions in
which sellers and buyers engage.1 9
The proposal of the commercial transaction can be analogized
to the proposal of a contract:
Similar to the language of a written contract, the lan-
guage in advertising can be seen as constituting part of the
seller's commitment to the buyer. Thus, advertising can
function as part of the contractual arrangement between the
buyer and seller. Of course, in addition to serving this
contractual function, advertisements also serve an informa-
tive function to which the first amendment applies. The
critical factor seems to be whether a state rule is based on
the informative function or the contractual function of the
language.'
Recognizing the contractual function of commercial speech is im-
portant.
First, it explains the intuitive belief that commercial speech
is somehow more akin to conduct than are other forms of
speech. The unique aspect of commercial speech is that it
is a prelude to, and therefore becomes integrated into, a
217. See supra note 204-10 and accompanying text.
218. Classic examples of speech-plus-conduct cases include Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989) (flag burning) and United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (burning
draft card). A principled distinction between speech and conduct has proved problematic
for free speech theory. See supra note 30. Rather than using the action-expression dichot-
omy to determine whether the speech in question merits protection, the focus should shift
to determining the degree of protection such speech should be accorded. In this way,
speech-plus-conduct can be viewed as another tension to be resolved in the context of
concrete cases, as this article advocates.
219. "mhe commercial speaker not only talks about a product, but also sells it."
Farber, supra note 124, at 386.
220. Id. at 387 (footnote omitted).
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contract, the essence of which is the presence of a promise.
Because a promise is an undertaking to ensure that a cer-
tain state of affairs takes place, promises obviously have a
closer connection with conduct than with self-expression.
Second, this approach focuses on the distinctive and power-
ful state interests implicated by the process of contract
formation. In a fundamentally market economy, the govern-
ment understandably is given particular deference in its en-
forcement of contractual expectations. Indeed, the Constitu-
tion itself gives special protection to contractual expecta-
tions in the contract clause. Finally, this approach connects
a rather nebulous area of first amendment law with the
commonplaces of contract law of which every lawyer has
knowledge .... The basic doctrines of contract law ...
provide a helpful guide in considering commercial speech
problems.2't
The contractual function also provides a basis for identifying
commercial speech. An important distinguishing trait of commercial
speech is its nexus between speech and the ensuing commercial
transaction. By identifying commercial speech as such, its content
and treatment can be demarcated from other areas of speech, espe-
cially core speech, thereby lessening the danger of doctrinal dilu-
tion. 2
Finally, the contractual function approach brings into focus the
strong state interests that underlie commercial speech. These con-
cerns include the well-recognized contract doctrines of falsity,
fraud, misrepresentation, coercion, overreaching, harassment, duress
and unconscionability. As this list illustrates, government may have
legitimate interests in regulating speech that do not implicate First
Amendment values, thereby providing a basis for regulation apart
from suppression of speech.' This contractual character of com-
mercial speech may be useful for scrutinizing the language em-
221. Id. at 389 (footnote omitted).
222. See supra notes 204-10 and accompanying text. The danger of doctrinal dilution,
and other threats to speech, is especially great in pathological periods, those periods
-characterized by a notable shift in attitudes regarding the tolerance of unorthodox ideas."
Blasi, supra note 23, at 450-51. In fact, doctrinal dilution might be viewed as a manifes-
tation of such pathology.
223. See Farber, supra note 124, at 389-91; cf. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968) (acknowledging incidental restriction on speech in upholding conviction of
draft card burning, in part, on the theory that "the governmental interest is unrelated to
the suppression of free expression").
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ployed in a commercial transaction and, when language is misused,
for assigning an appropriate remedy.
3. Not Value Free
Another principal justification for breaching the equal value
principle on behalf of commercial speech is that commercial speech
is not value free. It "not only helps mold the world, it molds the
world in very particular ways." 4 A cognitive psychology analy-
sis of the primary theoretical framework of consumer choice and
behavior with respect to modem advertising may explain this ef-
fect. The cognitive approach views consumer response as "largely
verbal problem-solving: Advertising information changes beliefs
about products/services that produce changed attitudes and lead to
new behavioral intentions."'
The cognitive approach appears to complement the economic
view of advertising as information. The economic view emphasizes
the savings in effort, time and money which advertising produces
and which promotes economic efficiency and rational
decisionmaking. 6 Such a rationale was endorsed by the Court in
Virginia Pharmacy. 7 However, recent studies on consumer be-
havior indicate that nonverbal and emotional advertising are better
explained through the paradigm of classical psychological condi-
tioning. Such advertising employs techniques and stimuli that ap-
peal to the emotional, subliminal and subconscious human personal-
ity. These studies show that consumers are not wholly conscious of
the effect of such advertising on their purchase decisions. 8
224. BAKER, supra note 7, at 203; see also Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28,
at 15.
225. 0. Lee Reed & Douglas Whitman, A Constitutional and Policy-Related Evaluation
of Prohibiting the Use of Certain Nonverbal Techniques in Legal Advertising, 1988
B.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 278-79 (citations omitted). While cognitive psychology includes the
study of all thinking processes, cognitive theorists have focused chiefly on verbal thinking,
especially verbal memory and analysis. Thus, "advertising's effect can be studied by test-
ing consumers for verbal recall of advertising and asking them to report their attitudes
and intentions." Id.
226. See id. at 281; see also sources cited in supra note 168.
227. See supra notes 164-68 and accompanying text.
228. Reed & Whitman, supra note 225, at 278-80 and especially authorities cited at 280
n.60. "The implicit conclusion is that consumers often are not conscious of the causal
relationship that prior advertising has to subsequent purchase behavior, especially advertis-
ing with emotional impact" Id. at 279. "he communications research manager of the
nation's leading soft drink manufacturer . . . even deemed Pavlov 'the Father of Modem
Advertising' in recognition of classical conditioning's importance to his work.- Id. at 280
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In this later view, the goal of nonverbal advertising is to condi-
tion the mind through emotional appeals in order to induce the
purchase of advertised goods or services. This type of persuasional
advertising tends to mold the world by creating the consumer de-
mand that the commercial world satisfies. 9 Advertisers manipu-
late consumers primarily through nonverbal, relatively
noninformational techniques that employ music, graphics and dra-
matizations.'
If the psychological conditioning analysis of advertising is
accurate, the economic theory's emphasis on information is mis-
placed. According to the conditioning rationale, the economic theo-
ry "is subject to serious interpretational error... since economists
largely ignore how decision-makers form preferences and focus
almost solely on the result of [presumed] rationality (e.g., [sic]
increased information engenders greater demand by lowering
costs)." 23' The economic theory of advertising is flawed because
it underestimates "nonverbal, emotional advertising information on
consumer preferences." 2 Economic theories may thus be unreal-
istic in some important respects. 3
(citing ADVERTISING AGE, Jan. 30, 1984, at 24 (statement of Joel S. Debow)).
Many advertising pioneers recognized early the role of emotion as a selling tool. J.B.
Watson, an academic psychologist turned advertising executive, id. at 275, once stated:
"'To make your consumer react, ... it is only necessary to confront him with either
fundamental or conditioned emotional stimuli."' STEPHEN FOX, THE MIRROR MAKERS 85
(1984), cited in Reed & Whitman, supra note 225, at 275. "Advertising worked not so
much by giving information as by arousing emotions." DAVID COHEN, J.B. WATSON: THE
FOUNDER OF BEHAVIORISM 189 (1979). "This view of persuasion is widely held by adver-
tising agency personnel: 'Advertising is not a debate. It's a seduction.' Reed & Whitman,
supra note 225, at 275 n.40 (quoting AL RIES & JACK TROUT, POsIIONING: THE BATTLE
FOR YOUR MIND 60 (1981)).
229. BAKER, supra note 7, at 203-04; C.B. MACPHERSON, DEMOCRATIC THEORY: ES-
SAYS IN RETRIEVAL 182 (1973) ([TIhe market system . . . creates the wants which it
satisfies."), quoted in Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28, at 15. Professor Baker
posits that advertising "stimulat[es] the most cheaply aroused desires." Baker, Commercial
Speech, supra note 28, at 15. Professor Farber suggests "[i]t might be tenable to treat
commercial speech like pornography and require some minimal level of 'redeeming social
value' as a prerequisite for first amendment [sic] protection." Farber, supra note 124, at
383.
230. See Reed & Whitman, supra note 225, at 275-78; see also infra notes 434-42 and
accompanying texL
231. Reed & Whitman, supra note 225, at 283 (citation omitted).
232. Id. Economic theory views deceptive advertising as a problem regulated mainly by
the marketplace; deception will fool consumers only once. The resulting damage to a
seller's reputation and subsequent loss of business will outweigh any profit from the de-
ception. Id. at 282.
233. Arie Kapteyn & Tom Wansbeek, Empirical Evidence on Preference Formation, 2 J.
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Perhaps economic theory could be made more useful by inte-
grating the methods by which consumers process information to
reach purchase decisions, instead of focusing solely on the results
of choice. Broadening the theory's conception of information to
include both verbal and nonverbal sources correspondingly broadens
the range of potential deception. The "added value" of advertising
might be more realistically viewed as "induced preference," a form
of deception.' The critical factor in assessing speech would then
seem to be whether or not the speech performs more an informa-
tive function, implicating important First Amendment values, or a
conditioning function.
There are deeper reasons for the commercial/noncommercial
distinction. These go to the values being formed, encouraged and
supported by the speech. The Bill of Rights was framed fundamen-
tally to carve out a sphere of individual liberty so that citizens
could better achieve dignity, autonomy and equality. The First
Amendment plays a leading role in sustaining and promoting these
human values.235 But these human values are threatened by the
American commercial market structure.236 Commercial America
tends to promote a system of values at odds with those enshrined
in the Bill of Rights. These commercial values include materialism,
exploitation, hedonism and superficiality. Americans are urged to
define themselves in terms of what they own or produce, not by
who they are or would like to become.' 7
ECON. PSYCHOL- 137 (1982).
234. Reed & Whitman, supra note 225, at 285-86. Human behavior is obviously com-
plicated, only elements of which are captured in the three theories (cognitive psychology,
classical conditioning, economic) here discussed. For a fuller discussion of the theories,
see id. at 273-87.
235. See supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text in connection with the work of Pro-
fessors Redish and Baker.
236. BAKER, supra note 7, at 204; Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1279-83.
237. As Professor Baker notes:
In our society, where the sense of self is frequently precarious and insecure,
and where comparison with others and social recognition frequently serve to
mold one's sense of personal identity, many people fmd their affirmation and
personal fulfillment in making money, in making a profit, in being "successful"
in their economic activities. n fact, prominent theorists have correlated the
historical development of western industrial capitalism with the spread of the
attitude that economic success is evidence of personal worth.
Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28, at 23 (citing RICHARD H. TAWNEY, RELIGION
AND THE RISE OF CAPITALISM 114-15, 250-53 (1962)). See also MAX WEBER, THE
PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 155-83 (Talcott Parsons trans. 1958)
(tracing capitalism's focus on material wealth to the Puritan ethic that labor is the purpose
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Criticism of the western commercial environment is widespread,
reflecting many viewpoints and ideologies. 8  Conservatives, 9
liberals2' and Marxistse' decry the view that persons are noth-
ing but objects for commercial exploitation. Opposition to a society
in which people are viewed as means not ends is a central theme
of classic liberal writers from Kant to Locke, Rousseau, Mill, and
Rawls.242 These concerns prompted Professor Baker to argue that
commercial speech should not receive First Amendment protection
at all. He asserts that the dominance of commerce over speech in-
herent in commercial speech severs the "connection between speech
and any vision" of the individual advertiser."o Therefore, the
speech is not freely chosen by the advertisers, but is coerced by
the market.
In contrast, conventional marketplace theory urges that "the
best test of truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted
in the competition of the market, and that truth is the only ground
upon which their wishes safely can be carried out."2" According-
ly, ideas cannot be suppressed merely because they are offensive or
threatening. Viewed from the standpoint of conventional market-
place theory "[i]f people want to internalize or promote materialis-
tic values, they ought to be free to do so."a 45
But the marketplace rationale seems "unduly romantic" in rela-
of life); SHIFFRIN, supra note 13, at 93 ("[O]ne could reasonably expect that daily expo-
sure to televised commercialism would promote a hedonistic, acquisitive, materialistic, self-
seeking, money-hungry culture.'); Tracy Westen, The First Amendment: Barrier or Impetus
To FTC Advertising Remedies?, 46 BROOK. L. REV. 487, 495 (1980) ('[S]ome advertisers
believe their purpose is not to tell people how the product works, but how they will feel
about themselves when they purchase it.").
238. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1280.
239. ROBERT A. NISBET, SOCIOLOGY AS AN ART FORM 77-78 (1977); Pope John Paul
Il, Centesimus Annus ("The Hundredth Year") (1991), reported in N.Y. Times, May 3,
1991, at 1, 7.
240. See, e.g., RONALD DwORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY passim (1977) (presenting
a theory of individual rights); ERICH FROMM, THE SANE SOCIETY 356 (1955) (concluding
that in modem industrialized society, "[h]appiness becomes identical with consumption of
newer and better commodities..."); RAWLS, supra note 41.
241. See, e.g., MAX HORKHEIMER, ECLIPSE OF REASON 141-44 (1947) (arguing that
commercialization encourages sacrifice of individuality in favor of conformity); HERBERT
MARCUSE, ONE DIMENSIONAL MAN 56-83 (1964) (arguing that in Western societies, tech-
nological progress has destroyed "higher culture).
242. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1280.
243. BAKER, supra note 7, at 202; Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28, at 17, 25.
244. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
245. Shifftin, supra note 30, at 1281. This assumes rational people will be best enabled
to make informed decisions through a "free trade of ideas."
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tion to commercial speech.2' Here the relevant question seems to
be whether the "free trade in ideas" is indeed free given the extent
of trade and the relative dearth of ideas. To the extent that con-
sumer choice is founded on coercion or deception, those respond-
ing to advertising have not consented, but have been manipulated.
The basis for consumer choice inevitably depends on the factors
that form contemporary culture.
Cultural inputs have a major influence in value formation. In
relation to commercial speech,
the inputs promoting materialism in America are quite
strong .... The authors of individual messages may not
intend that general emphasis, but the whole is greater than
the sum of the parts. Even if it were not, the parts add up
to a loud materialist chorus.
Moreover, the promoters of the materialist message
benefit from an almost classic case of market failure. Ad-
vertisers spend some sixty billion dollars per year to dis-
seminate their messages. Those who would oppose the
materialist message must combat forces that have a massive
economic advantage. Any confidence that we will know
what is truth by seeing what emerges from such combat is
ill placed. The inequality of inputs is structurally
based. 7
246. Id.
247. Id.; see also Baker, Commercial Speech, supra note 28, at 27-29 (discussing profit
motive and its capacity to shape media behavior); Fiss, supra note 104, at 1406-07 (dis-
cussing media access by differing economic classes). For instance, as Professor Baker
notes:
Corporations have often enormously outspent other interests, frequently with
telling results. For example, in a 1979 public power referendum in Westchester
County, New York, the consolidated Edison Company of New York contributed
$1,200,000 to defeat the proposal. This was almost 80 times the $16,000 spent
by a citizens' group that provided the only organized support for the measure.
Consolidated Edison's campaign overcame the measure's reported two-to-one
initial public support, defeating the measure with 55 percent of the vote on
election day.
Baker, supra note 7, at 222-23. Note also the comments of a Deputy Director of the
Federal Trade Commission, Tracy Westen: "Children see 7,000 advertisements for sugared
products each year, for example, yet they are rarely exposed to contrasting nutritional
messages of equal persuasiveness." Westen, supra note 237, at 506 (footnote omitted). In
analyzing this phenomenon, Westen concludes: "Although money does not guarantee suc-
cess, it often provides a voice loud enough to virtually drown out that of the opposition."
Id. at 510. Westen cites as examples various public interest referenda, passage of which
would have reduced or eliminated profits, defeated by massive corporate spending. Id.
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In sum, while commerce is surely important as a value or set
of values in the marketplace of ideas, it threatens human values to
the extent it dominates the marketplace. In America, the commer-
cial message obviously saturates society. Nonetheless, the market
failure argument has had limited appeal to the Court."4
4. Conclusion
From the standpoint of First Amendment theory, there is merit
in the positions of both Professor Baker and conventional market-
place theory. Commercial speech is not core expression. Neverthe-
less, commercial speech disseminates important information and,
therefore, is valuable in and of itself. In this way, commercial
speech reveals an inner tension in the First Amendment. On the
one hand, the "lesser status for commercial speech flatly contradicts
conventional First Amendment principles." 249 On the other hand,
commercial speakers can and should be free to disseminate their
messages. To resolve the tension arising from this complexity, a
compromise is being formed in the area of commercial speech
which allows commercial speech to be disseminated as other forms
of speech, but subject to "greater community control of the time,
place and manner of its dissemination."'  The resulting rule pro-
tects free speech values, but assigns more weight to communitarian
interests than is tolerable in core free speech areas.25' The com-
promise itself must be settled in the context of the concrete
case.
252
E. Justification for Greater Degree of Regulation
The potential of commercial speech to cause harm must also be
248. First NatI Bank v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (rejecting argument that corpo-
rations dominated initiative campaign despite spending $120,000 to opponents' $7,000, and
therefore rejecting any limitation on ability of corporations to spend money on campaign);
Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (invalidating a state statute
granting a right of reply to political candidates attacked by newspapers); Shiffrin, supra
note 30, at 1281 (rejecting the argument that the wealthy control candidates' political
campaigns and, therefore, rejecting expenditure limitations on such campaigns); see also
BAKER, supra note 7, at 220-23. But see Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to
Work Comm., 459 U.S. 197, 207-08 (1982) (upholding severe limitation on corporate
entities' opportunities to solicit funds for political speech).
249. Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1282.
250. Id.
251. See infra notes 253-80 and accompanying text.
252. See infra notes 281-442 and accompanying text.
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considered in determining the place of commercial speech within
First Amendment theory. Ultimately, harm provides the only sound
basis on which to restrict speech. 3 Moreover, only concrete
harm of sufficiently strong magnitude and likely imminence justi-
fies restriction.' Harm of this sort is, of course, made manifest
by the communitarian interests asserted to justify curtailment of
speech. With respect to commercial speech, those interests include
misrepresentation, deception, coercion, false and misleading speech
and unconscionability.' 5
Assuming some instances of harmful commercial speech, the
next relevant inquiry is how sharply regulation may be drawn to
advance those interests without compromising free speech values.
Regulation of commercial speech can generally be tailored relative-
ly precisely. There are three main reasons for this: verifiability,
durability and the fact that regulation can be more socially benefi-
cial than detrimental.
1. Verifiability
Commercial speech can be verified. The Court in Virginia
Pharmacy stated the essential rationale: "The truth of commercial
speech... may be more easily verifiable by its disseminator than,
let us say, news reporting or political commentary, in that ordinari-
ly the advertiser seeks to disseminate information about a specific
product or service that he himself provides and presumably knows
more about than anyone else.'' 6 The Court's characterization
253. "Mill thought it was useful to prohibit speech only when it was likely to cause
harm or, more precisely, harm to the interests of others." Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1262
(citing J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 12, 53 (D. Spitz ed. 1975)). If speech is not harmful,
attempts to restrict it must be aimed at suppressing the message the speaker intends to
convey.
254. As Professor Schauer paraphrases the test of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969), "[i]f the act is directed toward and is likely to incite or produce imminent lawless
action of significant magnitude, then deny protection." Schauer, Categories, supra note 61,
at 298.
255. See supra text accompanying note 223.
256. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 771 n.24 (1976). Or, as Justice Stewart put it:
Since the factual claims contained in commercial price or product advertise-
ments relate to tangible goods or services, they may be tested empirically and
corrected to reflect the truth without in any manner jeopardizing the free dis-
semination of thought Indeed, the elimination of false and deceptive claims
serves to promote the one facet of commercial price and product advertising
that warrants First Amendment protection - its contribution to the flow of
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may be both overinclusive and underinclusive in practice. Certainly
some political advertising, commentary and news reporting is rela-
tively verifiable; conversely, some commercial speech is difficult to
verify.257 However, the essential point that commercial speech is
relatively verifiable should not be lost."~
Because commercial speech is a second-order category of
speech and because the state interests underlying regulation of
commercial speech are relatively strong, a greater degree of regula-
tion may be tolerable as compared to core speech. To the extent
commercial speech can be verified, regulations may be narrowly
tailored to address the problems identified. When false and mis-
leading aspects are unmasked from the true and eliminated, the
speech remaining will be far less likely to pose harm. The verifi-
ability of commercial speech thus enables the state to act reason-
ably to achieve the legitimate goal of impeding false or misleading
advertising. 9
Government regulation of any sort will obviously be subject to
criticism for producing outcomes inconsistent with regulatory objec-
tives, and "government regulation of information is no excep-
tion."2 ° Results consistent with regulatory objectives will depend
on the government's ability to identify subjects warranting regula-
tion. Whether or not the false or misleading can then be unmasked
from the true in any given case of commercial speech is, of
course, an open question. The legal system is generally not good at
ascertaining the truth of speech, particularly political, scientific,
artistic or literary speech where the official record is, in fact, quite
bad."' On the other hand, the First Amendment tradition does
accurate and reliable information relevant to public and private decisionmaking.
Id. at 780-81 (Stewart, J., concurring).
257. See, e.g., supra note 113 (citing misleading political claims which could have been
verified). Prominent commentators have pointed out the verifiability of some political
speech and the difficulty of verifying some commercial speech. See, e.g., Farber, supra
note 124, at 385-86; Redish, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 633; Shiffrin, supra note 30,
at 1218.
258. Cass, supra note 13, at 1370-72. For examples of the verifiability determinant in
operation, see infra text accompanying notes 366-79, 388-420. As suggested here, "[w]e
must be opportunistic and grab progress where we can find it." D. HERZOO, WrrHoUT
FOUNDATIONS 243 (1985).
259. See supra notes 257.
260. Cass, supra note 13, at 1372.
261. See, e.g., ANNE L. HAIGHT, BANNED BOOKS: INFORMAL NOTES ON SOME BOOKS
BANNED FOR VARIOUS REASONS AT VARIouS TIMES AND IN VARIOus PLACES (3d ed.
1970); Edward J. Eberle, Prior Restraint of Expression Through the Private Search Doc-
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not tolerate such intrusion into core areas.
But the system's record with respect to core speech areas does
not apply with the same force to commercial speech. Here the
legal and regulatory system seems to operate fairly effectively in
unmasking the false or misleading from the true. Courts are experi-
enced in unmasking the false or deceptive from the true in con-
junction with contract, consumer protection and other private law
actions.262 Some regulatory agencies that handle speech questions
also seem to function well.2' Note particularly that the Court has
found the "experience of the FTC... instructive." 264 Assuming
such regulation can be accomplished accurately, it seems appro-
priate to rely on these relatively sound legal and regulatory regimes
to sort out issues of truth or falsity in commercial speech. Such
regulation appears to dovetail with the constitutional concern of
imposing only minimal restrictions on speech.
2. Durability
Durability is another characteristic of commercial speech that
makes a greater degree of regulation possible. Commercial speech
is durable in the sense that the profit motive inherent in commer-
cial speech better assures its survival even in the face of regula-
trine, 17 U.S.F. L. REV. 171, 181-84 (1983).
262. "A false representation regarding the price, quality, or quantity of a good or ser-
vice offered for sale can usually be unmasked in a legal proceeding without a great ex-
penditure of time and money or a great risk of error." Richard Posner, Free Speech in an
Economic Perspective, 20 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 39-40 (1986). Judge Posner sensibly
argues that truth or falsity marks the dividing line between socially beneficial and detri-
mental commercial speech.
263. The Federal Trade Commission ("FC") regulates misleading advertising and the
Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") regulates misleading speech with respect to
corporate and securities matters. For a discussion of FTC speech regulations, see GLEN 0.
ROBINSON ET AL., THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS (3d ed. 1986) (collecting cases);
Calvani et al., supra note 168, at 781-88; Ira M. Millstein, The FTC and False Advertis-
ing, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 439 (1964); Westen, supra note 237, at 498 (suggesting that
"intervention in the marketplace of commercial speech by the FTC and other government
agencies may be appropriate precisely because that marketplace functions imperfectly -
by failing to eliminate falsity and failing to generate necessary information"). For a dis-
cussion of SEC regulation, see LOUIS LOSS, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION
562-67 (1983) (information statements); Victor Brudney, Insiders, Outsiders, and Informa-
tional Advantages Under the Federal Securities Laws, 93 HARV. L. REV. 322 (1979).
Accord Cass, supra note 13, at 1372 ("comparative point holds" as to benefits of com-
mercial speech regulation); Schauer, Architecture, supra note 61, at 1187 n.28 ("the ar-
gument is one of comparative competence ...with respect to commercial speech [regu-
lation]").
264. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 649 (1985).
[Vol. 42:411
PRACTICAL REASON
tion. After all, "advertising is the sine qua non of commercial prof-
its."2" Moreover, commercial speech does not generally involve
unpopular or dissenting views, the expression of which can be
particularly vulnerable to the chilling effect of regulation.2" In-
deed, the fact that commercial "speech" existed even when unpro-
tected by the First Amendment evidences its durability.
Again, this characterization is both overinclusive and
underinclusive.2 7 Commercial speech is neither verifiable nor du-
rable in all cases. Still, the relative durability of commercial speech
when compared with core speech obviously lessens the danger that
valuable communications will be chilled.2
3. Benefits Can Outweigh Costs of Regulation
Verifiability and durability are critical to efforts aimed at ad-
vancing legitimate state interests while minimizing the errors of
regulation.2" Recent economic literature indicates that commercial
speech may be regulated relatively accurately and efficiently with-
out harming free speech values. 70 Assuming the legitimacy of
these findings, the economic perspective on regulation of commer-
cial speech dovetails with the First Amendment principle of tol-
erating restrictions on free speech only in the face of strong state
265. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 772
n.24 (1978). In the same footnote, the Court spoke of "commonsense differences between
speech that does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' and other varieties." Id.
at 771 n.24 (quoting Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Human Relations Comm'n, 413
U.S. 376, 385 (1973)). These "commonsense differences" were verifiability and durability.
Id.
266. Eberle, supra note 261, at 181-84 (discussing how unpopular views can be chilled
by prior restraints). Of course, some commercial speech might be viewed as disseminating
unpopular views. Consider, for example, the abortion services advertised in Bigelow v.
Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975), or the contraceptive devices discussed in Zauderer, 471
U.S. 626.
267. See, e.g., Redish, Free Speech, supra note 25, at 633-35; see also supra note 257
and accompanying text. Still, commercial speech is generally more verifiable and more
aurable than core speech. Cass, supra note 13, at 1368-73.
268. However, no category of speech is completely immune from the chilling effects of
regulation. In commercial speech, these effects seem increasingly evident. See infra text
accompanying notes 330-64.
269. Cass, supra note 13, at 1372; Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, Comments on Commercial
Speech, Constitutionalism, Collective Choice, 56 U. CIN. L. REV. 1383, 1391 (1988).
270. See generally Cass, supra note 13, at 1355-73 (discussing the ease with which
commercial speech can be regulated); Dau-Schmidt, supra note 269, at 1387-95 (same);
Posner, supra note 262, at 39-40 (concluding, after economic analysis, that little or no
change to commercial speech standards is necessary).
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interests, and then only in minimally intrusive ways. Nevertheless,
any regulatory regime should be applied with a keen eye on the
government. Official bias in regulation is always a concern, espe-
cially with respect to speech where the record of government intru-
sion is not commendable.27 While obvious bias against commer-
cial speech does not exist, the danger of official bias in the com-
mercial speech category is only reduced, not eliminated.272
Regulation need not be detrimental, even if it affects speech
rights. In fact, consumers and society generally could gain signifi-
cant benefits from regulation of commercial speech. The govern-
ment could function, optimally, as an effective guarantor of the
truth of commercial speech.273  As the Court in Virginia
Pharmacy suggested, "the State [may] insur[e] that the stream of
commercial information flow[s] cleanly as well as freely."274
Verification of commercial speech is the key to this rationale
approving regulation. If the government were to test products and
services against the claims made by advertisers, consumers would
have an accurate source of information from which to make re-
liable consumption decisions. Consumers could rely on advertise-
ments without testing products and services themselves and without
having to discount the claims advanced in the marketplace. Wide-
spread efficiencies and economies of scale could then be achieved.
For example, the informational value of commercial speech could
be freely promoted, thereby mitigating the adverse social and eco-
nomic effects arising from market imperfections that so concerned
Justice Blackmun.275 Viewing regulation from both the cost and
benefit side of the equation, regulation can more easily be justified
in the commercial speech area.276
Of course, regulation of commercial speech must be applied
fairly, accurately and without harm to speech values. Over-regula-
tion of commercial speech will chill valuable viewpoints. To the
extent speakers respond to government's rules with silence,
regulation undermines the informational value of commercial
271. See supra note 261 and accompanying text (discussing the legal system's inability
to ascertain truth in political or artistic speech).
272. See infra text accompanying notes 330-64.
273. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 269, at 1384, 1392.
274. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 743, 772 (1976).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
276. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 269, at 1392-93.
474 [Vol. 42:411
PRACTICAL REASON
speech by inhibiting truthful assertions along with falsehoods.
Regulations justifiable in the commercial speech area do not
carryover to core speech. As a matter of architectural integrity,
core speech demands greater deference from the state than the
second order categories exemplified by commercial speech.'"
Furthermore, theoretical and practical restraints impede regulation
in core areas of expression. Official regulation of political speech
presents an inherent conflict of interest; the government itself is a
major competitor in this marketplace of ideas. Regulation in the
commercial area is far less likely to be driven by partisanship or
self-interest.27 Experience indicates that government does not
regulate core speech well. 79 Political, academic, scientific and
artistic ideas are too subjective to be amenable to even-handed
regulation."s As a result, the net cost of regulating core speech
through bureaucratic mechanisms far exceeds any benefit to be
gained from attempts to do so. Instead, every member of society
participates directly in regulating core speech. Every politician,
artist, academician, scientist and listener of core speech represents a
consumer whose support speakers must rally to win market share
in the marketplace of ideas.
4. Conclusion
The regulatory model outlined above serves two related func-
tions. The exercise of assessing regulations provides a good means
of identifying commercial speech as such and, in turn, protects its
essential free speech value. Commercial speech is characterized by
its verifiability and durability. Testing speech for those qualities
focuses attention toward the goal of fitting regulation precisely to
justifiable state interests without harming free speech values. Regu-
277. See supra text accompanying notes 201-10.
278. Dau-Schmidt, supra note 269, at 1393; T. M. Scanlon, Jr., Freedom of Expression
and Categories of Erpression, 40 U. PMrr. L. REV. 519, 541 (1979) ("[Clommercial
speech [is] subject to restrictions that would not be acceptable if applied to other forms
of expression, ... first because there are reasonably clear and objective criteria of truth
in this area, and second, [because] we regard the government as much less partisan in the
competition between commercial firms than in the struggle between religious or political
views."); Shiffrin, supra note 30, at 1265, 1269, 1270.
279. Eberle, supra note 261, at 181-84; Kent Greenawalt, Free Speech Justifications, 89
COLUM. L. RM. 119, 135-38 (1989).
280. A breach of the equal value principle should only be tolerated where reasonably
reliable objective determinants indicate disparities warranting different treatment. See supra
text accompanying notes 204-06.
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lation so tailored helps weed out harmful aspects of advertising,
unhusking the essential kernel of commercial speech - truthful,
nondeceptive information - that makes it useful for private and
public decisionmaking. The regulatory approach also serves the
ultimate objective of distinguishing commercial from core speech,
thereby safeguarding core speech through architectural cohesion.
IV. METHODOLOGY FOR COMMERCIAL SPEECH ANALYSIS
The tensions in commercial speech described above are perhaps
best resolved through development of clear general rules that can
guide analysis in this area. This section sets forth these general
rules, explaining the rationale for each rule and the way in which
it offers coherence and structure to commercial speech methodolo-
gy. The rules proposed here are as follows:
Rule 1: Truthful, nondeceptive, noncoercive speech may not
be regulated except in the face of trly compelling govern-
mental interests.
Rule 2: Truthful speech that contains elements of, or is
disseminated in a manner that causes deception, coercion,
duress or harassment may be regulated. To regulate such
speech, government bears the burden of proving (1) the
presence of a substantial interest, (2) that the regulation di-
rectly advances the asserted interest, and (3) that the re-
striction on speech is no greater than necessary to serve the
interest.
Rule 3: False information may be regulated.
Speech cannot, of course, always be neatly classified as "true"
or "false." Much expression contains elements of both truth and
falsity. If speech mixes truth with falsehoods, resort to Rule 2 is
proper. Within Rule 2, proper attention can be focused on separat-
ing truthful from untruthful or misleading speech and on fashioning
the proper accommodation of values. Other speech will be patently
true or false and, therefore, properly subject to either Rule 1 or
Rule 3. Cases falling within the purview of these Rules will illus-
trate the central and clear solutions to problems at the extremes of
the commercial speech spectrum. The most difficult questions
posed by commercial speech will be worked out according to the
formula offered by Rule 2. Viewed together, the three general
Rules help order analysis in the commercial speech area, providing
coherence and structure to commercial speech methodology.
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A. Rule 1: Truthful Speech
Rule 1 does not differ from the standard analysis applicable to
core speech areas. A rule barring regulation of truthful commercial
speech is correct because truthful, nondeceptive and noncoercive
commercial speech is indistinguishable in its material aspects from
truthful noncommercial speech which receives strong protection
under the First Amendment. Truthful speech goes to the heart of
the Amendment's guarantee of expression: dissemination of infor-
mation and ideas. Thus, it follows that government cannot regulate
truthful speech except in cases of compelling interests. To the ex-
tent authorities interfere with the dissemination of truthful informa-
tion, they manipulate speech and deprive members of the public of
expression they may find useful in structuring their activities.281
As a result, government violates freedom of choice, altering our
vision without justification.2"
When government regulates truthful speech, it must demonstrate
a need to promote a truly compelling interest which justifies a
breach of the Amendment's guarantee against restraint of expres-
sion. To determine whether such a breach is tolerable, the Court
should invoke strict scrutiny analysis which does not differ from
the analysis applicable to intrusions upon core areas of speech. In
other words, the Court should determine independently the purpose
for the regulation and require the responsible authorities to estab-
lish the "compelling" or "overriding" interest purportedly served by
it.283 The interest must be one whose value is so great that it jus-
tifies derogating the speech at issue from the preferred position
typically accorded free speech in our value system. Moreover, even
if the government can demonstrate a "compelling" interest, the
Court will not uphold the regulation unless it concludes that the
281. See Posadas de P.R. Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328, 350-51 (1986)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (arguing that no differences between commercial and other kinds
of speech justify protecting commercial speech less when the government deprives citizens
of truthful information about lawful activities).
282. Government control of truthful commercial speech is exactly the type of "pater-
nalistic- conduct the Supreme Court decried in Virginia Pharmacy. See Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 770 (1976).
283. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557,
576-77 (1980) (Blackmun, L concurring) (arguing that a strict standard of review applies
to suppression of commercial information); NOWAC et al., supra note 13, at 530-31 (dis-
cussing the standards of judicial scrutiny applicable in equal protection cases, including
those involving afundamental right like freedom of expression).
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regulation is necessary to achieve the compelling interest. Regula-
tions which, upon close analysis, are overly broad, too vague or
not the least restrictive means available to the government will be
invalidated.2' Consistent with the preferred value of free speech,
the range of governmental actions surviving strict scrutiny should
be exceedingly narrow.
B. Rule 2: Speech With Elements of Deception, Coercion, Du-
ress or Harassment
Rule 2 acknowledges the subordinate position of much com-
mercial speech and is designed to sort out the innate tensions in
such speech. The general rule applicable to this "mixed" commer-
cial speech represents an intermediate level of heightened scrutiny.
Any permissible regulation of expression must advance "substan-
tial" governmental interests and be narrowly drawn so that the
restriction is no more extensive than necessary to serve the identi-
fied interest.
The four-part test framed by the Court in Central Hudson
provides essentially the correct approach:
At the outset, we must determine whether the expression is
protected by the First Amendment. For commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern
lawful activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask wheth-
er the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both
inquiries yield positive answers, we must determine whether
the regulation directly advances the governmental interest
asserted, and whether it is not more extensive than is nec-
essary to serve that interest.8 5
Several comments are necessary to clarify and then reformulate the
Central Hudson test so that it will properly reflect the preferred
value of speech in the accommodations to be struck pursuant to it.
The Court is clearly right in requiring that reviewing panels
first "determine whether the expression is protected by the First
Amendment." 28 6 It is essential to protection of the Amendment
that courts determine the free speech value of the expression at
issue apart from any governmental characterization that could be
284. NowAK et al., supra note 13, at 829.
285. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
286. Id.
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inappropriately skewed toward its position in the controversy. How-
ever, the Court is wrong in asserting that "for commercial speech
to come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful activ-
ity."217 Mere advocacy of unlawfulness has been rejected as a ba-
sis on which to punish speakers. 8 Instead, the government must
show that the speaker intends to incite lawless behavior and that
such behavior is likely to follow from the advocacy." 9 Requiring
proof that advocacy will lead to such serious harm deprives gov-
ernmental authorities of the opportunity to manipulate the laws they
enact to have the effect of restricting unpopular speech, including
commercial speech. If the "lawful activity" standard were to con-
trol, governments' attempts to channel conduct along preferred
routes would have the added effect of regulating, indirectly, speech
contrary to the laws prescribing the underlying conduct.21 Con-
versely, dissemination of truthful information does not necessarily
make the activity lawful. History is replete with examples of activi-
ties disseminating useful, truthful information which were consid-
ered unlawful at the time.291
Citizens should be as free to determine "truth" as the state. To
the extent that the government can control the exchange of infor-
mation and ideas, government impedes citizens' search for the
truth. The "lawful activity" standard confers on the government
greater ability to control the exchange. For this reason, the Central.
Hudson Court's suggestion that First Amendment protection be
predicated on "lawful" activity is contrary to core speech values
and, therefore, should be eliminated. Nevertheless, government may
have legitimate and substantial interests in regulating speech to
prevent unlawful activities.2 2
287. Id.
288. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
289. Id.
290. See, e.g., Posadas de P.R. Ass'n v. Tourism Co. of P.R., 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
Posadas is discussed infra notes 330-47 and accompanying text.
291. Redish, supra note 124, at 445. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616
(1919) (defendants convicted under Espionage Act of 1917); Schenck v. United States,
249 U.S. 47 (1919) (defendants convicted under the Espionage Act of 1917 for conspiring
to obstruct the draft).
Similarly, dissemination of truthful information may not be morally correct. See
D'Amato & Eberle, supra note 85, at 795-98 (1983) (discussing whether a lawyer would
have been ethically required to disclose information as to the whereabouts of a fugitive
slave in pre-civil war years).
292. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679,
697-98 (1978) (affirming district court's injunction prohibiting the society from discourag-
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Rule 2 may be the best method of ensuring fidelity to the First
Amendment, because it allows courts to independently scrutinize
the First Amendment value of the speech at issue prior to forging
an accommodation. With judicial assessment of First Amendment
values under the Rule 2 formula, there is greater likelihood that
any accommodation reached will properly reflect the preferred
position of free speech in our society. However, that accommoda-
tion will also account for the government's prerogative to remedy
unlawful activity where the harm posed by that activity is suffi-
ciently serious to outweigh the First Amendment values at issue.
The Central Hudson Court indicated that commercial speech
cannot be misleading if it is to enjoy First Amendment protection.
As with the "lawful activity" requirement, the Court erred in ex-
cluding misleading speech categorically. Misleading speech, by
definition, combines truthful elements with false ones.293 Rather
than completely suppressing speech that is "misleading," the focus
should shift to separating misleading from truthful aspects in order
to protect the kernel of value, truthful information, free speech
promotes. Ideally, this is what the legal system does in contract,
consumer protection, securities and labor law contexts.
The proper accommodation may then be fashioned by critically
evaluating these separate elements of misleading. Of course, the
result will depend on the values and statements at issue in any
given case. Generally, however, the remedy "is to open the chan-
nels of communication rather than to close them."29
With respect to the remaining elements of the Central Hudson
test, the Court was correct and the analysis need not be modified.
Courts must "ask whether the asserted governmental interest is
substantial." 295 Official interests need only be "substantial," not
"compelling." This approach is consistent with a second-order cat-
ing its members from underbidding one another, since such bidding violates antitrust
laws); Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Rights, 413 U.S. 376, 389
(1973) (holding that the First Amendment did not protect a newspaper's placement of
employment advertisements where the activity advertised, gender-based discrimination in
hiring, was illegal).
293. Truth might also be combined with coercion, harassment, duress or unconscionabili-
ty to constitute misleading speech.
294. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 770 (1976). Of course, the government has a legitimate interest in "insur[ing]
that the stream of commercial information flow cleanly as well as freely.- Id. at 772.
295. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Sere. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566
(1980).
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egory of expression. Courts should be attentive to justifications
proffered by the state and confine authorities' actions to their stated
purposes.29 Only after a court has decided from the evidence be-
fore it that the speech at issue is protected and that the
government's competing interest is substantial should the 'court
"determine whether the regulation directly advances the governmen-
tal interest. ,297
Finally, the regulation must be tailored narrowly to the interest.
"[I]f the governmental interest could be served as well by a more
limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive restriction
cannot survive."29 Moreover, the nature of the restrictions toler-
ated here should be qualitatively consistent with the interests to be
served. A least restrictive means standard is appropriately deferen-
tial to free speech.29
In light of these comments, a properly reformulated test for
Rule 2 is as follows:
First, we must determine whether the commercial expres-
sion is protected by the First Amendment. Second, we ask
whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial.
Third, if both inquiries yield positive answers, we must
determine whether the regulation directly advances the
governmental interest. And fourth, if the governmental
interest could be served as well by a more limited restric-
tion on commercial speech, the excessive restriction cannot
survive.
To answer the first question, one need largely look to see
whether the values set forth above are present.3" There may, of
course, be First Amendment values beyond those listed. Question
296. Cf. United States R.R. Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 186 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (opining that classification which deprived some railroad retirees
of their benefits "directly conflict[ed] with Congress' stated purpose... to preserve
the . . . benefits of [those] who had already qualified for them").
297. Ceptral Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
298. Id.
299. See Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 644 (1985) (holding
that "prophylactic rules" prohibiting commercial speech cannot be so broad as to prohibit
speech of a type not justifying the rule). But see Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469, 477 (1989) (concluding that "something short of a least-restrictive-means standard" is
"'commensurate with [the] subordinate position [of commercial speech] in the scale of
First Amendment values .... '" (quoting Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447,
456 (1978)).
300. See supra notes 131-82 and accompanying text.
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two in the methodology, whether or not "substantial" governmental
interests are present, can be answered in most instances by refer-
ence to the contractual function of commercial speech. 1 That
leaves questions three and four in the methodology for working out
an appropriate accommodation. Regulation of speech must be pro-
tective of it and minimally intrusive while directly advancing sub-
stantial interests.
Case law points the way toward fashioning such accommoda-
tions. The tools available to courts include affirmative disclosure or
disclaimer requirements, a preference for written communication
over other media and reasonable time, place and manner restric-
tions. These tools generally serve to protect core speech values in
the dissemination of ideas and information and, yet, mitigate the
harm of deception, coercion, overreaching or other substantial inter-
ests. They also help channel speech away from the borderline
between truth and falsity toward truth. Appropriate accommodations
reflecting more detail can be forged in concrete contexts.
C. Rule 3: False Information
The final rule for commercial speech analysis holds that false
information does not merit protection under the First Amendment
and, accordingly, may be regulated. Situations may exist, however,
in which it is necessary to tolerate factual errors in order to give
speech "breathing room." 30 3 Penalizing advertisers for every fac-
tual error no matter how insignificant would chill commercial
speech. Cautious advertisers may avoid making any assertions of
fact, thus undermining the informational value of commercial
speech.3t 4 Moreover, the truth or falsity of information conveyed
will not always be readily apparent to consumers or to those who
would be charged with policing advertisements. Accordingly, ac-
301. The contractual function approach is discussed supra text accompanying notes 218-
23. Case law will serve as an important guide to other substantial interests. See, e.g.,
National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 697-99 (1978)
(antitrust policy); Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 363-84 (1977) (professional-
ism of attorneys); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 761-73 (1976) (professionalism of pharmacists); Pittsburgh Press Co.
v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973) (equal employment op-
portunities for men and women).
302. See infra text accompanying notes 307-442.
303. Cf. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272 (1964) (recognizing that
some erroneous statements should be tolerated so that speech is not chilled).
304. See supra text accompanying notes 164-68.
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commodations should err on the side of protecting the flow of in-
formation so that the exchange of ideas which will undoubtedly
follow will clarify the veracity of the initial speech. 5
Beyond these values, however, patently false statements relating
to commerce contribute little to the value of free speech. Regula-
tion of objectively false information conforms with free speech
theory."6 We have little interest in false information. False infor-
mation does not add to our knowledge; it prolongs our ignorance
of the truth. False information does not further our vision of reality
or life; it clouds our perception. In short, false information impli-
cates relatively few First Amendment values. Furthermore, citizens
who rely on false statements may suffer some harm as a result.
This potential for adverse consequences gives rise to substantial
state interests. Accordingly, government is justified in regulating
false speech.
V. APPLYING THE PRACTICAL REASONING METHODOLOGY
This part of the article applies the practical reasoning model to
several paradigm problems in commercial speech. It focuses on
striking balances between free speech values and governmental
interests in concrete contexts. Demonstrating the analysis here
furthers the practical aim of.the article to lend guidance to judges
and other decisionmakers who must actually resolve these cases.
The commercial speech model presented also provides a framework
for solving more general free speech questions.
The primary methodology employed here derives from the three
general rules developed above. These rules offer coherence and
structure to analysis of commercial speech questions. The analytical
model cabins judicial discretion within the rules and applies them
in a principled manner to yield results wholly consistent with the
305. "Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However per-
nicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience of
judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas." Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.,
418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1973). The notion of tolerating false speech can be attributed to
John Stuart Mill, "who believed that even views that we know to be false deserve protec-
tion, because their expression makes the truth appear even stronger by contrast." REDISH,
supra note 6, at 46 (citing J.S. MI.L, ON LIBERTY 34-35 (1947)). Consistent with this
hypothesis, false factual information might itself possess value and promote another
"branch of self-realization: the development of one's human faculties, recognized as an
end in itself." Id. at 57.
306. Throughout the balance of this article, "false" information or speech indicates pa-
tently untrue assertions.
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First Amendment tradition. As this article has argued, practical
reasoning can best accomplish these goals.
Faced with speech contrary in some respect to government
interests, courts must forge an accommodation to resolve the con-
troversy. To begin this process, a court must carefully identify the
free speech values implicated. This analysis should be a critical,
disinterested evaluation of the pertinent issues. The competing
values identified must then be ranked according to their impor-
tance.3" Generally, such an evaluation will lead to categorization
of the case within one of the three rules. Cases falling within the
parameters of Rules 1 and 3 can be resolved relatively easily. For
example, truthful commercial speech (the Rule 1 case) should be
favored for its promotion of free speech values absent a compelling
interest proved by the state. Similarly, false advertisements (the
Rule 3 case) should be subjected to the full weight of government
regulations designed to silence them.
That leaves Rule 2 for working out the close cases in which
free speech values compete with strong state interests. In applying
Rule 2, courts must make an especially careful, principled and
dispassionate choice of the value or values which predominate.' °
Use of the three rules in combination with practical reason has
the effect "of reducing but not eliminating entirely the reliance on
intuitive judgments."3" The methodology helps focus attention on
the "practical aim" of courts in "reach[ing] a reasonably reliable
agreement 310 about First Amendment cases. Nevertheless, even
this approach may ultimately be only an "illuminating approxima-
tion of what inevitably remains a quest for more certain resolution"
as Grand Theory and moral philosophy purport to offer.
307. Cf Eberle, supra note 53, at 20 (advocating a similar approach for resolving
attorneys' moral dilemmas when faced with conflicting rules of professional ethics).
308. Id.
309. RAWLS, supra note 41, at 44, cited in Eberle, supra note 53, at 19. Importantly,
the methodology proposed also helps reduce official bias. Cf. supra text accompanying
notes 271-72.
310. RAWLS, supra note 41, at 44, cited in Eberle, supra note 53, at 19.
311. Eberle, supra note 53, at 19 (citing RAWLS, supra note 41, at 45); cf. Farber &
Frickey, supra note 5, at 1652 (suggesting that while absolute truth is not in all ways
humanly attainable, "something less may still suffice").
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A. Rule 1 Truthful Speech: Suppression of Truthful Speech is
Rarely, If Ever, Warranted
Much commercial speech jurisprudence fits under Rule 1. The
Virginia Pharmacy paradigm makes clear that truthful,
nondeceptive, noncoercive information concerning the availability,
price, quantity and quality of .products and services is worth pro-
tecting under the First Amendment for the reasons discussed
above. 12 The Virginia Pharmacy rationale of protecting truthful
information from complete suppression can be extended broadly,
easily covering advertising of most goods and services. As a corol-
lary, the scope of official restrictions of commercial speech should
be severely restricted where truthful information is conveyed.
1. Virginia Pharmacy Applied to the Professions
Another case fitting squarely within the Virginia Pharmacy
model is Bates v. State Bar of Arizona."3 Bates concerns the dis-
semination of truthful information about the availability, price and
type of routine professional legal services, "such as uncontested
divorces, uncontested adoptions, simple personal bankruptcies, and
changes of names."314 As in Virginia Pharmacy, the Supreme
Court ruled that dissemination of this information cannot be subject
to blanket suppression. The Court explained the case as follows:
The constitutional issue in this case is only whether the
State may prevent the publication in a newspaper of
appellants' truthful advertisement concerning the availability
and terms of routine legal services. We rule simply that the
flow of such information may not be restrained, and we
therefore hold the present application of the disciplinary
rule against appellants to be violative of the First Amend-
ment.'1
5
The Bates rule should extent to protect truthful advertising of any
professional service from suppression by regulators.
Nevertheless, specific instances of advertising raise concerns
that compete with the Court's decision to extend First Amendment
312. See supra text accompanying notes 131-82.
313. 433 U.S. 350 (1977)
314. Bates v. State Bar of Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 354 (1977).
315. Id. at 384.
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protection. Advertising in the legal field presents "peculiar prob-
lems" which could warrant state intervention." 6 For example, ad-
vertising relating to the quality of legal services would be difficult
for consumers to judge or verify.31 Similarly, "in-person" solici-
tation could subject vulnerable potential clients to undue influence
by trained advocates."' The state has a significant interest in
preventing these problems. As a result, the free speech protection
for professional advertising may have to accommodate these con-
trary concerns. However, such an undertaking would be the focus
of a Rule 2 analysis. 3
19
2. Equal Protection of Speaker Interests - Central Hudson.
The Virginia Pharmacy rationale of protecting dissemination of
truthful information and ideas from complete suppression further
extends to protection of all speakers' interests. For instance, Cen-
tral Hudson illustrates that corporations, like pharmacists and attor-
neys, enjoy First Amendment protection from complete suppression
of their advertisements. 320 In Central Hudson, the Public Service
Commission of New York attempted to prevent a utility from
sending its customers advertisements promoting the use of electrici-
ty.32 The Court struck down the prohibition as overbroad in rela-
tion to the asserted state interests. 322 As the Central Hudson
Court observed, a speaker's corporate status, even its "monopoly
position, does not alter the First Amendment's protection for its
commercial speech."3M Liberty and equality are two core free
speech values that, at a minimum, mandate equal access for all
316. Id. at 366.
317. Id.
318. Id.
319. The Bates Court did not balance the concerns mentioned above against First
Amendment values because those problems were not at issue. Id. at 367-68. Rather, the
Court considered restrictions on price advertising by attorneys, id., and concluded that no
justification for restrictions directed at price advertising warranted absolute suppression of
attorney advertising. Id. at 379.
Detailed treatment of specific problems in attorney advertising is taken up in the
case law that subsequently unfolded, some of which is discussed infra notes 366-433 and
accompanying text
320. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 570-71
(1980).
321. Id. at 558.
322. Id. at 570-71.
323. Id. at 568.
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speakers to the streams of information. Such equality also helps
protect important listener interests in speech.
Problems of market failure and structural imbalance may coun-
ter these interests to some extent. Affirming corporations' right to
disseminate truthful advertising should not be an excuse for sanc-
tioning widely disparate impact in all cases.324 Accordingly, at a
certain point it seems reasonable to conclude that the volume of
corporate commercial speech crosses the line separating speakers'
equal access and listeners' freedom of choice from speaker inequal-
ity and concomitant listener coercion. In such situations, the bal-
ancing of interests would favor reasonable time, place and manner
restrictions."5
The speech at issue in Central Hudson was truthful and con-
tained no element of deception or coercion. 26 Accordingly, its
proper treatment is under Rule 1, not Rule 2. The Court's four-part
analysis, which more closely resembles Rule 2,327 illustrates the
need for generally reliable rules by which to answer free speech
328questions. It follows that these rules should be applied in a
careful and principled manner, as supplied by practical reasoning.
The outcome in Central Hudson represents an unfortunate example
of how traditional legal reasoning may not be suited to the task of
upholding First Amendment values. 29 Practical reasoning offers a
324. Dominant corporate commercial speech could also pose a threat to liberty and
equality values. Professor Baker notes the disproportionate impact corporations can have
on issues by dipping into their deep pockets to fund advertising campaigns. BAKER, supra
note 7, at 218-23. Baker observes that '[c]orporations have often enormously outspent
other interests, frequently with telling results.- Id. at 222. See also Fiss, supra note 104,
at 1406-08 (positing that during the 1970's when the Supreme Court found conflict be-
tween the First Amendment and capitalistic concern, capitalism prevailed); Shiffrin, supra
note 30, at 1236 (concluding that the Court has used "the first amendment as a weapon"
to suppress political speech and promote commercial speech). Corporate political speech is
a topic beyond the scope of this article. Obviously, the problems raised are difficult to
reconcile with free speech values and merit careful attention.
325. See supra notes 224-48 and accompanying text. Concerns arising from perceived
inequality due to market failure or structural imbalance present cases to be resolved ac-
cording to the Rule 2 formula.
326. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
327. See supra text accompanying notes 285-302.
328. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. Under Rule 2, courts must assess the govern-
ment interest advanced as justifying a challenged regulation only when the speech at
issue, though truthful, contains elements of, or is disseminated in a manner that causes,
deception, coercion, duress, harassment or similarly substantial interests. A proper applica-
tion of Rule 1, on the other hand, denies the validity of any regulation applied to truth-
ful, nondeceptive, noncoercive speech, except regulations further compelling interests. See
supra text accompanying notes 281-84.
329. The four-step analysis in Central Hudson is a departure from previous methods of
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sounder means of reaching reasonably reliable and more predictable
outcomes that remain faithful to the Free Speech Tradition.
3. The Need for Practical Reason - Posadas de Puerto Rico
Association v. Tourism Company of Puerto Rico
Posadas de Puerto Rico Association v. Tourism Company of
Puerto Rico illustrates graphically the need for First Amendment
jurisprudence incorporating practical reason.3 In Posadas, the
Court sustained a Puerto Rican statute forbidding advertisements of
casino gambling directed at Puerto Rican nationals, even though
casino gambling was legal in Puerto Rico and Puerto Rico adver-
tised the activity widely outside the commonwealth.33' If Virginia
Pharmacy is a paradigm of First Amendment analysis, then
Posadas is a view through the opposite side of the looking
glass.332 In Posadas the Court failed to fulfill its constitutional
function to determine independently the free speech value of the
expression in question, which was concededly the truthful,
nondeceptive, and noncoercive advertisement of gambling casinos.
Instead, the Court blindly deferred to social regulation. Under the
practical reasoning methodology advocated here, Rule 1 would
apply to this type of truthful speech.
Under Rule 1, the Court would invoke strict scrutiny analysis
in order to determine whether the purported interest asserted to
justify the restriction on speech is "compelling." The trial court
found that Puerto Rico's interest in suppressing advertising aimed
determining whether commercial speech is protected by the First Amendment. Compare
Central Hudson, 477 U.S. at 566 (describing the four-step analysis used to determine
"whether the expression is protected by the First Amendment") with Virginia State Bd. of
Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (affirming
that reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions can be applied to commercial speech,
but concluding that those restrictions were exceeded by the Virginia Pharmacy statute). As
Justice Blackinun, stated in his Central Hudson concurrence: "I concur only in the Court's
judgment . . . because I believe the test now evolved and applied by the Court is not
consistent with our prior cases and does not provide adequate protection for truthful,
nonmisleading, noncoercive commercial speech." Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 573
(Blackmun, J. concurring).
330. 478 U.S. 328 (1986).
331. Id. at 348.
332. See Philip B. Kurland, Posadas de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: "'Twas
Strange, 'Twas Passing Strange: 'Twas Pitifu4 'Twas Wondrous Pitifu44" 1986 SUP. CT.
REv. 1, 6 ("When Oliver Wendell Holmes told us that: 'The life of the law has not been
logic; it has been experience,' he was not suggesting the abandonment of reason.-
(footnote omitted)).
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at its residents was to reduce the demand of casino gambling by
them. 3 Legislators devised the advertising ban as a means of
minimizing the harmful effects of legalized gambling on the popu-
lation while simultaneously allowing gambling to bolster the
commonwealth's tourism industry.3" Yet, Puerto Rico took no
steps to prevent suspected harms by forbidding resident gambling.
To the contrary, "Puerto Rico has legalized gambling casinos, and
permits its residents to patronize them."33 Justice Brennan, dis-
senting, concluded from these facts that "the Puerto Rico Legisla-
ture has determined that permitting residents to engage in casino
gambling will not produce the 'serious harmful effects' that have
led a majority of States to ban such activity."336 Nonetheless, five
justices had "no difficulty in concluding" that Puerto Rico's interest
in the advertising ban was substantial. 7  Even if the
commonwealth's interest was "substantial," a characterization which
seems unreasonable under the circumstances, its justification for the
advertising ban was certainly not "compelling."
Here, as in Central Hudson, "the conduct of citizens is molded
by the information that government chooses to give them." 33 The
government of Puerto Rico sought "to manipulate private behavior
by depriving citizens of truthful information concerning lawful
activities."339 Such manipulation violates core speech values, like
"viewpoint- and public-agenda-neutrality," 4  equality, liberty,
autonomy and dignity.
Posadas is also troubling to the extent that it condones dis-
criminatory treatment of intended listeners."4 Recall that the
Puerto Rico statute sustained by the Court prohibited advertising
333. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 341.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 353 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
336. Id.
337. Id. at 341.
338. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 575 (Blackmun, J., concurring in the judgment).
339. Posadas, 478 U.S. at 351 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
340. Id. (quoting Jonathan Weinberg, Note, Constitutional Protection of Commercial
Speech, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 720, 750 (1982)).
341. See id. at 360 (Stevens, J., dissenting). As Justice Stevens reasoned:
The regulation ... poses what might be viewed as a reverse privileges and
immunities problem: Puerto Rico's residents are singled out for disfavored treat-
ment in comparison to all other Americans. But nothing so fancy is required to
recognize the obvious First Amendment problem in this kind of audience dis-
crimination.
Id. (footnote omitted).
4891992]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
aimed at commonwealth residents, but it allowed wide dissemina-
tion of advertising to non-residents. "The First Amendment surely
does not permit Puerto Rico's frank discrimination among publica-
tions, audiences, and words." 2 Discrimination is antithetical to
the First Amendment. To the extent government unjustly 'deprives
any potential listeners of truthful information which might influence
the listeners' thinking on the subject of the advertisement, the re-
striction violates core First Amendment values like liberty, equality,
autonomy, dignity and democracy. Moreover, deference to govern-
mental suppression of truthful information for such tenuous an
excuse as feared harm to citizens violates the objectives of the
Amendment like advancement of knowledge, truth, democracy, self-
government and private and public decisionmaking.
[T]he people in our democracy are entrusted with the re-
sponsibility for judging and evaluating the relative merits
of conflicting arguments. They may consider, in making
their judgment, the source and credibility of the advocate.
But if there be any danger that the people cannot evaluate
the information and arguments advanced by appellants, it is
a danger contemplated by the Framers of the First Amend-
ment.
343
Blind deference to state suppression is a stance strikingly at
odds with our free speech tradition. Yet, Posadas evinces the
Court's willingness to tolerate threats to constitutionally protected
speech by government authorities.' The Posadas Court failed to
hold the state to its burden of establishing both a substantial in-
terest in regulating casino advertising and the absence of less re-
strictive means to accomplish .the state's objective, assuming it was
legitimate.' To the extent courts fail their appointed constitu-
tional function and yield to social pressure embodied by actions of
the political branches, the judiciary places the First Amendment in
grave jeopardy.?4
342. Id. at 363 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
343. First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791-792 (1978) (footnotes omitted).
344. See Posadas, 478 U.S. at 358-59 (Brennan, J. dissenting) (accusing the majority of
"giving government officials unprecedented authority to eviscerate constitutionally protected
expression").
345. Indeed, the Court even deferred to the legislature to determine whether or not a
less restrictive alternative would be adopted. See id. at 344 ("We think it is up to the
legislature to decide whether or not such a *counterspeech" policy would be as effective
in reducing the demand for casino gambling as a restriction on advertising.")
346. Deference by the courts to decisions of the political branches to restrict speech
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For these reasons, Posadas poses a serious threat to the values
of free speech and a substantial danger of doctrinal dilution, both
within and beyond the category of commercial speech.4 7 The
practical reasoning methodology advocated here provides an alter-
native analytical approach designed to repel that threat by assuring
that First Amendment outcomes will not be so dependent on dis-
cretionary judgments. Judicial discretion would be cabined within
the Rules; First Amendment decisions would be more principled,
predictable and faithful to the Amendment's tradition. The web of
First Amendment values combined with practical reason minimizes
the danger of future Posadases.
4. The Need to Keep Faith with Virginia Pharmacy - Board of
Trustees v. Fox
The Court's recent decision in Board of Trustees v. Foi-4 8
further illustrates the need for courts to apply practical reasoning in
the commercial speech context. In Fox, the Court considered
whether or not a regulation excluding from university dormitories
all speech activity motivated by profit should be struck as an
unconstitutional restriction of free speech rights.' At issue was
the attempt of a company that sold housewares to hold what the
Court called "Tupperware parties" in dormitories." ° At these
"parties," the company offered housewares for sale and provided
information on topics "such as how to be financially responsible
and how to run an efficient home."35'
The Court properly recognized that the speech at issue had to
be categorized first so that the appropriate level of protection could
be ascertained.352 It also observed that the university prohibition
on private commercial activity in student dormitories implicated
both pure speech and commercial elements.353 The students chal-
raise the spectre of those authorities determining the content of the First Amendment, a
proposition with a dubious history. See supra sources cited at 261 and text accompanying
notes 278-80.
347. For an example of the effects of such a doctrinal dilution, see the Court's subse-
quent decision in Board of Trustee v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
348. Id.
349. Id. at 473.
350. Id. at 472.
351. Id. at 474.
352. Id. at 473.
353. Id. at 474.
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lenging the university's regulation argued unsuccessfully that the
commercial and noncommercial aspects of the speech were "inex-
tricably intertwined" and, therefore, that the speech as a whole
should be categorized as noncommercial.3" However, rather than
separating the pure, i.e., noncommercial, speech from the commer-
cial and applying a higher standard of protection for the pure
speech, the Court determined that the limited protections accorded
commercial speech govern the whole of the speech at issue as if it
were solely commercial.35 Thus, the Fox Court's decision to
judge core speech by lesser speech standards graphically illustrates
the insidious effect of doctrinal dilution.
In addition, Fox provides further evidence of the threat to the
First Amendment posed by the Court's blind deference to social
regulation. The Fox Court rejected the "least restrictive means" as
the appropriate standard for assessing the fourth prong of the Cen-
tral Hudson test.3M Instead, the Court found that its "decisions
require... a [reasonable, narrowly tailored] 'fit' between the
legislature's ends and the means chosen to accomplish those ends"
to uphold the governmental restrictions of speech.35 7  "Within
those bounds we [the Court] leave it to governmental
decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be
employed.""' The Fox Court remanded the case to the district
court to determine whether or not the regulation was more restric-
tive than necessary based on the "reasonable fit" standard.
359
354. Id. In rejecting that contention, the Court stated:
[There is nothing whatever "inextricable" about the noncommercial aspects of
these presentations. No law of man or of nature makes it impossible to sell
housewares without teaching some economics, or to teach home economics
without selling housewares. Nothing in the [regulation] prevents the speaker
from conveying, or the audience from hearing, these noncommercial messages,
and nothing in the nature of things requires them to be combined with com-
mercial messages.
Including these home economics elements no more converted [the
company's] presentations into educational speech, than opening sales presenta-
tions with a prayer or a Pledge of Allegiance would convert them into religious
*or political speech.
Id at 474-75.
355. Id. at 475.
356. See supra text accompanying notes 285-299.
357. Fox, 492 U.S. at 480 (quoting Posadas de P.R. Assoc. v. Tourism Co. of P.R.,
478 U.S. 328, 341 (1986)).
358. Id.
359. Id. at 486.
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Justice Blackmun, in dissent, remains true to the Virginia Phar-
macy paradigm and attacks the university regulation for its over-
breadth.' Justice Blackmun notes the university's concession
that its regulation bars "any speech in a dormitory room for which
the speaker receives a profit," and he observes that even tutors
would fall within this prohibition." ! He concludes for the dissent
that "[bly prohibiting all speech in a dorm room if the speaker re-
ceives a fee, the [regulation] ... indiscriminately proscribes an
entire array of wholly innocuous expressive activity, and for that
reason is substantially overbroad."362
If practical reasoning were applied to the Fox scenario, no
remand would be necessary. Having properly categorized the
speech at issue as involving commercial elements, a court's atten-
tion could be focused toward those aspects as it evaluated asserted
government restrictions. In Fox, the government regulator asserted
a substantial interest: "promoting an educational rather than com-
mercial atmosphere on [the university's] campuses, promoting safe-
ty and security, preventing commercial exploitation of students, and
preserving residential tranquility."3" The university would also
have a substantial interest in preventing coercion, harassment, de-
ception or invasion of privacy that tend to occur in in-person solic-
itations. However, practical reasoning would demand that these
interests be advanced directly by regulations government imposes
and in a manner that treads lightly on free speech. Where truthful
speech is at issue, restrictions that satisfy these criteria include only
those the government can prove constitute the least restrictive
means available."
B. Rule 2: Speech With Elements of Deception, Coercion, Du-
ress or Harassment.
Rule 2 is designed to sort out the tensions which may exist in
some commercial speech in order to forge the proper accommoda-
tion of free speech values with competing interests in the commer-
cial context. Given the preferred value of free speech in our soci-
ety, the accommodation must generally favor speech. Nevertheless,
360. Id. at 487 (Blackmun, ., dissenting).
361. Id.
362. Id. at 489.
363. Id. at 475.
364. See supra text accompanying notes 283-84, 298-99.
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government may place restrictions on speech when' it demonstrates
a substantial interest in doing so.
To restrict speech, the state must follow "carefully structured
commercial speech standards ... to ensure the full evaluation of
competing considerations and to guard against impermissible [intru-
sions on speech] and discrimination among different categories of
commercial speech."3  These standards mandate that any regula-
tion must be carefully drawn to advance directly the asserted inter-
est, and that the restriction be no greater than necessary to serve
that interest. This section illustrates how these goals may be ac-
complished.
1. More Rather Than Less Disclosure - Mailed Announcements
Soliciting Legal Business.
In re RM.J demonstrates how accommodations may be
achieved in a manner appropriate to the protection of free speech
values.3" RM.J concerned four asserted commercial speech
problems arising from a mailed advertisement for legal servic-
es.3W R.M.J., the lawyer, had mailed advertisements describing
practice areas in which he had special expertise and listing the
prices he charged for certain routine service.3 R.M.J. challenged
state ethics rules barring dissemination of this information as vio-
365. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 661 (1985) (Brennan, J.
concurring).
366. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 204 (1982).
367. Id
Justice O'Connor, dissenting in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, enumer-
ated the traditional justifications for prohibiting attorney advertising. These views provide
the context for the Court's careful scrutiny of state laws regulating such advertising. The
state regulations at issue were enacted largely in response to the Court's decision in Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), invalidating absolute prohibitions of attor-
ney advertising. According to Justice O'Connor.
At least two persuasive reasons can be advanced for the restrictions [on un-
solicited legal advice]. First, there is an enhanced possibility for confusion and
deception in marketing professional services. Unlike standardized products, pro-
fessional services are by their nature complex and diverse. Faced with this
complexity, a layperson may often lack the knowledge or experience to gauge
the quality of the sample before signing up for a larger purchase. Second, and
more significantly, the attorney's personal interest in obtaining business may
color the advice offered in soliciting a client. As a result, a potential
customer's decision to employ the attorney may be based on advice that is
neither complete nor disinterested.
Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 674 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).'
368. Id. at 196.
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lating the First and Fourteenth Amendments. 369 The Court consid-
ered four breaches of the disciplinary rules.
The Missouri disciplinary rules at issue in RM.J. prescribed the
manner in which attorneys could advertise their areas of practice,
including the precise wording lawyers could employ.37 R.M.J.
strayed from the permitted language in describing his practice
areas. However, the Court noted that R.M.J.'s deviation from the
rules "ha[d] not been shown to be misleading."371 In" fact,
R.M.J.'s description of his practice areas was truthful, nondeceptive
and "in certain respects... more informative than" the labels
approved by the professional disciplinary rule.3 2 Accordingly, the
Court found no substantial interest served by the rule's restriction
to balance against First Amendment values.
The Court viewed similarly the rule's prohibition of attorneys
listing the jurisdictions in which they are licensed to practice.373
Indeed, the Court characterized that information as "factual and
highly relevant."374 The Court did find disturbing the prominence
R.M.J.'s advertisement gave his membership in the bar of the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court.375 It considered the fact "uninforma-
tive" and its emphasis in "bad taste." Nonetheless, the record failed
to indicate the fact was misleading, and the Court declined to
subject this "potentially misleading" statement to the disciplinary
rules' restrictions. 76 Searching for an indication that the disci-
plinary rule considered the fact of Supreme Court practice poten-
tially misleading, the Court observed that the rule contained no
prescription of type-size nor a requirement that the significance (or
insignificance) of such status'be explained.377 If a state were to
find such a label misleading to consumers, the Court's observations-
might serve as appropriate remedies. Under the Virginia Pharmacy
paradigm, more disclosure is preferable to less.
The last problematic aspect of the advertising in R.M.J. was its
369. Id. at 198.
370. aL at 194-95.
371. Id. at 205.
372. Id. For example, the advertisement listed "real estate" in lieu of 'property" as set
forth in the disciplinary rule and "contracts" and "securities" though nothing similar ap-
peared on the sanctioned list. Id.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. Id.
376. Id. at 206.
377. Id.
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dissemination through the mail. Solicitation of legal business by
mail presents potential problems of coercion, harassment and du-
ress. However, the Court determined that "absolute prohibition"
was not the proper solution.78 The Court concluded that a less
intrusive restriction on speech, such as "requiring a filing" with an
appropriate agency so "the state may be able to exercise reasonable
supervision over such mailings," could adequately protect the state
interest.379
The Court's analysis in RM.J. illustrates the proper regard for
truthful information in the face of legitimate state concerns which
would tend to restrict dissemination. R.MJ. is thus consistent with
the rationale of the Virginia Pharmacy paradigm that more infor-
mation is better than less.
2. Disclosure as a Remedy for Potential Deception - Peel
v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Commission"°
The Court's decision in Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disci-
plinary Commission follows from RMJ. In Peel, a lawyer adver-
tised his certification by the National Board of Trial Advocacy
(NBTA).38' The fact was truthful, accurate and readily verifi-
able."l Nevertheless, the Court continued its inquiry to determine
"whether the potentially misleading character of such statements
creates a state interest sufficiently substantial to justify a categori-
cal ban on their use." 3 The state had argued consumers might
be misled by the labels "certified" or "specialist."3  After all,
378. Id.
379. Id.
380. 110 S. Ct. 2281 (1990) (plurality opinion).
381. Id. at 2284. Peel's letterhead identified him as a "Certified Civil Trial Specialist."
Id. at 2285.
382. Id. at 2288.
383. Id. at 2287.
384. Id. at 2290; see also id. at 2294 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall ex-
plained that:
[t]he name "National Board of Trial Advocacy" could create the misimpression
that the NBTA is an agency of the Federal Government. Although most law-
yers undoubtedly know that the Federal Government does not regulate lawyers,
most nonlawyers probably do not.. . . Furthermore, the juxtaposition on
petitioner's letterhead of the phrase "Certified Civil Trial Specialist By the
National Board of Trial Advocacy" with "Licensed: Illinois, Missouri, Arizona"
could lead even lawyers to believe that the NBTA, though not a governmental
agency, is somehow sanctioned by the states listed on the letterhead.
Id. (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall also suggested that "the reference to
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potential clients often have limited bases for evaluating the quality
of legal services offered. The plurality found the argument insuffi-
cient to justify suppression of such truthful information.38
In Peel, as in R.M.J., the appropriate remedy for alleviating the
state's concerns is more information not less. The Court suggested
a number of alternatives reflecting this approach."g Once again,
the plurality took the opportunity to endorse "the principle that dis-
closure of truthful, relevant information is more likely to make a
positive contribution to decisionmaking than is concealment of such
information."3"
3. Disclosure as a Remedy for Potential Undue Influence
a. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel 8 - Newspa-
per Advertising
Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel illustrates the in-
creasing sophistication of commercial speech. Zauderer, an attorney,
published a newspaper advertisement targeted at persons he knew
would be in need of legal services, specifically, women who had
suffered injuries resulting from their use of the Dalkon Shield
intrauterine contraceptive device." 9 Zauderer's advertisement pre-
sented the Court with three regulations to test against the First.
Amendment shield for nondeceptive commercial speech: "prohibi-
tions on soliciting legal business through advertisements containing
advice and information regarding specific legal problems; restric-
tions on the use of illustrations in advertising by lawyers; and
disclosure requirements relating to the terms of contingent
fees. 390
Assessing the first violation, the Court found (as the Office of
Disciplinary Counsel had conceded) that Zauderer's advertisement
represented "entirely accurate" facts about the IUD and did not
mislead readers to believe that Zauderer promised success in litigat-
ing potential claims. 391 "[T]he advertisement reported the indis-
[Peel's] certification as a civil trial specialist may cause people to think that [Peel] is
necessarily a better trial lawyer than attorneys without the certification." Id. at 2295.
385. Id. at 2292.
386. See id. at 2292-93.
387. Id. at 2292 (citing Virginia Pharmacy and Fox).
388. 471 U.S. 626 (1984).
389. Id. at 630-31.
390. Id. at 638.
391. Id. at 639-40.
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putable fact that the Dalkon Shield had spawned an impressive
number of lawsuits and advised readers that appellant was willing
to represent other women asserting similar claims."3" It also "ad-
vised women that they should not assume that their claims were
time-barred ....
The Court rebuked the state's argument that difficulty consum-
ers may encounter in distinguishing truthful and helpful legal ad-
vice offered in an advertisement from false information warranted
an absolute ban on such advice.3' The Court found attorney ad-
vertising no more problematic than advertising for other goods and
services. "[Indeed, insofar as [Zauderer's] advertising tended to
acquaint persons with their legal rights who might otherwise be
shut off from effective access to the legal system, it was undoubt-
edly more valuable than many other forms of advertising." 95
Zauderer's advertisement implicates many of the values that form
the web supporting free speech: he advances readers' knowledge
about the state of Dalkon Shield litigation and potential opportuni-
ties for recovery, he advances his own interests by attracting clients
and advances listeners' interests by encouraging them to seek coun-
sel, and finally, he conveys information which can facilitate private
and public decisionmaking. Thus, on its face, Zauderer's speech
merits protection from state suppression.?
At first glance, Zauderer's advertisement appears to come with-
in the parameters of the Rule 1 formula; because the speech con-
veys truthful, verifiable and nondeceptive information, the state
should be required to prove that a compelling interest justifies the
restriction. However, Rule 2 provides the better test for this case
given the Court's earlier acknowledgement that some forms of
attorney solicitation might warrant state restriction. Specifically, in
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association, the Court held that states
had a compelling interest in restricting in-person solicitations of
clients "that involve fraud, undue influence, intimidation, overreach-
ing, and other forms of 'vexatious' conduct."3" The state
analogized Zauderer's targeted advertisement to in-person solicita-
392. Id. at 640.
393. Id.
394. Id. at 644-45.
395. Id. at 646.
396. See supra text accompanying notes 281-84.
397. 436 U.S. 447, 468 (1978).
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tion, finding comparable problems associated with both. 98 Such
assertions by the state merit careful review and place Zauderer in
Rule 2 where close attention may be focused on the tensions inher-
ent in this commercial speech.
Analyzing the state's reliance on Ohralik, the Court found
speculation of coercion and undue influence unconvincing. The
medium employed by Zauderer to convey his message was disposi-
tive.399 Print advertising of the type at issue in Zauderer poses
significantly less danger of overreaching, undue influence or coer-
cion than may be present in other forms of solicitation, particularly
in-person contacts with potential clients.'o The content of print
matter may be verified relatively easily and reliably. Print advertis-
ing, moreover, can convey ideas and information in a manner that
is conducive to listeners' reflection and exercise of free choice. It
is thus a relatively neutral or "value-free" presentation of the mes-
sage. For these reasons, print advertising is particularly useful in
directing information toward the truth and away from the false ex-
pression. To the extent the Court considered such details as the
differences in advertising media and weighed the state's concern in
light of those facts, Zauderer illustrates the methodology of Rule 2
in which close attention is to be given the competing free speech
and communitarian values.
Zauderer also focused the Court's attention on protection of art
in advertising, a prime candidate for applying the Rule 2 formu-
la." 1 Illustrations can implicate important free speech values be-
cause they draw listeners' attention to the message, impart infor-
mation directly and possess artistic value.4 2 Therefore, an accu-
rate, nondeceptive, noncoercive commercial illustration of the type
in Zauderer is entitled to the same First Amendment protection as
written or verbal communication.403 However, assessing a state's
interest in restricting particular artwork in advertising may be more
difficult than construing the text of commercial speech to the ex-
tent illustrations "operat[e] on a subconscious level.'" ° Accord-
398. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 641.
399. Id. at 642.
400. Id.
401. Id. at 647-49.
402. Id. at 647. For a discussion of the free speech value of art, see supra text accom-
panying note 156.
403. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 647.
404. Id. at 648.
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ingly, where artwork is the target of commercial speech regulators,
challenges are best handled on a case-by-case basis where close
attention may be focused on the competing factors at issue.
The third regulation in Zauderer illustrates the process by
which Courts may sanction restrictions on truthful but misleading
commercial speech. Zauderer failed to disclose in his advertisement
that notwithstanding his contingent-fee arrangement, clients might
be liable for certain costs whether or not successful in their
claims.' The state regulations required affirmative disclosure of
these facts to prevent laypersons from being misled by the subtle
distinction between fees and costs./' Because of the potential for
deception in using those terms without explanation, the state dem-
onstrated a substantial interest in regulation.
The state's response provides a vehicle for examining the latter
steps of the Rule 2 analysis. That is, given a substantial interest,
the state must respond with regulations that advance its interests
without sweeping too broadly. Outright suppression clearly would
not meet this test. Because the preferred remedy is more rather
than less information, disclosure requirements like those mandated
by the state in Zauderer are preferable. Disclosure requirements
directly advance the interest in preventing deception or confusion
in the marketplace, but may be applied in a way that treads mini-
mally on free speech values.4" As the Court concluded, the
state's requirement that attorneys like Zauderer disclose that liti-
gants will have to pay costs even if unsuccessful in their suits
"easily passes muster." °
b. Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association' - Direct Mail Ad-
vertising
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association sanctioned direct mail
advertising by attorneys to potential clients known to be facing
particular legal problems. As in Zauderer, the rule of professional
responsibility governing Shapero categorically banned the conduct
405. Id. at 650.
406. Id. at 652.
407. Id. at 651. While "unjustified or unduly burdensome disclosure requirements might
offend the First Amendment by chilling protected commercial speech, . . . an advertiser's
rights are adequately protected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to
the State's interest in preventing deception of consumers." Id.
408. Id. at 652.
409. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
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at issue.! Blanket bans on expression offend the First Amend-
ment, as Virginia Pharmacy and its progeny make clear. A broad
restriction cannot survive when a more narrowly tailored regulation
of the perceived evil is feasible.411
Like the Zauderer facts, the perceived evils in Shapero includ-
ed the potential for overreaching and undue influence." The
state equated targeted direct mailings with in-person solicitation,
characterizing Shapero's letters as "'Ohralik in writing.' 4 3 How-
ever, as in Zauderer, the medium was dispositive. The Court ad-
mitted, "[i]n assessing the potential for overreaching and undue
influence, the mode of communication makes all the differ-
ence."' 14 The Court concluded that written communication, even
though personalized, is not accompanied by the threat of abuse
which attends in-person contact of lawyers seeking business with
potential clients in need of particular legal advice.1 5 Moreover,
the Court repeated its finding in Zauderer that written advertise-
ments can be beneficial to recipients.41 6 Written solicitation, in
short, disseminates information and ideas in a manner conducive to
furthering rational private and public decisionmaking.
Nonetheless, targeted mailings are not immune to state regula-
tion. States have an interest in policing such advertising to prevent
the abuse which could arise. For example, a personalized letter
may present an increased risk of deception."7 The practical rea-
soning approach embodied in Rule 2 would mandate that the
state's response to this concern be tailored to allow the practice,
subject to restrictions designed to assure the veracity of the speech.
The Court offered some suggestions for regulating abuses.41 8
410. Id. at 471 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCt Rule 7.3 (1984)).
411. Id. at 472 (citing In Re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982)).
412. Id. at 475.
413. Id. For a discussion of Ohralik, see infra text accompanying notes 421-33.
414. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475.
415. Id. at 475-76.
416. Id. at 476.
417. l The Court suggested that a personalized letter
could, in certain circumstances, lead the recipient to overestimate the lawyer's
familiarity with the case or could implicitly suggest that the recipient's legal
problem is more dire than it really is .... Similarly, an inaccurately targeted
letter could lead the recipient to believe she has a legal problem that she does
not actually have or, worse yet, could offer erroneous legal advice.
Id.
418. See id. at 476-77.
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With respect to facts in personalized letters about the recipient, the
Court proposed that a state:
might, for example, require the lawyer to prove the truth of
the fact stated (by supplying copies of the court documents
or material that lead the lawyer to the fact); it could re-
quire the lawyer to explain briefly how she discovered the
fact and verified its accuracy; or it could require the letter
to bear a label identifying it as an advertisement or direct-
ing the recipient how to report inaccurate or misleading
letters.
4 19
As the Shapero Court reminded, the theory of free speech protec-
tion for commercial speech is "'grounded in the faith that the free
flow of commercial information is valuable enough to justify im-
posing on would-be regulators the costs of distinguishing the truth-
ful from the false, the helpful from the misleading, and the harm-
less from the harmful." ' 20
4. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Association - In-person Solicita-
tion of Legal Business421
Ohralik illustrates application of practical reasoning yielding an
outcome less deferential to free speech rights. In Ohralik, the bal-
anced tipped toward the state's interest notwithstanding the thumb
which rests constantly on the First Amendment side of the scale. In
Ohralik, the Court upheld an absolute prohibition of in-person
solicitation of clients by attorneys.4' Even Ohralik admitted that
"the State has a legitimate and indeed 'compelling' interest in pre-
venting those aspects of solicitation that involve fraud, undue influ-
ence, intimidation, overreaching, and other forms of 'vexatious con-
duct."423
Free speech theory explains why the Ohralik holding differs
419. Id. at 477-78 (citations omitted).
420. Id. at 478 (quoting Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,-471 U.S. 626, 646
(1985)).
421. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
422. Id. at 468. After learning of a car accident, Ohralik visited one of the drivers in
the hospital to solicit her business. He then found a passenger, also injured but by that
time released from the hospital, at her home and purportedly obtained her business as
well. Id. at 450-52. When the accident victims attempted to discharge him, Ohralik sued
them for breach of contract and obtained portions of their insurance settlements. Id at
452.
423. Il
[Vol. 42:411
PRAC77CAL REASON
from Zauderer and Shapero in which the Court refused to condone
absolute bans of the speech undertaken. First, in-person solicitation
- is materially different than written speech.424 Second, the state's
interest is more significant in the Chralik scenario than in less
direct forms of communication.4" Like other forms of commer-
cial speech, in-person solicitation can be an effective means of
imparting information to listeners.426 As we accumulate informa-
tion, we evaluate its veracity and significance and formulate our
decisions accordingly. This process embodies the objective of free
speech. However, in-person solicitation detracts from free speech
values to the extent it truncates the information-gathering process
the listener would otherwise undertake. In-person solicitation, thus,
has the potential of constricting the flow of information to the
recipient, thereby inhibiting the listener's ability to judge the
speech which is conveyed. As a result, listeners can be misled and
effectively deprived of the thing free speech is meant to ensure -
the right to make an informed, autonomous decision.427
Beyond the theoretical explanation of in-person solicitation as
an impediment to advancing truth or facilitating decisionmaking,
the Ohralik Court found the potential for harm particularly compel-
ling under the circumstances. Because Ohralik was a trained advo-
cate expounding upon specialized information, i.e., the law, his
prospective clients were particularly susceptible to Ohralik's con-
trol.42 These circumstances tipped the balance even further in
favor of the state's position.
Having confirmed the state's interest, the Rule 2 analysis
would at this point require that the scope of the state's regulation
also be examined. Indeed, in Ohralik, the attorney challenged not
the state's interest, but its application of the ban in his case.429
However, the Court found the state's "prophylactic" restriction on
in-person solicitation of clients justified. In addition to the inherent-
ly harinful nature of in-person solicitation, sound, practical reasons
support the ban. Chief among these is the fact that in-person solici-
424. See supra text accompanying notes 397-98.
425. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 455 (comparing the state's interest in the case at bar
with the state's interest in Bates v. State Bar of Ariz. where the Court struck absolute
bans of attorney advertising).
426. See, e.g., id. at 458 ("tip" about existence of uninsured motorist coverage).
427. See id. at 457-58 (discussing the potentially oppressive nature of in-person solici-
tations).
428. Id. at 464-66.
429. Id. at 462.
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tation "is not visible or otherwise open to public scrutiny, .. . ren-
dering it difficult or impossible to obtain reliable proof of what
actually took place."43 As a result, any in-person solicitation per-
mitted "would be virtually immune to effective oversight and regu-
lation by the State or by the legal profession ... ."431 Given this
outcome, the ban, albeit "prophylactic," would constitute an appro-
priately tailored, effective response by the state.
Notwithstanding the conclusion in Ohralik, the preferred posi-
tion of free speech in our value structure demands that such a ban
apply only in those situations where one-sided, badgering, immi-
nently coercive and harmful conduct is likely to occur or has actu-
ally occurred in the past. Practical reason requires careful, judicious
assessment of particular situations so that accommodation of free
speech values for competing social interests are properly structured
to allow as much speech as possible. Certainly, in-person commu-
nications with respect to political expression, associational petition
rights and other fundamental rights are permissible.432 There may
even be room for truthful, noncoercive, nondeceptive in-person
proposals of legal representation or other commercial transactions if
those qualities could be ensured.433
4. Electronic media.
The electronic media presents unique and difficult problems in
the commercial speech context, and a comprehensive treatment of
this subject is beyond the scope of this article. Nevertheless, treat-
ment of persuasive electronic media expression follows from free
speech theory, and its general handling is sketched here.
First, the quality of speech disseminated electronically is mate-
430. Id. at 466.
431. Id. (footnote omitted).
432. See, e.g., In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 439 (1978) (holding that solicitation of
clients on behalf of ACLU constitutes political expression not subject to advertising re-
strictions as rigid as those imposed by state disciplinary rules). One way of distinguishing
Ohralik from Primus is the presence of "pecuniary gain" as a "significant motive" for the
solicitation.
433. See Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 472 n.3 (Marshall, J., concurring) (discussing "'benign'
solicitations of clients-). For example, lawyers might be permitted to propose representa-
tion of a prospective client following required disclosure of their purpose and interests,
including financial or other conflicts. Another alternative, less restrictive than a ban, would
be institution of a cooling-off period of suitable length after a solicitation so as to allow
a prospective client time to consider and reevaluate the proposal and, upon reflection,
rescind any commitment agreed upon with impunity.
[Vol. 42:411
PRACTICAL REASON
rially different than written information. Certainly, electronic media
advertising can inform the public of valuable ideas and informa-
tion, thus implicating important First Amendment values. However,
much of the advertising circulated by these media actually contain
little informational value. Moreover, that information which is
present could easily be disseminated through alternative media that
implicate less weighty state interests.
Electronic media rely pervasively on nonverbal techniques to
convey messages through emotional and subliminal appeals. These
techniques are designed more to persuade than inform using one-
sided, manipulative presentations.4" Indeed, the classical condi-
tioning paradigm is especially suited to electronic media advertising
because "consumers generally receive [it] passively since they
control neither the opportunity to receive the information nor the
pace and duration of exposure."43" Unlike print material, consum-
ers tend not to consider actively information conveyed by electron-
ic media, or to be able to reconsider or evaluate such information
at their discretion. Of course, the audience chooses whether or not
to encounter the media, but once they do, "they [tend] to process
information without critical deliberation."4' Electronic media ad-
vertising is, thus, not conducive to reflection or free choice, prereq-
uisites to informed, rational and reliable decisionmaking.
434. See supra text accompanying notes 228-30. Commentators have long recognized
these problems. See, e.g., MEIKLOHN, supra note 8, at 87 ("The radio as it now oper-
ates among us is not free. Nor is it entitled to the protection of the First Amendment. It
is not engaged in the task of enlarging and enriching human communications. It is en-
gaged in making money."); SHIPFRIN, supra note 13, at 92 ("American television is a
powerful educator, and the kind of person encouraged by American television is substan-
tially at odds with the kind of person encouraged in American schools."). Courts also
have acknowledged these problems. See, e.g., FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726,
748 (1978) ("the broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans"); Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm.,
412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973) ("viewers constitute a 'captive audience'"); Capital Broadcasting
Co. v. Mitchell, 333 F. Supp. 582, 584-86 (D.D.C. 1971), aft'd, 405 U.S. 1000 (1972)
(upholding prohibition of cigarette advertising on electronic media). According to the
Mitchell court, "[tihe unique characteristics of electronic communication make it especially
subject to regulation in the public interest." Id. at 582. "Substantial evidence showed that
the most persuasive advertising [for cigarettes] was being conducted on radio and
television, and that these broadcasts were particularly effective in reaching a very large
audience of young people ... [and had] potential influence on young people." Id. at
585-86. "[There are significant differences between the electronic media and print ... 'It
is difficult to calculate the subliminal impact of this pervasive propaganda ... .." Id. at
586.
435. Reed & Whitman, supra note 225, at 280.
436. Id. at 280 n.61.
19921
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
On the other hand, music, graphics and dramatizations possess
artistic value which, in its own right, constitutes a form of protect-
ed core speech. However, the artistic value of commercial speech
generally furthers the goal of inducing purchases without providing
consumers information relevant to their spending decisions. Ac-
cordingly, commercial speech should have less weight in the First
Amendment equation notwithstanding its artistic merit. The Rule 2
formula provides the appropriate framework for evaluating electron-
ic media advertising because the images it conveys may be mis-
leading even if accurate. Use of nonverbal techniques in the com-
mercial context should be judged on the basis of whether they are
"predominately informational" from a First Amendment
standpoint437 Under that rule, there may be important First
Amendment value associated with graphical techniques, while less
free speech value is identified with musical or dramatic techniques.
In sum, the quality of electronic media speech is low from the
standpoint of free speech theory. Indeed, to the extent this form of
commercial speech persuades rather than informs, it "may disserve
the individual and societal interest ... in facilitating informed and
reliable decisionmaking" as in the case of in-person solicita-
tion.4 38
Second, weighing against the weak speech value of electronic
advertising are relatively strong state interests. Commercial speech
delivered via the electronic media can be deceptive, misleading,
coercive, unduly influential, overreaching and abusive.439
On balance, therefore, any accommodation of electronic adver-
tising with governmental interests should generally be struck in
favor of regulation. Of course, regulation is tolerable only in the
face of concrete harm, proof of which authorities must establish.
Moreover, electronic media cases certainly should be evaluated
carefully on a case-by-case basis in order to scrutinize the presence
437. In re Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d 188, 189 (N.J. 1986) (attorney advertising
need be predominately informational, -both in quality and quantity, the communication of
factual information rationally related to a consumer's need for, and choice of, counsel pre-
dominates") Accord In re Zang, 741 P.2d 267 (Ariz. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 1067
(1988).
438. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 458.
439. See supra text accompanying note 223. These interests are informed by the central
justifications for the secondary status of commercial speech as described in Part III(D),
supra notes 211-52 and accompanying text, especially the speech plus conduct rationale
set forth supra text accompanying notes 218-23. The Court's definition of commercial
speech also reflects these justifications. See supra text accompanying note 221.
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of free speech value and, where appropriate, protect such
value.40 In the absence of significant First Amendment value,
however, officials should have a relatively free hand to regulate.
Applying these standard First Amendment principles to electronic
media speech does not, however, justify an absolute ban on non-
verbal techniques. Less restrictive means must be employed in the
concrete case that directly advances the state interest while appro-
priately protecting speech.
C. Rule 3: False Information
False information possesses relatively little First Amendment
value." 1 Accordingly, it may generally be regulated. For exam-
ple, advertisements of services costing $100 when in actuality they
cost $150 should be subject to regulation. Likewise, a false state-
ment that a company has voluntarily petitioned for bankruptcy may
be regulated. Nevertheless, to protect important speech values, it
may be necessary to provide expression some "breathing room" in
specific cases. For example, when punitive damages for libel are at
issue, a stricter standard, i.e., actual malice, is appropriate." 2
While it may not always be easy to separate truthful speech from
false speech, certainly much information is patently false and,
accordingly, subject to regulation pursuant to Rule 3.
VII. CONCLUSION
By now the central meaning of the First Amendment is well
settled. The task presently before us is to capture the more com-
plete meaning of the Amendment. Inevitably, this means
broadening the reach of the Amendment in order to enlarge our
vision and construct an ever better understanding of life. Life is
diverse and contrary, full of innate tensions, contradictions and
complexities. This contrariness filters through the First Amendment
prism amidst the broader expanse of reality reaching the
Amendment's haven. But this tension poses great challenges to the
substance and stability of the Amendment and to our reasoning
440. For example, the product advertised may influence the degree of regulatory control
to be tolerated. Buying a household appliance is not like hiring a lawyer. A consumer
can more easily judge the former and is less likely to be harmed by a misinformed deci-
sion with respect to that purchase. See Felmeister & Isaacs, 518 A.2d at 199.
441. See supra notes 303-06 and accompanying text.
442. Dun & Bradstreet v. Greenmoss Builders, 472 U.S. 749, 781 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
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capabilities.
Coherence may best be secured through reliance on a web of
beliefs collectively comprising our understanding as to how we
should live. Stabilized by this web of values, we can focus careful
attention on sorting out and resolving the inevitable tensions be-
tween the value of free speech and competing social interests. To
accomplish this, we need draw upon the best of what human rea-
soning offers. Practical reasoning seems to provide the best route,
harmonizing the rift between theory and practice while illuminating
faithfully the essence of the Amendment. Truth might thus be dis-
covered through confrontation with experience.443
In short, thinking small, concentrating on the concrete problem
and building from the ground up has its advantages. Certainly com-
promises will have to be made along the way. Commercial speech
is one of them. Nevertheless, the noble commitment to free speech
is worth preserving in spite of the difficult compromises that re-
main ahead.
443. SHIWFRN, supra note 13, at 146 (citing Ralph Waldo Emerson and other roman-
tics).
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